Opinion
2:20-cv-02504-FLA (ASx)
03-29-2021
Dominique EVANS, et al. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.
Alexander J. Petale, Law Offices of Alexander J. Petale, Los Angeles, CA, Charles K. Kilgore, Law Office Charles K. Kilgore, Beverly Hills, CA, for Dominique Evans, Darryl Johnson. Dennis Michael Gonzales, Paul B. Beach, Raymond W. Sakai, Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC, Glendale, CA, Emily B. Suhr, Carpenter Rothans and Dumont LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for County of Los Angeles, Mike Rodriguez, Mark Lillienfeld. Arnold F. Lee, Office of the Pasadena City Attorney, Pasadena, CA, for Dana Orent, City of Pasadena.
Alexander J. Petale, Law Offices of Alexander J. Petale, Los Angeles, CA, Charles K. Kilgore, Law Office Charles K. Kilgore, Beverly Hills, CA, for Dominique Evans, Darryl Johnson.
Dennis Michael Gonzales, Paul B. Beach, Raymond W. Sakai, Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC, Glendale, CA, Emily B. Suhr, Carpenter Rothans and Dumont LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for County of Los Angeles, Mike Rodriguez, Mark Lillienfeld.
Arnold F. Lee, Office of the Pasadena City Attorney, Pasadena, CA, for Dana Orent, City of Pasadena.
Proceeding: RULING GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DKTS. 28, 30]
FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ruling
Before the court are two Motions for Summary Judgment. The first was filed by the City of Pasadena and Dana Orent (the "City Defendants") on December 3, 2020. Dkt. 28. The second was filed by the County of Los Angeles, Mark Lillienfeld, and Michael Rodriguez (the "County Defendants") on December 4, 2020. Dkt. 30. Plaintiffs oppose the Motions. Dkt. 70 ("Opp."). The court held a hearing with the parties on March 12, 2021.
Collectively, the court refers to the City Defendants and County Defendants as "Defendants" herein. For purposes of this order, the court need not distinguish the two sets of Defendants, as the Motions contain nearly identical arguments and statements of undisputed facts.
Plaintiffs’ opposition contained 32 pages of substantive argument in violation of the 25-page limit of Local Rule 11-6. On March 2, 2020, the court struck all pages after page 26 of the brief and allowed Plaintiffs to seek leave to file an oversized brief upon a showing of good cause. Dkt. 73. On March 5, 2021, Plaintiffs submitted an ex parte application requesting the court consider the full opposition brief. Dkt. 75. The court granted the request on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 77.
For the reasons below, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety.
Evidentiary Objections
In moving for, or opposing, a summary judgment motion, "[a] party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
The parties advance hundreds of objections to the evidence submitted by their counterparts in connection with the Motions for Summary Judgment. See Dkts. 64-1, 65-2, 69. Many of the objections are boilerplate evidentiary objections based on irrelevance, lack of foundation, and hearsay. While these objections may be cognizable at trial, on a motion for summary judgment, the court is concerned only with the admissibility of the relevant facts at trial, and not the form of these facts as presented in the motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) advisory committee's note to 2010 amendment ("Subdivision (c)(2) provides that a party may object that material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. The objection functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting."); Fraser v. Goodale , 342 F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003) ("At the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the evidence's form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents."); Block v. City of L.A. , 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.").
Thus, to the extent the court relies upon evidence to which the parties object, the objections are OVERRULED. To the extent the court does not, the objections are DENIED as moot.
Background
Defendants removed this action from the Los Angeles Superior Court on March 16, 2020. Dkt. 1. The operative pleading is Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). Dkt. 1-2. The SAC states four claims against Defendants for: (1) false imprisonment; (2) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 ("the Bane Act"); (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – equal protection; and (4) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) – equal protection. In short, the SAC alleges Defendants Orent, Lillienfeld, and Rodriguez, working as detectives for Los Angeles County and the City of Pasadena, intentionally caused various witnesses to give false statements that led to the arrests of Plaintiffs for murder. See generally Dkt. 1-1 (SAC). Plaintiffs were acquitted of the murder at trial after spending approximately four years incarcerated. SAC ¶ 38.
The court notes Plaintiffs’ opposition papers often lack proper citations, and Plaintiffs fail to meet their obligation to present disputed facts to the court clearly. See Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. , 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) ("It is absurdly difficult for a judge to perform a search, unassisted by counsel, through the entire record, to look for ... evidence [the lawyer wants the judge to read]."). The court attempts to collect the relevant undisputed facts, based on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the non-moving parties. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
If the court states a fact as undisputed herein, it has found any alleged dispute invalid.
