Opinion
B317793
05-09-2024
GABRIEL ESTRADA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.
Carpenter & Zuckerman, John C. Carpenter and Asa O. Eaton, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Deputy City Attorney, Timothy Martin, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC624648, Stuart M. Rice, Judge. Affirmed.
Carpenter & Zuckerman, John C. Carpenter and Asa O. Eaton, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Deputy City Attorney, Timothy Martin, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.
MOOR, Acting, P. J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Gabriel Estrada and his wife Sonia Estrada appeal from a judgment in favor of defendant and respondent City of Los Angeles in this action based on the dangerous condition of a public sidewalk. On appeal, the Estradas contend: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint to add disability-related claims, (2) the procedure used to issue a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision deprived them of an opportunity to object, and (3) the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that the City had notice of the dangerous condition and the dangerous condition caused Gabriel's fall.
Because the parties share the same last name, they will be referred to by their first names for ease of reference.
We conclude: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend, (2) the Estradas agreed to the procedure for the trial court's statement of decision, and moreover, have not shown any harm, and (3) substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the Estradas failed to meet their burden to show the dangerous condition caused Gabriel's fall. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dangerous Condition of Sidewalk
Between 2002 and 2006, a Ficus tree was planted in a tree well adjacent to the sidewalk on the east side of Irolo Street. The City did not plant Ficus trees or approve permits for private parties to plant them because the invasive roots damage nearby infrastructure. There is no record of the City issuing a permit for the Ficus tree at issue on Irolo Street, but many times owners of adjacent properties plant trees in the parkway without obtaining a permit. In approximately 2009, the City installed a grate on a storm drain in the area of the tree at issue.
In the spring of 2010, a property owner on the opposite side of the street made a service request to the City about a different type of Ficus tree that was lifting sidewalk slabs on the west side of the street. William Candlish, an arborist working for the City, inspected the trees on the west side and requested repairs to the sidewalk on the west side of the street. If he had seen the Ficus tree at issue on the east side, he would have reported it, but he did not notice it. He was focused on completing his inspection quickly in order to proceed to other inspections, and he was not required to look for issues beyond the service request. The City later issued a permit for a third party to remove the trees on the west side.
In 2011, the Ficus tree at issue on the east side began to displace the nearby sidewalk slab at an angle from the adjoining slab. By 2014, the offset between the adjoining slabs reached a height differential of 2.75 inches at one end, while the slabs were level at the other end.
Gabriel's Injury
On July 5, 2015, Sonia and Gabriel drove to a restaurant where the family planned to celebrate Gabriel's birthday. Sonia stayed with the car while Gabriel walked around the corner to the restaurant entrance on Irolo Street. Gabriel's daughter found him lying face down on the sidewalk approximately 15 feet, 8 inches from the height differential between the slabs. When she arrived, he regained consciousness; however, he has never been able to remember the event that caused his injuries.
Litigation Initiated and Leave to Amend Denied
In December 2015, the Estradas presented a claim for damages to the City based on allegations that Gabriel tripped and fell due to a dangerous condition of the sidewalk. The claim did not allege that Gabriel had a disability or that any disability laws were violated.
On June 22, 2016, Gabriel and Sonia filed a complaint against the City based on a dangerous condition of public property. The complaint did not allege that Gabriel was disabled or include a cause of action based on violation of any disability law. In response to interrogatories, Gabriel stated that he did not have a physical, emotional, or mental disability or condition that contributed to the incident. In April 2020, the trial court vacated the trial date set for May 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
More than six months later, and nearly five years after the claim was presented to the City, in October 2020, the Estradas filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), the Disabled Persons Act (DPA; Civ. Code, § 54 et seq.), and Government Code sections 4450 and 11135. The proposed amended complaint alleged for the first time that Gabriel suffered from three disabilities (diabetes, hypertension, and peripheral neuropathy), and the City caused his fall by failing to make the sidewalk accessible to people with disabilities as required under the ADA. It also newly alleged that the City systematically violated ADA requirements concerning pedestrian rights of way. The proposed amended complaint sought new injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney fees, and statutory damages.
