Estep v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. Usher v. State

    388 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    3. The trial court did not err in charging the law of flight to the jury. While evidence of presence at the scene and flight, without more, is insufficient to support a criminal conviction, Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1, 3 ( 267 S.E.2d 314) (1980), there is other supporting evidence here which makes this principle inapplicable. Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840, 842 ( 213 S.E.2d 689) (1975).

  2. Haney v. State

    581 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 13 times

    Henderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 170 ( 316 S.E.2d 814) (1984). See also Harris v. State, 222 Ga. App. 56, 58(2) ( 473 S.E.2d 229) (1996); Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314) (1980). 2.

  3. Bollinger v. State

    259 Ga. App. 102 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 14 times

    Henderson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 170 ( 316 S.E.2d 814) (1984). See also Harris v. State, 222 Ga. App. 56, 58(2) ( 473 S.E.2d 229) (1996); Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314) (1980). 2. Next, Bollinger and Shaw contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for retrial, because they were sentenced by a judge who did not preside over the trial, and the trial transcript was incomplete.

  4. Duke v. State

    335 S.E.2d 400 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that defendant's attempt to influence another person to give false testimony to establish an alibi was circumstantial evidence of his guilt of having committed burglary

    Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979). See Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314) (1980); Bogan v. State, supra; Perry v. State, supra; Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 195 (2) ( 300 S.E.2d 201) (1983). Compare Parker v. State, 155 Ga. App. 617 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 871) (1980).

  5. In re V. T

    309 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    In the case sub judice, the trier of fact (the juvenile court judge) observed and heard the witnesses, and certainly is best qualified to judge the reasonableness of an hypothesis raised by evidence or its lack than by this court which is restricted to issues of law. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). Where the trier of fact was authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, as an appellate court we will not disturb that finding unless the verdict of guilty is unsupportable as a matter of law. Staymate v. State, 237 Ga. 661 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 421); Bowen v. State, 139 Ga. App. 190, 192 ( 228 S.E.2d 187).

  6. Sutton v. State

    308 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    These jurors observed and heard the witnesses and were best qualified to judge the reasonableness of an hypothesis raised by the evidence than is this court which is restricted to resolving issues of law. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). In this case the jury was fully informed that if confronted with two equally plausible (reasonable) theories, one consistent with guilt and the other innocence, the jury was required to return a verdict of innocence.

  7. Thomas v. State

    308 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    In this case, the jurors observed and heard the witnesses, and were better qualified to judge the reasonableness of an hypothesis raised by evidence or its lack than is this court which is restricted to consideration of issues of law. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). If the jury is authorized by the evidence to find appellant guilty, the appellate court will not disturb the finding, unless the verdict of guilty is unsupportable as a matter of law. Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 242, 245 ( 223 S.E.2d 643).

  8. Bailess v. State

    308 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 3 times

    In this case the court sitting without a jury heard and saw the witnesses and was better qualified to judge the reasonableness of an hypothesis raised by the evidence than is this court which is restricted to issues of law. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). We are satisfied that the only reasonable hypothesis which could be drawn from the evidence presented to the trier of fact was sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact of appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  9. Burns v. State

    305 S.E.2d 398 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 19 times

    The jurors in this case heard the witness, and are better qualified to judge the reasonableness of a hypothesis raised by evidence (or its lack) than is this court which is restricted to a cold record and to issues of law. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). On the basis of the evidence presented to the trier of fact, we are satisfied that such trier of fact could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by legal and competent evidence that appellant's guilt was fully established. Baldwin v. State, 153 Ga. App. 35, 37 ( 264 S.E.2d 528). This enumeration is without merit.

  10. McConnell v. State

    304 S.E.2d 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that past crimes may corroborate an accomplices testimony regarding a current crime when the modus operandi of the crimes are similar

    Thus the ultimate question and responsibility in this bench trial of weighing the evidence lay with the trier of fact as a question of fact rather than by resolution as a matter of law alone. Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1 ( 267 S.E.2d 314). Our examination convinces us that on the basis of the evidence presented, any trier of fact could rationally find upon such evidence proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Baldwin v. State, 153 Ga. App. 35, 37 ( 264 S.E.2d 528).