A. Events the Night of Johnis Jackson's Murder
In 1997, Plaintiffs Dominique Evans ("Evans") and Darryl Johnson ("Johnson") were dating. City Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts ("City SUF"), Dkt. 33-2 ¶ 9. On Friday, June 20, 1997, Evans, Gina Riley ("Riley"), Devan Howard ("Howard"), and Johnis Jackson ("Jackson") attended a party in Loma Alta Park in Altadena. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 15. The party was attended by members of the Crips gang. Id. ¶ 24. Jackson and Howard were members of the Crips and wearing clothing that identified themselves as such. Id. ¶¶ 14, 23. At the Loma Alta Park party, Evans played music from her car's stereo. Id. ¶ 28. After drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, she discovered some of her and Johnson's CDs were missing from her car. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 29. Evans became "livid" and "upset," and screamed derogatory names at the partygoers until a male partygoer slapped her across the face. Id. ¶¶ 30-32. Evans then left the party with friends. Id. ¶ 34.
All citations to the City SUF are to the amended statement filed by the City Defendants, Dkt. 33-2. The County Defendants filed a substantially similar statement. See Dkt. 30-1.
Shortly after, Jackson and Howard also left the park, catching a ride back to La Venezia Court in Altadena. Id. ¶ 35. They began to walk west from La Venezia Court on Calaveras Street, and then north on Fair Oaks Avenue. Id. ¶ 36. At approximately 3:25 a.m. on June 21, 1997, Jackson was fatally shot in the back. Id. ¶ 41. Howard later testified at trial that he saw Evans drive by in her car, just before they were attacked by rapid gunfire. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Howard did not see the shooter because it was dark. Id. ¶ 40. As Jackson fell, he tossed a gun to Howard. Id. ¶ 43. Howard ran to a nearby house where he asked the occupant to call 9-1-1. Id. ¶ 44.
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD") homicide Detectives Diane Harris and Dirk Edmondson were assigned to investigate Jackson's murder. Id. ¶ 47. Approximately two hours after the shooting, they found sixteen expended .40 caliber shell casings at the murder scene and determined the murder weapon was either a .40 caliber Glock or Smith & Wesson Sigma. Id. ¶¶ 49-50.
Plaintiffs object that the tipster call "[v]iolates the right to confront the witness (6th Amend.)." See, e.g. , Dkt. 69 (Plaintiff's Separate Statement, "PSS") ¶ 51. For purposes of this civil action, however, the Sixth Amendment is not applicable. Austin v. United States , 509 U.S. 602, 608, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, (1993) ("The protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’ ").
On June 22, 1997, the day after Jackson's murder, an anonymous female tipster called LASD and relayed the following to police: the tipster had been at the Loma Alta Park party, where she heard Evans "arguing and cussing about a CD." City SUF ¶¶ 51, 54. Evans left the park around 3 a.m. after someone slapped her. Id. ¶¶ 56-58. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at the park to break up the party, and the tipster ran from the park and hid. Id. ¶¶ 59-60. While hiding, the tipster saw Evans drive by in a car on Palm Street. Id. ¶ 61. There appeared to be people ducking within Evans’ car. Id. ¶ 62. The tipster believed Evans was bringing two men in the Bloods gang to shoot up the park in retaliation for Evans being slapped, and that Evans dropped off Jackson's shooter, who approached Jackson and Howard from behind on foot. Id. ¶¶ 63-66. Specifically, the tipster believed Evans dropped off the shooter at "a burger stand." Id. ¶ 65.
According to Defendants, Johnson was a member of the Pasadena Squiggly Lane criminal street gang, a Bloods gang that rivaled the Crips gang. City SUF ¶¶ 11-13. Plaintiffs dispute that Johnson was a member of any gang. PSS ¶ 11.
Fair Oaks Burger is located less than one block from where Jackson was killed. Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
The tipster provided the police with a physical description and photograph of Evans. Id. ¶¶ 73, 76.
C. Police Investigation 1997-1998
The detectives interviewed Plaintiffs and the following witnesses in 1997:
• On July 1, 1997, LASD Detective Harris interviewed Jackson's mother, who stated she heard the people involved in her son's death were "Dominique" and "Darryl," as well as two other men. City SUF ¶¶ 80-81.
• On July 11, 1997, LASD Detectives Harris and Edmondson interviewed Evans and Johnson separately. Id. ¶ 90. Evans stated she became angry and yelled during the party at Loma Alta Park because someone stole her CDs. Id. ¶¶ 91-92. She also told the detectives a man named "3-D" had slapped her, which prompted her to leave the party and drive to Palmdale after dropping off her friends. Id. ¶¶ 93-96. Both Evans and Johnson stated Johnson had been home in Palmdale that night watching their children. Id. ¶¶ 97, 99.