The Estradas' attorney John Carpenter provided a declaration stating that the Estradas were seeking leave to amend because the City had indicated it would seek to preclude evidence at trial related to ADA standards. He also stated that was willing to withdraw the request to amend the complaint in exchange for confirmation from the City that it would not seek to exclude references to disability-related standards, including ADA standards.
The City opposed the motion on several grounds, including that the new claims failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act and were barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court denied leave to amend, finding that the Estradas failed to explain when the facts that gave rise to the new allegations were discovered or why they had waited so long to seek an amendment. In addition, the proposed amendments would prejudice the City by requiring litigation of new issues that changed the nature of the case and were not presented to the City as part of the government claim.
Trial
A bench trial began on May 4, 2021. The Estradas' civil engineering expert Brad Avrit testified that the ADA requires the City to maintain sidewalks free of height differentials of more than a quarter of an inch. There were multiple conditions in the area of Gabriel's fall that created a substantial risk of injury. In addition to the height differential in the sidewalk slabs adjacent to the Ficus tree, there was a four-inch height differential between the edge of the slab and the parkway. There were two additional height differentials where sections of the sidewalk north of the tree were being lifted up by the Ficus tree roots. Although some of the other height differentials were not tripping hazards that were sticking up, pedestrians could step on them and rotate their feet. There were a series of bolts adjacent to a wall that were protruding from the sidewalk south of the Ficus tree, which were tripping hazards. There was also a height differential between the sidewalk and adjacent asphalt, and between the sidewalk and the tree well without a tree cover. There were multiple hazards in the area of Gabriel's fall, and the existence of so many tripping hazards clustered in the same geographical area increased the risk of injury and inhibited a pedestrian's ability to recover from a fall. There was no history of Gabriel tripping over his own feet without reason. Avrit opined that the sidewalk condition was the most likely cause of Gabriel's fall. Avrit did not conduct a biomechanics analysis, however, Asked in cross-examination if it was his opinion that Gabriel tripped on the 2.75-inch displacement of the sidewalk slabs, Avrit responded, "It's my understanding that [Gabriel] was walking southbound and would have to have crossed this uplift and ended up face down next to this tree that you see just beyond the uplift and to the right. [¶] I don't know for a fact because we don't have video or anything of this incident whether or not that particular uplift caused the initiation of the loss of balance or [if] it was the other conditions of the sidewalk to the south of that particular uplift." Avrit also agreed that he did not know for a fact whether Gabriel tripped on any of the other height differentials that he discussed in the case.
The City's biomechanics expert John Brault testified that Gabriel had multiple factors that increased his risk for a fall, including diabetes, foot numbness, macular degeneration, a history of prior falls, and more than four daily prescription medications. Brault opined that the uplifted slab, at a distance of 15 feet and 8 inches away from the location where Gabriel was found, was too far away to have been related to the fall based on the normal biomechanics of tripping.
The Estradas' arborist Kay Greeley opined that the City likely planted the tree at issue because there was no permit for it, but she acknowledged that the City was no longer planting Ficus trees at the time and that a private party may have planted the tree without a permit.
The City's arborist Candlish testified that private parties often plant trees without the City's knowledge. Candlish found no record of the City planting the Ficus tree or receiving a service request for it.
The City had not received a complaint about the sidewalk displacement before Gabriel's fall. The City inspected sidewalks only in response to complaints and did not instruct employees to look for defects outside the area of a complaint. Brault testified that the City's complaint-driven inspection system was reasonable. This method is by far the most common method used by cities.
The Estrada's sidewalk expert testified that an employee responding to a complaint was required to look for defects in the immediate area, by which he meant within 20 feet. The distance between the east and west sidewalks on Irolo Street is 46 feet. In December 2013 and May 2014, City employees inspected and repaired potholes that were located approximately 207 feet from the displaced slab. In March 2014, City employees installed truncated domes, a type of mat that improves access for pedestrians with disabilities, at the sidewalk corner, 67 feet from the displacement of the slab.
Closing Argument and Decision
The parties and the court held a discussion about scheduling on June 2, 2021 that was not recorded. On the record, the trial court explained that the court would set a schedule for closing argument briefs. At the request of the Estradas' attorney, the court had agreed to allow closing oral argument. The Court instructed the parties that their arguments "should not reiterate the legal arguments that have already been made in the briefs other than needing to weave them together, and at that time the matter will stand submitted. [¶] I'll set another date where I will announce my decision orally with reasoning behind it."
