Opinion
3:24-cv-00776-YY
05-16-2024
EUGENIA SONG, Plaintiff, v. MORGAN STANLEY AND CO., LLC, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
YOULEE YIM YOU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FINDINGS
Pro se plaintiff Eugenia Song, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, has filed another complaint in this district, this time against Morgan Stanley and Co., LLC (“Morgan Stanley”). Because plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and it does not appear that the defect can be cured, the case should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Relevant Law Requiring Screening Cases and Determining Jurisdiction
The IFP statute provides that “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction; . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief sought, which may include in the alternative or different types of relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). “Rule 8 does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2006) (citations omitted). “A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Federal courts hold a Pro se litigant's pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam) (holding a document filed Pro se “is to be liberally construed”; a plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds on which it rests) (citation omitted). Pro se “pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995).
In addition to determining whether the complaint states a claim for relief, this court is “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [it has] subject matter jurisdiction. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
II. Analysis
The allegations in the complaint stem from plaintiff's long-standing suspicions that a Columbia University professor has colluded with the Central Intelligence Agency and others to use a “militarized weapon” against her since she was a student a Columbia University. See, e.g., Song v. Columbia University, et al, 3:23-cv-00407-JR; Song v. Central Intelligence Agency, 3:24-cv-00697-SB. This time, plaintiff alleges:
A complete history of plaintiff's cases is described in Song v. Central Intelligence Agency, 3:24-cv-00697-SB, Findings and Recommendations (May 10, 2024).
On May 10, 2024 at 8:40 am ET, defendant through U.S. military or Interpol in Frankfurt, Germany contacted plaintiff with a militarized weapon causing brain damage. The CIA is used for this and, as a matter of course, followed by New York City or NYC's Interpol, which is in Germany. It started as an academic exercise, by a faculty member of social psychology, in a graduate school of education, in New York City.Compl. 4, ECF 1. The complaint contains attachments referencing John Landers, whom plaintiff previously sued in his capacity as a Managing Director of Morgan Stanley. See Song v. Landers, 3:23-cv-00372-YY. Plaintiff fails to specify any particular cause of action against Morgan Stanley, although she indicates that her damages are “[d]irect and proximate for tort claim.” Id.
Generally, a Pro se plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege a claim for relief. Here, however, plaintiff has filed numerous similar cases, which have been dismissed for failure to state a claim under various theories, including her prior case against Landers, in which she was allowed to amend her complaint twice, but nevertheless failed to state a claim for relief either under a racketeering or state tort theory. See Song v. Landers, 3:23-cv-00372-YY, Findings and Recommendations (May 2, 2023).
Moreover, the IFP statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). “Examples of the former class are claims against which it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit, . . . and [e]xamples of the latter class are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar.” Id. at 327-28. “To pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations means that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations.” Payne v. Contra Costa Sheriff's Dep't, No. C 02-2382CRB(PR), 2002 WL 1310748, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2002) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992)). “A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Id.
Here, plaintiff has filed multiple cases alleging that she has been an unwitting participant in a secret program conducted by Columbia University, the CIA, and other individuals, in which a military weapon-grade intelligence tool for psychological research has been used against her. Plaintiff has filed cases against Columbia University, Columbia University professors, the CIA, the United States Government, a Morgan Stanley managing director, and others, all of which contain the same “fantastic or delusional scenario.” This case, like the others that have been dismissed as frivolous, also warrants dismissal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Because plaintiff has failed to allege a valid claim for relief, this case should be dismissed. Because plaintiff has filed numerous cases based on the same frivolous allegations, the dismissal should be with prejudice, along with an admonishment that future filings of a similar nature may result in a finding that plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due June 5, 2024. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.