• On July 22, 1997, LASD Detectives Harris and John Brown interviewed Desean Holmes ("Holmes"), who stated he was not present at the park or when the murder took place, but had heard that a Crip member named 3-D had slapped Evans, and Johnson shot Jackson in retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 102, 104-07. Holmes told the detectives he heard Jackson had a gun on him when he was shot, and his friend took the gun and ran away. Id. ¶¶ 108-110. Holmes also stated that approximately a couple months prior, he saw Eric Thomas ("Thomas") give Johnson a .40 caliber Glock handgun. Id. ¶ 111. According to Plaintiffs, Holmes also told Detective Harris he had heard rumors from others that he, himself, was responsible for the Jackson murder. PSS ¶ 108.
• On November 19, 1997, LASD Detective Harris interviewed Riley, who stated she was at Loma Alta Park with Evans the night Jackson died. City SUF ¶¶ 121-23. Riley said after Evans was slapped, they left the park, and Evans dropped her off at her home approximately three miles from the park around 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. Id. ¶¶ 124-28.
Pasadena Police Department detectives found .40 caliber rounds in Johnson's home on October 24, 1997 after serving a search warrant in an unrelated case. Id. ¶¶ 115, 120. City Defendant Orent had invited LASD Detectives Harris and Edmondson to observe the search because he knew they considered Johnson a possible suspect in Jackson's murder. Id. ¶ 117.
In April 1998, Defendant Orent informed LASD Detectives Harris and Edmondson that Thomas had shot Johnson on March 20, 1998 with a .40 caliber gun during an incident unrelated to Jackson's murder. Id. ¶¶ 129-32. Detective Harris tested the shell casings recovered from that shooting: they did not match the casings from the Jackson murder. Id. ¶¶ 135-36.
Detectives interviewed additional witnesses in 1998:
• On June 24, 1998, LASD Detectives Harris and Edmondson interviewed Artesha Daniels ("Daniels") while in custody. Id. ¶ 137. Daniels stated Evans and Riley told her Johnson had killed Jackson in retaliation for Evans getting slapped. Id. ¶ 140.
• On October 31, 1998, LASD Detectives Harris and Brown, City Defendant Orent, and County Defendant Lillienfeld interviewed Thomas after he was convicted of the attempted murder of Johnson. Id. ¶¶ 141-42, 144. Thomas stated he was with Johnson at Johnson's house the night of the Jackson murder, when Evans told them she had been slapped. Id. ¶¶ 148-49. He told police Johnson and Evans then drove Thomas to his girlfriend's house, which was near the location where Jackson was killed. Id. ¶¶ 150-51. According to Thomas, Johnson later confessed to Thomas that Evans had dropped Johnson off before Johnson shot at Jackson and Howard. Id. ¶¶ 152-54. Thomas also admitted he had sold Johnson a .40 caliber Glock handgun approximately one to two weeks before Jackson's murder. Id. ¶ 157.
D. Police Investigation 1999-2010
The Jackson murder investigation largely went cold around 1999. Law enforcement tried unsuccessfully to locate Howard and continued to follow up on leads regarding his whereabouts. City SUF ¶¶ 163-64. City Defendant Orent continued to interview several individuals about the Jackson murder while investigating other homicides, including Rena Shay ("Shay") in 2003. ¶¶ Id. 166, 168. County Defendant Rodriguez assisted LASD Detective Harris by interviewing additional witnesses in 2007. Id. ¶¶ 170-72.
On March 30, 2007, County Defendant Rodriguez and LASD Detective Harris interviewed Steven Wright ("Wright"), who stated he was at Loma Alta Park the night of Jackson's murder. Id. ¶¶ 173-75. Wright said he saw Evans become angry after her CDs had been stolen, and, after being slapped, heard Evans state, "One of y'all homies is going to die." Id. ¶¶ 176-77. Wright also told police that several weeks prior to Jackson's murder, Johnson had pointed a .40 caliber Glock at him. Id. ¶ 178.
On September 17, 2008, County Defendant Rodriguez and LASD Detective Harris located Howard in custody and interviewed him. Id. ¶¶ 179, 181-82. Howard stated he had been at the Loma Alta Park when Evans became angry about her CDs and was slapped by a Crip gang member. Id. ¶¶ 184-89. He stated that while walking with Jackson later that night, he saw Evans drive by in her car, and shortly thereafter, someone started shooting at them from behind, killing Jackson. Id. ¶¶ 190-93. In 2010, Defendant Rodriguez re-interviewed Howard, who largely relayed the same information from his 2008 interview. Id. ¶¶ 202-03. Howard affirmed he was certain he saw Evans drive by him. Id. ¶ 273.