On June 4, the court set a briefing schedule for the written closing arguments. The court added, "You have raised with me - -and I think it makes sense - - that you will be focusing mostly on legal issues in that written document since I am going to also allow you to make oral argument thereafter after I've reviewed all the briefs." The court set oral argument for July 26, 2021. The court stated that the City, after consulting with its appellate section, and the Estradas' counsel had agreed to the court announcing its decision orally. The court would essentially dictate its tentative decision and proposed statement of decision on the record before a court reporter and articulate all of the reasons for the conclusions. The court acknowledged the parties' rights under Rules of Court, rule 3.1590, subdivision (c)(4). The announcement of the tentative decision and proposed statement of decision "will be it" unless within a number of days after the court's announcement of the tentative decision and proposed statement of decision, "one of the parties specifies a principal controverted issue as to which that party is requesting a statement of decision . . . and [the court] would either respond by saying, well, I've already addressed that or I will supplement my tentative decision slash proposed statement of decision with an answer to that concern that's been raised, and that becomes the final statement of decision, and everybody is accepting the fact that, if there is a need for a second get-together for that purpose, that can also be done in the same method orally by a court reporter." Both parties agreed to the procedure stated by the court. The minute order stated the court would announce an oral proposed statement of decision on July 26, 2021.
The Estradas filed a closing argument brief on June 14, 2021. The City filed a closing argument brief on June 21, 2021. And the Estradas filed a reply brief on June 28, 2021.
At the hearing on July 26, 2021, the court stated, "As you may recall, it was agreed by the parties by stipulation that the court could issue its tentative ruling [and] proposed statement of decision orally before a court reporter in which I would articulate not only how I rule, but how I came to that conclusion. And that was my intention in proceeding today. [¶] The plaintiff[s' counsel] had asked that . . . he would still like the opportunity to address the court orally, which I said would be fine[,] understanding, of course, that I've read everything[.]" The court admonished that oral argument was not an opportunity to argue the case again, mentioning the parties' rights under [Rules of Court,] rule 3.1590, subdivision (c)(4) and (g), if an issue was unaddressed, as well as remedies even after judgment is entered. "So with that in mind, plaintiff carrying the burden of proof, may address the court first."
Counsel for the Estradas responded that "perhaps the point of requesting argument, your Honor, was to address issues that the court may have. And I fully respect that the court has reviewed the transcript and the evidence and heard the evidence. [¶] Perhaps with counsel's agreement, if you could give us what your feelings are and I could better direct my arguments towards those issues[,] in the way the court would issue a tentative ruling[.]"
The court noted, "I was debating with myself whether I should . . . just announce my decision, you'll sit quietly and listen, and then . . . I'll give you the chance to speak further to see if I want to make any alterations to what I've concluded . . . and if you do that, would that satisfy the rights you've both maintained under [Rules of Court, rule] 3.1590."
Counsel for the Estradas stated, "My preference, your Honor, is instead of just arguing things that may be moot or the court's not interested in, I'd rather have the information regarding where the court is leaning, and as the court may consider the arguments; and then - you know, and then issue its ruling. [¶] I think that would be the best and most effective." A further discussion was held off the record.
Back on the record, the court summarized, "Both parties have stated that they would rather I go ahead and give my ruling, but it is not a final ruling. It is my tentative ruling. And then both counsel will have a chance to make arguments knowing where I'm headed so that, rather than just get up and repeat themselves from what they said in their briefs, they can specifically address particular issues in which I will take notes and then decide at that point whether we need additional time for me to finalize my tentative decision [and] proposed statement of decision."
The court added, "Let me ask you both this, . . . since I'm going to give . . . the decision that I've reached and then you're both going to speak to it, if you wish, will that be it? Will that -will that satisfy for you your rights under [Rules of Court, rule] 3.1590 to potentially object to that proposed statement of decision and/or set forth under subdivision (c) that there's a controverted issue that you would like to address which wasn't addressed?"
