Opinion
35571.
DECIDED APRIL 8, 1955.
Burglary. Before Judge Perryman. Lincoln Superior Court. December 10, 1954.
L. C. Grover, for plaintiff in error.
J. Cecil Davis, Solicitor-General, contra.
The evidence amply supports the verdict to the effect that the testimony against the defendant was sufficiently corroborated by evidence independent of the evidence of the accomplice.
DECIDED APRIL 8, 1955.
Will Evans (whom we shall hereinafter call the defendant) and Harry Callaway were jointly indicted in Lincoln County, Georgia, for the offense of burglary, in that they did break and enter the storehouse of C. T. Spratling with the intent to commit a larceny. Callaway entered a plea of guilty on the same date that the defendant was tried. The jury found the defendant guilty. He filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds only. The judge denied the motion for a new trial. On this judgment the defendant assigns error. The indictment was returned at the April term of court, and the trial of the defendant was at the following October term. There is no dispute as to the breaking and entering. The Sheriff of Lincoln County testified in substance that, on the morning after the burglary, he investigated and found the storehouse broken into and the safe, which was located in the storehouse, gone. The safe contained various articles, including narcotics. The witness testified also that a car, having tires making a certain kind of treadmarks, left treadmarks in the back of the store approximately where the safe had been loaded on the car. In about a week after the burglary the sheriff arrested Callaway and at the same time looked for the defendant. The sheriff went to the home of the defendant, who lived with the defendant's father, and stated to the father that he wanted to talk with the defendant about a burglary. At the time of the conversation of the sheriff with the father of the defendant, the car of the defendant was in the yard of the defendant's father. The father of the defendant told the sheriff that the defendant was not in the house at the time but was "somewhere around." The tires of the defendant's car had treadmarks which made tracks in the mud the same as the treadmarks which were found in the vicinity of Spratling's storehouse the night of the burglary. The defendant did not report to the Sheriff of Lincoln County, but fled with his car out of Lincoln County. The sheriffs of adjoining counties were looking for the defendant. He evaded them for approximately two months. Finally the Sheriff of Hart County located the car of the defendant and arrested him. At the time of the defendant's arrest, he denied his identity, stating that his name was Brown. The Sheriff of Hart County turned the defendant over to the Sheriff of Lincoln County. There was evidence to the effect that the defendant's car was in the vicinity of the county where the stolen safe was found early in the morning after the burglary. The defendant denied that he had any part in the burglary, but said that he did, on the morning after the burglary, purchase from Callaway $55 worth of narcotics and later purchased some more.
Callaway, who pleaded guilty, went into detail as to how he and the defendant broke open the storehouse, backed the defendant's vehicle up to the storehouse, broke into the storehouse, and loaded the safe onto the vehicle, then carried the safe to a certain place, removed it from the vehicle, broke into the safe, and obtained the narcotics. The officers took Callaway, and under his direction, located the safe and returned it to the owner, but the narcotics and certain other articles were gone. Then it was that the officers went to the home of the defendant's father and located the defendant's car and left word with the father that they wanted to talk with the defendant concerning a burglary. It was over two months before the defendant was located and arrested by a sheriff.
The defendant, in his trial, attempted to prove an alibi. The father of the defendant testified that the defendant spent the entire period of time with him, from the time the storehouse was closed at about twelve o'clock noon until the burglary was discovered the following morning. The State produced evidence to contradict this contention of the defendant's alibi. The evidence placed the defendant's car in the vicinity of the county where the defendant's car was found the morning after the night of the burglary. The evidence placed the defendant in company with Callaway in the early morning after the burglary. A witness for the State testified that, the night before the burglary, he saw the defendant and Callaway together in Lincolnton. The defendant contended that he bought $55 worth of narcotics on the morning after the burglary; he admitted that he was with Callaway early in the morning after the burglary in the vicinity where the safe was broken into and "dumped." Counsel for the defendant rested the case almost entirely on the proposition that the testimony of the accomplice Callaway was not sufficiently corroborated to sustain a conviction of the defendant. Whether or not the accomplice is sufficiently corroborated is peculiarly a question for the jury. In Chapman v. State, 109 Ga. 157, 165 ( 34 S.E. 369), the Supreme Court said: "The question as to whether or not there is sufficient corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice to produce conviction of a defendant's guilt, is peculiarly one for the jury." In Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 49 ( 52 S.E. 1), the court held: "What shall be the extent of this corroboration is a question to be determined by the jury. It may be strong, or it may be slight; but in each case it must be of such character as to satisfy the minds of the jury as to the connection of the accused with the criminal enterprise."
The Court of Appeals held in Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105 (1) ( 182 S.E. 414), as follows: "To sustain a conviction of a felony on the testimony of an accomplice, `there must be corroborating circumstances which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty.'"
In our opinion, under the law, the jury were authorized to find that the evidence, independent of the testimony of the accomplice, was sufficient to find the defendant guilty. There is nothing in the facts or the law to sustain the defendant's contention. He cites Hall v. Page, 4 Ga. 428 (3) (48 Am. D. 235); Keys v. State, 108 Ga. 771 ( 33 S.E. 632); Head v. State, 59 Ga. App. 451, 452 ( 1 S.E.2d 227); Mosley v. State, 65 Ga. App. 800 ( 16 S.E.2d 504); Code § 38-121; Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106; Middleton v. State, 52 Ga. 527; Blois v. State, 92 Ga. 584 ( 20 S.E. 12); Thompson v. State, 52 Ga. App. 105 (1) ( 182 S.E. 414); Rice v. State, 16 Ga. App. 128 (1) ( 84 S.E. 609); Perkins v. State, 59 Ga. App. 335 (1) ( 200 S.E. 812); Potter v. State, 83 Ga. App. 713 ( 64 S.E.2d 630); Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 535 ( 1 S.E.2d 405); Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695 (3a) ( 69 S.E.2d 253); and King v. State, 77 Ga. App. 720 ( 49 S.E.2d 790). We see no necessity of going into a discussion of the cases cited by counsel for the defendant.
The court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial for any of the reasons assigned.
Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.