On July 8, 2010, County Defendant Rodriguez and LASD Detective Gary Sica interviewed Pamela Lett ("Lett") while in custody for an unrelated criminal matter. Id. ¶¶ 204, 206. Lett told the detectives that around 2001 or 2002, she heard rumors that Johnson, whom she knew at the time, played a role in Jackson's murder. Id. ¶¶ 209-10. She stated that when she confronted him, Johnson told her he killed Jackson in retaliation for Evans being slapped at the party in the park. Id. ¶¶ 211-12.
County Defendant Rodriguez also re-interviewed Daniels in 2010, who recanted most of her 1998 interview, stating she would have said anything to get out of jail at the time. Id. ¶¶ 196-98.
E. Arrests of Plaintiffs and Preliminary Hearing in 2013
On May 20, 2013, Los Angeles Superior Court ("LASC") Judge Michael Camacho found probable cause to search a home associated with Johnson and Evans for, among other things, a .40 caliber handgun in relation to the Jackson murder. City SUF ¶ 222. On May 21, 2013, Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney ("DDA") Stefan Mrakich signed a "Felony Complaint for Arrest Warrant" against Plaintiffs and attached police reports from the LASD. Id. ¶¶ 227-28. Finding probable cause, LASC Judge Terry Smerling signed the arrest warrants. Id. ¶¶ 233-34. Both Plaintiffs were arrested the same day. Id. ¶¶ 238, 240.
Between September 3 and 6, 2013, a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause was held in the Jackson murder case. Id. ¶ 260. Seven witnesses testified: LASD Sergeant Paul Dino, LASD Deputy Patricia Fant, Shay, Lett, Thomas, City Defendant Orent, and County Defendant Rodriguez. Defendant Rodriguez testified about his interviews of Howard, Wright, and Lett, including Howard's statement that he was certain he saw Evans drive by him before the shooting. Id. ¶¶ 262-83. Lett testified she did not recall what she said during her 2010 interview. Id. ¶ 285. Thomas reiterated points from his interview in 1998, but could not recall the full details. Id. ¶¶ 290-95. City Defendant Orent added to Thomas’ testimony through his prior interview of Thomas, and briefly testified regarding his interviews of Shay and Daniels. Id. ¶¶ 301-03. As for the substance of the Daniels interview, City Defendant Orent testified that Daniels said Evans was going to conduct a shooting in retaliation for someone slapping Evans. Id. ¶ 303. In closing argument, Plaintiffs’ attorney argued that the witnesses were motivated to lie and, in fact, had lied to the court, and that Plaintiffs should not be held to answer for Jackson's murder. Id. ¶ 306.
At Plaintiffs’ second criminal trial in 2017, Lett confirmed detectives did not tell her what to say in her 2010 interview. City SUF ¶ 218.
LASC Judge Teri Schwartz, who presided over the preliminary hearing, found probable cause and held Plaintiffs to answer for Jackson's murder. Id. ¶ 305.
F. Plaintiffs’ Trial and Witness Recantations
In January 2016, Daniels testified during Plaintiffs’ murder trial that she had lied during her 1998 interview based on information City Defendant Orent had given her. City SUF ¶ 313. According to Daniels, Defendant Orent had given her several pieces of paper that amounted to a false "script." PSS ¶ 323. In November 2016, Plaintiffs’ criminal case was dismissed because of the prosecution's inability to secure a witness for trial, and was refiled the same day. City SUF ¶ 315. On November 29, 2016, a second preliminary hearing was conducted before Judge Suzette Clover, and Plaintiffs again were held to answer for the Jackson murder. See Opp. at 11-13. In March 2017, a jury acquitted Plaintiffs of the murder charges. City SUF ¶ 317.
In September 2020, during a deposition in this action, Thomas recanted his prior statements regarding the Jackson murder. Id. ¶ 321. In the deposition, Thomas stated he had met with City Defendant Orent and County Defendant Lillienfeld a couple of weeks before his 1998 interview. Id. ¶ 320. Thomas testified he had lied during the interview because Defendant Orent told him he would help Thomas get a more lenient sentence for shooting Johnson if he helped convict Johnson of the Jackson murder. Id. ¶ 321. Thomas also testified Defendants Orent and Lillienfeld allowed Thomas to have a conjugal visit with his girlfriend at the time in exchange for his cooperation. PSS ¶ 141. According to Thomas, his testimony at the 2013 preliminary hearing was also false because Defendants Orent and Lillienfeld had fed him information. Id. ¶ 323.
Discussion
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Facts are "material" only if dispute about them may affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Id.