Counsel for the Estradas stated that he would like to follow the procedure set forth "in the code." The court clarified, "So . . . either of you may argue about something that you want me to think about further and then still potentially file written objections?" Counsel for the Estradas responded, "I think that's the safest bet." The court stated, "All right. Okay. And if so, if I'm going to modify my tentative decision [and] proposed statement of decision, I will still be doing that orally?" Both parties agreed that the court would make any modification orally.
The trial court stated its tentative decision and proposed statement of decision. The court found the displacement was a dangerous condition that created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, but the Estradas did not meet their burden of proof to show that the City had actual or constructive notice of the displacement.
The court found the City's complaint-driven sidewalk inspection system was reasonable in light of the costs of inspecting thousands of miles of sidewalk. The court relied on the testimony that some smaller cities used similar complaint-response inspection systems.
The court also found there was no basis to conclude that the City planted the tree. The court relied on Candlish's testimony that there was no record of the City planting the tree and the tree would not have been approved for planting at that location.
The court also found credible Candlish's testimony that he did not see the Ficus tree when he was across the street in 2010, and if he had, he would have reported it. The court concluded the burden of proof was not met that any repair crew had knowledge of the displacement. The court credited witness Craig Shaw's testimony that repair crews have a long list of repairs to perform by the end of the workday. It was not reasonable to require street repair crews to search for additional street defects, as that would significantly obstruct their ability to complete work on a particular day. The court concluded the Estradas had not shown City employees who were engaged in repairs or activities on Irolo Street would have encountered the displacement.
In addition, the trial court concluded that the Estradas did not meet their burden of proof to show the dangerous condition was a substantial factor in causing Gabriel's injuries. Gabriel did not know how he fell and there was no video or eyewitness evidence. The court expressly credited Avrit's honest testimony that he did not know for a fact whether it was the 2.75-inch displacement that caused Gabriel to lose his balance or one of the other height differentials located on the sidewalk that he had identified in the case.
The court stated, "looking at the circumstantial evidence, it is impossible for the finder of fact to conclude that it is more likely than not that [Gabriel] tripped over the [approximately] 3-inch uplift in the panel north of the Ficus tree. It appears from Mr. Avrit's testimony that the plaintiff's head came to rest near the end of the wall adjoining the sidewalk, which is approximately 16 feet from the uplift. This seems an improbably long distance to stumble and fall after tripping over the uplift." Taking Gabriel's daughter's testimony in deposition and at trial to be true about Gabriel's position on the ground, the distance from this particular displacement did not seem plausible. The court found Brault's testimony persuasive. The court noted that the additional risk factors identified by Brault were not the basis for the court's decision. The risk factors were one of the reasons that Gabriel may have fallen, but it was the Estradas' burden of proof to show it was more likely than not that Gabriel tripped over this particular dangerous condition, which they did not meet.
The court concluded that it would be speculation to conclude that Gabriel fell after tripping over an uplift, rather than a reasonable inference from the facts presented. Therefore, the court could not conclude that the dangerous condition caused Gabriel's condition.
The Estradas' attorney was then given the opportunity to argue the case. He argued that relying solely on complaints to make repairs was unreasonable. He argued the City had constructive notice of the dangerous condition, because they must have planted the Ficus tree, and Candlish must have seen the Ficus tree when he was inspecting trees across the street, based on photographs at the time showing the tree rose above a truck parked next to it.
The Estradas' attorney also argued that expert witnesses never know anything for a fact. Instead, they provide opinions and draw inferences to help the trier of fact reach conclusions. He admitted that they did not know which part of the sidewalk had tripped Gabriel, but asserted that Gabriel must have tripped over the dangerous condition or tripped over his own feet, and there was no evidence that he tripped on his own feet. Their attorney characterized the causation issue as a "close call," but he argued that some evidence preponderated over no evidence. At the conclusion of the Estradas' final argument, the court went off the record and the proceedings adjourned.
The July 26, 2021 minute order states that the trial court announced its tentative statement of decision orally as indicated on the record and found the plaintiffs had not met their burden. The court scheduled a "Non-Appearance Case Review re receipt of objections to Statement of Decision" for August 11, 2021. The Estradas did not file any written objections.
On August 11, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order stating that it had delivered the tentative decision and proposed statement of decision on July 26, 2021, by agreement of the parties. No written objections had been received. After considering the oral argument of counsel, the tentative decision and statement of decision that had been delivered orally was adopted as the court's statement of decision.
