Opinion
A-13975
05-08-2024
ROBERT EVAK, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Ted Stepovich, Law Office of Ted Stepovich, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Second Judicial District, Trial Court No. 2KB-18-00124 CR Kotzebue, Paul A. Roetman, Judge.
Appearances: Ted Stepovich, Law Office of Ted Stepovich, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Robert Evak was convicted of second-degree assault after he stabbed his cousin, Theodore Booth, multiple times in the head and neck with a screwdriver. He raises two issues on appeal.
AS 11.41.210(a)(1).
First, Evak argues the superior court erred when it denied his mid-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal because, according to Evak, the State failed to prove that he was not acting in self-defense. We disagree. The standard a trial court uses to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal is the same standard an appellate court uses when it determines if there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court "must view all evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and must then determine whether, viewing the evidence in this manner, a fair-minded fact finder could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt on all essential elements of the crime."
Phornsavanh v. State, 481 P.3d 1145, 1156 (Alaska App. 2021).
Id.
At trial, Booth testified that he did not remember most of the incident, but the State introduced Booth's prior statements to police that Booth tried to subdue Evak when Evak was acting erratically, and that Evak responded by attacking Booth with a screwdriver. The State also presented evidence that Evak had provided conflicting versions of events to police - first claiming that Booth had attacked a third person and that Evak was protecting that person, and then later claiming that he was defending himself from Booth directly and that the third person was not involved. Given these facts, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find both that Evak had committed second-degree assault and that Evak was not acting in self-defense.
See Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574, 578 (Alaska App. 2009).
Second, Evak argues that the superior court erred when it rejected his two proposed mitigating factors: (1) that he "committed the offense under some degree of duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense, but that significantly affected [his] conduct"; and (2) that he "acted with serious provocation from the victim." According to Evak, the superior court rejected these proposed mitigators because the jury rejected Evak's claim of self-defense. Evak argues that this was legally incorrect because the two mitigating factors may exist even when the defendant was not acting in self-defense.
AS 12.55.155(d)(3).
AS 12.55.155(d)(6).
But Evak misrepresents the superior court's comments at sentencing. The superior court noted that the jury's verdict was the "starting point" for its analysis and that it tended to show that Booth's version of events was more credible than Evak's. But the court clarified that "Evak doesn't have to prove that self-defense applies" to receive the benefit of the mitigators. The court then conducted its own independent review of the evidence and explained why Evak had not proven the mitigators by clear and convincing evidence.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.