If the moving party on summary judgment does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the party still bears an initial burden to identify relevant portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a fact necessary for one or more essential elements of each claim upon which the moving party seeks judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, the moving party need not carry its burden on summary judgment by producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, but may simply show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If, on the other hand, the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must establish beyond controversy every essential element of its claim. S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana , 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial to defeat the motion. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). Summary judgment must be granted for the moving party if the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The court must decide whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in light of the facts presented by the nonmoving party, along with any undisputed facts. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1987). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ " Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. "If the nonmoving party produces direct evidence of a material fact, the court may not assess the credibility of this evidence nor weigh against it any conflicting evidence presented by the moving party. ... Inferences from the nonmoving party's ‘specific facts’ as to other material facts, however, may be drawn only if they are reasonable in view of other undisputed background or contextual facts and only if such inferences are otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. , 809 F.2d at 631-32. "[S]ummary judgment should not be granted where contradictory inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts ...." Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley , 622 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1980). The nonmoving party, however, must not simply rely on the pleadings and must do more than make "conclusory allegations [in] an affidavit." Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ; see also Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
II. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"), a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs’ SAC claims a violation of the Equal Protection clause for purposes of the Section 1983 action, but the underlying factual allegations sound in a Fourth Amendment violation for malicious prosecution. See SAC ¶¶ 49-51; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 911, 919, 197 L.Ed.2d 312 (2017) (holding the Fourth Amendment governed a Section 1983 action alleging arrest was based on fabricated evidence). The court, therefore, construes Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim as both (1) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection; and (2) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights when they were maliciously prosecuted without probable cause.
At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs argued Plaintiffs were falsely imprisoned because Defendants fabricated probable cause for their arrests. See also SAC ¶ 49 (alleging there was no probable cause because Defendants conspired to falsify witness statements). As the court explains infra , Section IV, the proper cause of action is for malicious prosecution, not false imprisonment.
Though the SAC does not plead it, Plaintiffs also briefly assert their due process rights were violated. Opp. at 19. Plaintiffs concede, however, "how can it possibly be said that the Plaintiffs were denied their right of due process, when in actuality, it was the due process of law that brought the Plaintiffs through two separate jury trials, which resulted in an acquittal of all charges[?]" Opp. at 20. To the extent Plaintiffs frame the alleged lack of probable cause for their arrests as a due process violation rather than a Fourth Amendment violation, the result is the same, as the court finds there was probable cause independent of the allegedly false testimony.
A. Equal Protection Claim
"To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must provide evidence of discriminatory intent or motive. Navarro v. Block , 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995).
While the SAC alleges Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to the equal protection of the law, see SAC ¶ 49, Plaintiffs largely abandon this theory of liability in opposition to the present Motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs briefly argue, without citing any relevant legal support, that "Plaintiffs are within a very particularized class of persons who have been charged with a serious crime but have had criminal charges against them dismissed or [have] been acquitted ...." Opp. at 19. The court is not aware of any legal authority that establishes this as a protected class for equal protection purposes. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 1, 61, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (describing race, national origin, alienage, indigency, and illegitimacy as suspect classes). Nor do Plaintiffs allege a "class-of-one" claim, whereby Defendants treated them differently from other similarly situated individuals without a rational basis to do so. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). Although the SAC mentions Plaintiffs’ race, see, e.g. , SAC ¶ 54, Plaintiffs do not discuss racial discrimination in their opposition and fail to alert the court to any evidence showing Defendants’ possessed a discriminatory motive, or treated Plaintiffs differently as criminal suspects because of their race.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Section 1983 equal protection claim.
B. Fourth Amendment Malicious Prosecution Claim
To succeed on a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiffs "must show that the defendants prosecuted [them] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [them] equal protection or another specific constitutional right." Freeman v. City of Santa Ana , 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Dec. 29, 1995). "Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought ... against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto , 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara , 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) ).
The presence of probable cause is an "absolute defense" to malicious prosecution. Lassiter v. City of Bremerton , 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009). Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel because the issue of probable cause to charge and hold the Plaintiffs over for trial was litigated at Plaintiffs’ preliminary hearing. E.g. , Dkt. 28 at 16-19. They further argue that, regardless of whether the claim is estopped, there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs independent of the testimony Plaintiffs claim was false. E.g. , Dkt. 28 at 15-16.
1. Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel "has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The Supreme Court has held collateral estoppel may apply when section 1983 plaintiffs attempt to relitigate, in federal court, issues decided against them in state criminal proceedings. Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 103, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Furthermore, "[i]n California, as in virtually every other jurisdiction, it is a long-standing principle of common law that a decision by a judge or magistrate to hold a defendant to answer after a preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie —but not conclusive —evidence of probable cause." Awabdy , 368 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis in original).