The Estradas filed an ex parte application to strike the August 11, 2021 minute order adopting the statement of decision. Their attorney had expected the court to schedule a hearing date to state the court's final decision after taking into consideration the final arguments of all counsel. They argued that the court could not have considered points made by the parties in their final oral arguments. They requested that the court issue a new statement of decision orally on the record that addressed the final oral arguments of counsel. They did not object to the substance of the statement of decision as to any particular issue.
On August 26, 2021, the trial court denied the application. The court entered judgment for the City on September 2, 2021.
The Estradas filed a motion for a new trial on September 30, 2021. They argued there was an irregularity in the proceedings because the trial court prepared a decision and failed to consider points raised in oral argument that challenged the decision. In addition, the Estradas argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. With respect to causation, the Estradas made the same argument that they made in their oral closing argument. The Estradas also argued that it was a legal error not to find a reasonable inference that Gabriel more likely than not tripped on the height differential.
A hearing was held on the new trial motion on November 18, 2021. The Estradas' attorney summarized the prior discussions of procedures for written and oral closing arguments. He believed that after oral argument on the tentative ruling, the trial court would issue a proposed statement of decision. Issuing a proposed statement of decision would set the timeline to address other issues. He argued that the Estradas were deprived of the opportunity to have their factual arguments beyond the briefs heard, which affected their right to due process. He stated, "[T]he only remedy is to grant me a new trial, a new trial where there will be a benefit of considering all the arguments. Because there's a tentative decision, which was then adopted by this court. By definition, it could not possibly have considered a single factual argument that was contemplated at the oral hearing. It didn't happen yet. The tentative decision was read before any factual - contemplated factual arguments."
The motion filed by the City with this appellate court on September 21, 2023, to augment the record with the reporter's transcript of the proceedings on November 18, 2021, is granted.
The City argued that there had been no harm. The Estradas had not identified anything in oral argument that would have made a difference to the final decision. Everything in the new trial motion was presented in their oral argument, and the oral argument was presented before the court made its tentative ruling final. The ex parte hearing was also the same argument that was being made in the new trial motion.
The trial court explained, "I was prepared when I took the bench that day to hear oral argument. I was going to listen to all the oral arguments. I had notes on where I was at. And had something been said to me orally, if I did not go first - and I only went first because Mr. Carpenter asked me to go first - I would have altered my notes and expressed my tentative ruling." The trial court noted that the oral arguments by both parties enhanced the written closing briefs, but the court did not hear anything new in oral argument. The trial court added, "The only thing that troubles me is this idea that, because I didn't change my tentative ruling after he argued, I could not have considered the oral argument. That is just blatently [sic] wrong.... I considered everything that was said at oral argument. Nothing that was said at oral argument changed my mind....So the comments by Mr. Carpenter that I could not have considered the oral argument in reaching my final decision is wrong." The court added, "The points raised in oral argument were points that I had heard over and over again throughout the trial ...."
The trial court denied the new trial motion. The Estradas filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Leave to Amend
The Estradas contend the trial court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend to allege disability-related causes of action. We find no abuse of discretion.
"Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only '[w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party....' [Citation.] A different result is indicated '[w]here inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party' is shown. (Estate of Murphy (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 304, 311.) In Murphy, . . . 'the proposed amendment opened up an entirely new field of inquiry without any satisfactory explanation as to why this major change in point of attack had not been made long before trial.' (Ibid.) Under those circumstances, denial of leave to amend was appropriate." (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) In addition, "if the proposed amendment fails to state a cause of action, it is proper to deny leave to amend." (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1280.)
In this case, the trial court found the City would be prejudiced by allowing belated amendment of the complaint to add multiple causes of action based on disabilities that were not originally alleged. The Estradas sought to amend their complaint more than four years after it had been filed, after discovery was closed, and several months after the trial date, which was rescheduled solely due to the Covid-19 pandemic. There was no explanation as to when the Estradas learned of the disability-related claims. Not only did the Estradas fail to allege any claim based on disability in the original complaint, but in discovery they affirmatively led the City to believe that no disability was at issue, as Gabriel stated in responses to interrogatories that he had no disability that contributed to the incident. The new claims in the proposed amendment would have required additional discovery proceedings, and they were barred by the failure to include them in a timely government claim and by applicable statutes of limitations.
