Opinion
No. 05-02-00944-CR.
Opinion Filed January 16, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. WX02-00072-P. AFFIRMED.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices BRIDGES and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Terry Lynn Eakes filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking to avoid extradition to Alabama. The matter was referred to a magistrate, who made findings and recommendations that the relief requested be denied. The district judge adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations, and entered an order denying appellant relief. This appeal followed. In one point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying relief because the extradition documents on their face show extradition is barred by laches. The State responds that appellant's complaint is not reviewable in Texas. For the reasons set for below, we affirm. Only four issues may be raised by application for writ of habeas corpus: (1) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (2) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether the petitioner is the same person named in the request for extradition; and (4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. See Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). A Governor's Warrant that is regular on its face establishes a prima facie case for extradition. See Ex parte Johnson, 651 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1983, no pet.). The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case, which can be done by the supporting papers introduced at the hearing. See Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (op. on reh'g). Laches is an equitable remedy that prevents a party from asserting a claim because of a lapse of time that results in prejudice to the adverse party. See Blacks Law Dictionary 875 (6th ed. 1990). Appellant argues that because Alabama has not shown diligence by doing anything meaningful to execute process between the 1997 indictment and the 2001 warrant, the doctrine of laches precludes extradition. Appellant relies on Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), to support his argument that laches may be raised in habeas corpus proceedings. Carrio, however, addressed whether the doctrine of laches applied in a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus proceeding in which a Texas inmate waited fourteen years after he was convicted to attack the conviction in a Texas court. Id. at 488. Carrio does not stand for the proposition that laches may be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to avoid extradition. Moreover, although appellant characterizes his attack as being to the extradition documents, it is actually more in the line of a speedy trial complaint, challenging the State of Alabama's ability to prosecute him due to the delay. The purpose of extradition is to "enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed." Doran, 439 U.S. at 287. Whether Alabama may actually prosecute appellant for the offense is for the Alabama courts, not Texas courts, to determine. See Ex parte Ward, 470 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971); Ex parte Horsley, 460 S.W.2d 906, 907 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); see also California v. Superior Court, 482 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1987) (asylum state not appropriate forum for entertaining defenses or guilt/innocence of party charged); State ex rel. Holmes v. Klevenhagen, 819 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (court in asylum state without jurisdiction to consider equitable issues). Therefore, whether or not laches prevents his prosecution in Alabama, appellant may not rely on the doctrine to prevent his extradition to that State. See Ex parte Sanchez, 987 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd, untimely filed); see also Strachan v. Colon, 941 F.2d 128, 131-32 (2d Cir. 1991) (forty-four year delay, despite previous opportunities, did not preclude extradition); In re McBride, 254 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (eighteen year delay in seeking extradition despite other opportunities to do so); People v. Martin, 567 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill.App. Ct. 1991) (questioning continued validity of Bowman in light of Doran, and holding delay did not preclude extradition). But see Bowman v. Woods, 264 N.E.2d 151 (Ill. 1970) (demanding state forfeited extradition right by declining other opportunities during previous thirteen years). Finally, the lapse of time between the return of the indictment and the issuance of the arrest warrant does not rebut the validity of the Governor's Warrant or the supporting documents. To obtain the Governor's warrant, Alabama had to present to the Governor of Texas proof appellant was previously convicted of or is substantially charged with a crime in that state. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13 (Vernon 1979 Supp. Pamph. 2003). Such proof may be made by an indictment, an information and supporting affidavit, or an affidavit before a magistrate and the warrant issued upon it. See id. § 3. In its demand for extradition, the State of Alabama included an indictment that substantially charges appellant with two counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. The fact that the warrant was issued a few years after the indictment was obtained does not rebut the validity of the indictment. Because the Governor's warrant and supporting documentation are valid on their face and appellant's laches complaint is not reviewable by Texas courts, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant the relief he sought. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's order denying appellant the relief he sought by his application for writ of habeas corpus.