Opinion
A-13482
02-09-2022
KEITH ANDREW EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Kenai, Sharon A. S. Illsley, Judge Trial Court No. 3KN-19-00116 CR.
Michael Horowitz, Law Office of Michael Horowitz, Kingsley, Michigan, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Donald Soderstrom, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A jury found Keith Andrew Evans guilty of cruelty to animals for failing to care for his horse, Diamond. To prove this offense, the State was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Evans had a legal duty to care for Diamond and that, acting with criminal negligence, he failed to do so and thereby caused the horse severe physical pain or prolonged suffering. 1
AS 11.61.140(a)(2).
On appeal, Evans challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that Diamond experienced "severe physical pain" or "prolonged suffering."
When we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from that evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. We then ask whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).
Id. at 849.
At trial, the State presented evidence that Diamond deteriorated steadily over the course of several months. According to the testimony of multiple witnesses, Diamond looked "okay" in October 2018, but by November, she had protruding bones, and witnesses repeatedly saw her tied up without food, water, or shelter. (A veterinarian later testified that horses require at least twenty pounds of hay daily, a continuous supply of water, and shelter from the elements.)
By January, when the veterinarian examined Diamond, she concluded that the horse had several health issues-including diminished muscle mass, yellowed eyes, an abnormal coat, bad teeth, poor hooves, a swollen leg, and digestive problems. Additionally, Diamond was almost 300 pounds underweight, severely dehydrated, and "slowly starving to death." The veterinarian testified that these conditions did not manifest overnight, but were the result of months of inadequate care. Diamond's condition was so poor that the veterinarian was uncomfortable sedating her during the winter months.
Given this evidence, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Diamond experienced "severe physical pain" or "prolonged suffering." 2 Evans's arguments to the contrary hinge on viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to himself.
In his brief, Evans points out that neither "severe physical pain" nor "prolonged suffering" is defined by statute. To the extent Evans intends to argue that the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague, we note that the possibility of a difficult or borderline case does not invalidate a statute when an ordinary person would conclude that the statute unquestionably applies to the conduct charged. Here, the charged conduct - starving a horse nearly to death over several months and keeping it without water and shelter - falls squarely within the statute's core prohibition.
Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 9 (Alaska 1974); Peratrovich v. State, 903 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Alaska App. 1995).
See, e.g., Sickel v. State, 363 P.3d 115, 116 (Alaska App. 2015) (addressing a conviction for animal cruelty involving a horse that was 200 pounds underweight and had no shelter).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 3