In the Estradas' briefs on appeal, they do not address compliance with the government claim requirement or the applicable statutes of limitation. Instead, they assert that they should have been allowed to amend the complaint and then the City should have been required to test the legal sufficiency of the new claims through additional pleadings. We disagree. No error has been shown.
The Estradas also complain in their appellate briefs that they would have been able to offer additional evidence at trial if the court had granted leave to amend to add causes of action, but they do not separately contend that the court erred in making any particular evidentiary ruling at trial given the causes of action that were tried.
Statement of Decision
The Estradas contend the trial court denied them due process by providing a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision without waiting until after oral argument and before the case was submitted. They argue this alleged error was neither invited, nor harmless. We disagree.
" 'In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo.'" (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 150, 162 (Ribakoff).) Where a party's conduct induces the court to commit an error, the party is estopped from raising the error as a ground for appellate reversal. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403.)
In this case, the Estradas' counsel requested that the court deliver the tentative ruling and proposed statement of decision prior to oral argument. The Estradas benefitted from the agreed upon procedure by tailoring their oral argument to the areas that the trial court considered dispositive, rather than wasting time arguing about issues that the trial court viewed in their favor, such as whether the sidewalk presented a dangerous condition. After requesting and benefiting from this procedure, the Estradas are estopped on appeal to assert that it was error.
Moreover, "[e]ven when error is demonstrated, the judgment will not be reversed unless it is 'reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.' [Citation.]" (Ribakoff, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.)"' "A trial court rendering a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts. A trial court is not required to make findings with regard to detailed evidentiary facts or to make minute findings as to individual items of evidence. Only where a trial court fails to make findings as to a material issue which would fairly disclose the determination by the trial court would reversible error result. Even though a court fails to make a finding on a particular matter, if the judgment is otherwise supported, the omission is harmless error unless the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the complaining party which would have the effect of countervailing or destroying other findings. A failure to find on an immaterial issue is not error. [Citation.] In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a party's request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the court's decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. [Citation.]" [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Ribakoff, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 163.)
The Estradas have not shown that any error in the timing of the statement of decision was prejudicial. They had an opportunity to object to any defects in the proposed statement of decision, which became the statement of decision, in their closing oral argument, in their ex parte application, and in their motion for new trial, but they did not identify any issue that the trial court failed to address. The trial court stated that it had considered the Estradas' oral argument carefully, but did not reach a conclusion different from its announced tentative decision. On appeal, the Estradas have not identified any objection to the statement of decision relevant to the issue of causation. No harm has been shown.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Estradas contend there is no substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that they failed to meet their burden of proof to show causation. We disagree.
"The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence. A plaintiff must prove a legal duty to use care, breach of that legal duty, and a breach that is a proximate cause of injury." (Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, 214 (Kaney).) "A slip-and-fall plaintiff need not remember her fall to recover damages provided the evidence gives rise to a reasonable and probable inference that the defendant's negligence was a substantial contributing factor." (Id. at p. 217.)
"We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact." (Ribakoff, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.) "Under that standard, 'when the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, . . ." 'the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding." '"' [Citation.]" (Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 736, 744-745.)
In this case, the trial court found the Estradas failed to meet their burden to show it was more likely than not that Gabriel tripped over the displacement or any other height differential on the sidewalk. Gabriel did not know why he fell, no one witnessed the fall, and there was no video. His daughter consistently testified about the location where she found him, which was approximately 16 feet from the displacement. The court did not find the opinion of the Estradas' expert Avrit persuasive because he admitted that he did not know whether the displacement caused Gabriel's fall. Instead, the court credited the testimony of the City's expert that it was not probable for Gabriel to have tripped over the displacement and stumbled 16 feet before falling on the ground. This is not a case where the only reasonable inference was that Gabriel tripped over the height differential between the sidewalk slabs. There was no uncontradicted or unimpeached evidence as to where the fall began or whether the displacement contributed to Gabriel's fall. Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion on the issue of causation, we need not additionally address the sufficiency of the evidence to support other elements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent City of Los Angeles is awarded its costs on appeal.
We concur: KIM, J., LEE, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.