Under California law, a party asserting collateral estoppel must establish five elements:
The court looks to state law for purposes of collateral estoppel. Wige v. City of Los Angeles , 713 F.3d 1183, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013).
First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.
Lucido v. Superior Court , 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990). "As a general rule, each of [the] requirements [for collateral estoppel] will be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution." Wige , 713 F.3d at 1185 ; see also Greene v. Bank of Am. , 236 Cal. App. 4th 922, 933, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 887 (2015), as modified on denial of reh'g (May 28, 2015) (citing Wige ). All five Lucido elements are met here.
First, the court must presently determine whether the evidence supports a finding of probable cause for Plaintiffs’ arrests and prosecution. This is identical to the issue resolved at the two preliminary hearings, when Plaintiffs were held to answer for Jackson's murder. Wige , 713 F.3d at 1185. Thus, the first element is satisfied.
Second, the issue of probable cause was actually litigated. Indeed, defense counsel for Plaintiffs even contended that witnesses lied during the 2013 preliminary hearing, arguing:
Every one of these witnesses had some motivation to lie. And, in fact, we contend that they did lie. Most of the people were in custody. Most of the people had criminal records from which they were either trying to or hoped for some sort of relief from their own personal problems.
Dkt. 28-56 (Ex. VV) at 686-87. This argument was made to and considered by Judge Schwartz before her ruling finding probable cause. Thus, the second Lucido element is satisfied.
Third, the question of probable cause was decided at the time of the preliminary hearings. Indeed, the purpose of a preliminary hearing under California law is to determine whether probable cause exists to support the criminal charges that have been filed and to hold the defendants over for trial. See Haupt v. Dillard , 17 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended (Apr. 15, 1994). As Judge Schwartz held in the 2013 preliminary hearing:
This is a preliminary hearing where the court has an obligation to listen to the evidence; weigh the evidence; determine if it's sufficient; if credible to support the charges; and for a strong suspicion to hold the defendants to answer for the charges. And I think there is. This, again relies in large part on hearsay
testimony, which is admissible, primarily through – I have to say Detective Rodriguez, the testimony that I heard just from Detective Rodriguez, as to some of the statements made by the witnesses during the interviews, specifically the interviews with Mr. Howard, I believe there is a strong suspicion that both defendants committed the crime.
Dkt. 28-56 (Ex. VV) at 690-91. This is sufficient to satisfy the third Lucido element.
Fourth, a "finding of probable cause to hold the defendant over for trial is a final judgment on the merits for the purposes of collateral estoppel under the California law...." McCutchen v. City of Montclair , 73 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1145-46, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 (1999). Judge Schwartz's ruling at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing satisfies the fourth Lucido element.
Finally, there is privity because Defendants seek to assert collateral estoppel against Plaintiffs, who were the parties who were held to answer upon Judge Schwartz's finding of probable cause. Accordingly, all five elements required for collateral estoppel are established here.
Plaintiffs argue collateral estoppel is inapplicable because Thomas and Defendant Orent withheld information and presented false facts to the preliminary hearing court, thus tainting its probable cause determination. Opp. at 8-11. Plaintiffs cite Burke v. McDonald , 572 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2009) to argue collateral estoppel will not prevent defendants from suing officers for a violation of their constitutional rights "if an officer withholds information or facts from the prosecutor or from the Court, such that the Court cannot be understood to have exercised an informed, independent judgment" when determining whether the defendants should be held to answer the charges at a preliminary hearing. Opp. at 8-9.
To be sure, "collateral estoppel does not apply when the decision to hold a defendant to answer [at trial] was made on the basis of fabricated evidence presented at the preliminary hearing or as the result of other wrongful conduct by state or local officials." Awabdy , 368 F.3d at 1068 ; see also McCutchen , 73 Cal. App. 4th at 1147, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 ("When the officer misrepresents the nature of the evidence supporting probable cause and that issue is not raised at the preliminary hearing, a finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing would not preclude relitigation of the issue of integrity of the evidence."). Collateral estoppel, however, may still preclude relitigation of the probable cause determination in a subsequent civil proceeding if the plaintiff "challenges [the allegedly tainted evidence] at the preliminary hearing as being false, and the [judge] decides the credibility issue in the arresting officer's favor." Greene , 236 Cal. App. 4th at 933, 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 887.
The false evidence exception does not apply here. At the 2013 preliminary hearing, Plaintiffs argued that witnesses – Thomas in particular – had fabricated evidence, lied, and only remembered the core facts they wanted to use to help themselves, as Plaintiffs re-argue here. City SUF ¶ 306; City Defs. Evid. Ex. VV at 446:27-447:16. The preliminary hearing judge, nevertheless, held the Plaintiffs to answer for Jackson's murder. At the hearing, Judge Schwartz made clear her probable cause ruling was based on evidence Plaintiffs did not challenge as false, namely, County Defendant Rodriguez's testimony regarding Howard's interviews. City SUF ¶ 307. In other words, the undisputed evidence shows that Judge Schwartz found the evidence presented was sufficient to establish probable cause when faced with the same argument advanced here – that witnesses made false statements. Plaintiffs, thus, were afforded a fair opportunity to litigate the question of probable cause in the criminal action, and there is no injustice here that should foreclose the application of collateral estoppel.
Accordingly, the court finds Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel to the extent it is based on lack of probable cause to arrest, charge, and prosecute Plaintiffs.
2. Probable Cause Independent of Alleged Falsities
For the sake of completeness, as the court has held that Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from asserting their Section 1983 claim, the court addresses the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing court's finding of probable cause on its merits. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds there was probable cause to arrest, charge, and prosecute Plaintiffs independent of the statements of Thomas, City Defendant Orent, and Daniels, which Plaintiffs claim were false. See Opp. at 8-13.
"Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime." United States v. Buckner , 179 F.3d 834, 837 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Garza , 980 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1992) ) (alteration in original). To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, "we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause." Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U. S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U. S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ). When law enforcement officers work closely together, probable cause is determined by looking to the facts known collectively by the arresting officers. Burrell v. McIlroy , 464 F.3d 853, 857 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006).
Because probable cause deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances, it is a "fluid concept" that is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). It "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Probable cause "is not a high bar," Kaley v. United States , 571 U.S. 320, 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090, 188 L.Ed.2d 46 (2014), and may be based on both hearsay and circumstantial evidence, United States v. $65,251.99 in Bank Account Funds , 84 F. App'x 927, 928 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment on an issue of probable cause, however, "is appropriate only if no reasonable jury could find that the officers did or did not have probable cause to arrest." McKenzie v. Lamb , 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiffs argue that because certain witnesses, including Thomas and Daniels, recanted prior statements that were false, there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. Opp. at 9-13. But if probable cause supported Plaintiffs’ arrests even after correcting for the allegedly false information, the court may grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Smith v. Almada , 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming grant of summary judgment on Section 1983 claim because probable cause still existed after correcting for allegedly false and omitted information in police officer's warrant application); see also Ewing v. City of Stockton , 588 F.3d 1218, 1224-28 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient probable cause after disregarding an officer's allegedly false statements in a warrant application); Scotti v. City of Phoenix , 609 F. App'x 386, 387 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim because probable cause, independent of the false information conveyed by a police officer, supported the plaintiff's arrest and prosecution).
The court finds there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for Jackson's murder, independent of the witness statements Plaintiffs contend were false. The undisputed facts show the following:
Plaintiffs’ hearsay objections fail for purposes of a probable cause determination. See $65,251.99 in Bank Account Funds , 84 F. App'x at 928.
• In 1997, Plaintiffs Evans and Johnson were dating. City SUF ¶ 9.
• The night of the murder, Evans was at a party at Loma Alta Park with mostly Crips gang members, including Jackson and Howard. Id. ¶¶ 14, 20, 22.
• Evans was playing music from her car's CD player and became "livid" and "upset" when she concluded that CDs had been stolen from her car. Id. ¶¶ 28-30. She called other partygoers derogatory names, and a man at the park slapped Evans in the face. Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
• Wright stated Evans yelled out at the party, "One of y'all homies is going to die tonight." Id. ¶ 33.
• Jackson was wearing clothing that identified his gang membership when he was shot in the back and killed later that night. Id. ¶¶ 23, 41.
• An anonymous female tipster told police she saw someone slap Evans in the park, saw Evans drive by just before the murder with people ducking in the car, and believed Evans dropped off the individual who shot at Howard and Jackson from behind. Id. ¶¶ 51, 56, 61-68.
• Jackson's mother stated she heard "Dominique" and "Darryl" were involved in her son's death. Id. ¶¶ 80-81.
• Howard stated in two separate interviews that he saw Evans drive by in her car just before the shooting, and corroborated elements of the tipster's statements by confirming someone shot at them from behind. Id. ¶¶ 190, 192, 273.
• Holmes told police he heard a Crip gang member slapped Evans and that Johnson shot Jackson in retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 106-07. Holmes further stated Jackson had a gun and tossed it to his friend when he was shot, which Howard later confirmed. Id. ¶¶ 43, 108-110.
• Rounds were found in Johnson's home that matched the type of ammunition used in Jackson's murder. Id. ¶¶ 49, 50, 120.
• Holmes and Wright saw Johnson with a .40 caliber Glock handgun weeks before the murder. Id. ¶¶ 111, 178.
At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued Wright did not testify at Plaintiffs’ criminal trial and invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. This is not relevant to the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for the Jackson murder. As Plaintiffs do not contend Defendants fabricated it, Wright's statement to police is properly considered here.
Plaintiffs emphasized at the hearing that Howard only recognized Evans by the silhouette of her hair, but the transcript of Howard's 2010 interview reveals Howard told police he recognized Evans’ car and confirmed he was "100% certain[ ]" he saw Evans drive by him before the shooting. Dkt. 28-42 (Ex. HH) at 544-47.
Collectively, these facts establish more than the necessary "fair probability" that Plaintiffs committed the Jackson murder. Buckner , 179 F.3d at 837. Plaintiffs, in turn, fail to identify any evidence to suggest these witnesses’ testimonies were fabricated or coerced, and a reasonable jury could not find the police lacked probable cause to arrest them. See Kaley , 571 U.S. at 338, 134 S.Ct. 1090 (reiterating probable cause is "not a high bar"). The court, therefore, finds Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment because Defendants had probable cause for the arrests and subsequent prosecution.
As Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim fails because Defendants had probable cause to arrest, charge, and prosecute Plaintiffs, the court need not reach Defendants’ arguments regarding causation, immunity, and municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
III. Claim Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
To prove a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, a plaintiff must first succeed on a Section 1983 claim. See Caldeira v. Cty. of Kauai , 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding "the absence of a section 1983 deprivation of rights [claim] precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the same allegations"). As Plaintiffs do not dispute their conspiracy claim is based upon the allegations of their Section 1983 claim, the court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this claim.
IV. False Imprisonment Claim
Plaintiffs claim they were falsely imprisoned because Plaintiffs’ arrests were not based on "true or accurate" probable cause, as it was "falsely created." SAC ¶ 37. A California court has explained the difference between false imprisonment and malicious prosecution as follows:
The distinction between malicious prosecution and false imprisonment is an important one, and is stated to be that in malicious prosecution the detention is malicious but under the forms of law, whereas in false imprisonment the detention is without color of legal authority. ... If [a plaintiff] is arrested or confined without a warrant, or legal authority apart from a warrant, malicious prosecution will not lie, since the essence of that tort is the pervision [sic] of proper legal procedure, and the remedy is false imprisonment. On the other hand, if there is valid process or due authority apart from it, the arre[s]t is not "false," and the action must be one of malicious prosecution.
Collins v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco , 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 676-77, 123 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1975) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to warrants. Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim, therefore, fails, as the police acted with color of legal authority. See id. (noting that since an officer complied with the formal requirements of the law by obtaining a warrant, "his offense might have been malicious prosecution, but it was not false arrest"). Moreover, even if the court were to treat Plaintiffs’ allegations as one sounding in malicious prosecution, "the plaintiff must prove that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the defendant's direction and terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice." Sangster v. Paetkau , 68 Cal. App. 4th 151, 163, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 66 (1998). As above, the presence of probable cause dooms this claim as well.
In opposition, Plaintiffs note for the first time that County Defendant Rodriguez failed to sign the complaint for Plaintiffs’ arrest warrants. See Dkt. 28-21 (Ex. M) at 268. Plaintiffs argue this is because Defendant Rodriguez "knew there was no probable cause for the warrants." Opp. at 8. The court is not aware of any authority holding a failure to sign a complaint for an arrest warrant may form the basis of a false imprisonment claim, and Plaintiffs cite none. In any event, the court has found probable cause existed for Plaintiffs’ arrests, which bars Plaintiffs’ claim. See Hamilton v. City of San Diego , 217 Cal. App. 3d 838, 844, 266 Cal.Rptr. 215 (1990), modified (Oct. 30, 1990) (finding probable cause to arrest barred false imprisonment claim).
The court, therefore, GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants on the false imprisonment claim and need not address Defendants’ additional arguments regarding causation and immunity.
V. Claim Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (Bane Act)
A plaintiff bringing a claim under the California Bane Act must show "(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion." Allen v. City of Sacramento , 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67, 183 Cal.Rptr.3d 654 (2015), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 6, 2015).
As with the other claims, Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim fails because there was probable cause for Defendants to arrest Plaintiffs for the Jackson murder. Thus, Plaintiffs have not established the intentional or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional right. The court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on the Bane Act claim. Having granted the Motions on this basis, the court need not address Defendants’ arguments regarding the absence of "threats, intimidation, or coercion" or immunity.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.