Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-5916 (NHP).
May 20, 1999
Kimberly S. Tyler, Esq., WINKLER, BEVACQUA GREENE, P.C., Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Stuart Alderoty, Esq., David P. Kalm, Esq., LE BOEUF, LAMB, GREENE MAC RAE, LLP, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant, Louis Pinto and Sons.
LETTER ORDER ORIGINAL ON FILE WITH CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Louis Pinto and Sons' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of plaintiff, the Estate of Jerry Sheldon Wright. This Court heard oral argument on April 29, 1999. For the reasons stated more particularly herein, defendant Louis Pinto and Sons' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. More specifically, defendant Louis Pinto and Sons' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED ONLY WITH REGARD TO THE FEDERAL CLAIMS ASSERTED THEREIN AS TO ALL DEFENDANTS. Furthermore, defendant Louis Pinto and Sons' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED WITH REGARD TO THE STATE LAW CLAIMS. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the balance of plaintiff's Complaint, inclusive of the state law claims as to all defendants, is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court, Law Division in Morris County for disposition. As a result of the foregoing, this case is CLOSED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 28, 1996, Jerry Sheldon Wright, a New Jersey resident, was employed as a garbage collector by defendant Louis Pinto and Sons, a New Jersey corporation. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 2, and 9. Defendants James Caldwell and Dave Labar, both residents of New Jersey, also were employed as a garbage collectors by Louis Pinto and Sons. See id. at ¶ 4, 5, and 9. Plaintiff alleges that at some point during the work day on October 28, 1996, James Caldwell twice ran over plaintiff's body with a garbage truck, ultimately causing his demise. See id.On November 5, 1997, plaintiff, the Estate of Jerry Sheldon Wright ("plaintiff") instituted this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County by filing a Complaint against defendants Louis Pinto and Sons, James Pinto, Louis Pinto, James Caldwell, Dave Labar, XYZ Corp., ABC Corp., John Doe and Richard Roe. See id. Plaintiff's atypical Complaint sets forth several barely decipherable allegations against all defendants: (1) intentional tortious conduct; (2) "willful and wanton negligence;" (3) "egregious and oppressive" tortious conduct "characterized by malice or wantonness;" (4) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983; (5) violations of the First Amendment; (6) violations of the Thirteenth Amendment; and (7) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. On or about December 21, 1998, it appears that an ex parte Order was entered in Passaic County changing the venue of this case to Morris County. See Notice of Removal at ¶ 1.
On December 31, 1998, defendant Louis Pinto and Sons ("LPS") filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See id.
On March 16, 1999, LPS filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to State a Claim and/or for Plaintiff's Prejudicial Delay in Serving Process Upon Employer. See Notice of Motion.
On April 29, 1999, this Court heard oral argument in connection with LPS' Motion to Dismiss. During oral argument, plaintiff's counsel conceded dismissal of plaintiff's First Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment claim and § 1983 claim. Plaintiff's counsel requested additional time to address the issue of whether plaintiff had stated any federal claims against the defendants, and accordingly, whether the case should be remanded to the state court. Instead, plaintiff submitted a letter brief, in lieu of making a formal motion, wherein plaintiff requested to amend the Complaint to include a § 1985 claim against defendants. See Plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief dated May 4, 1999.
In light of plaintiff's concession, this Court will not address the following claims: (1) First Amendment; (2) Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) § 1983. Accordingly, this Court deems such claims DISMISSED . See also Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant Louis Pinto and Sons' Motion to Dismiss.
On May 6, 1999, LPS opposed plaintiff's supplemental letter brief.
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b)(6)
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted when it appears beyond doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved consistent with the allegations of that claim in the Complaint. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993). All allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and reasonable factual inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor.Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 636 n. 3 (1980). The question in addressing such a motion is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the complainant can prove any set of facts that would entitle the complainant to relief. Schanzer v. Rutgers University, 934 F. Supp. 669 (D.N.J. 1996).
As more fully set forth herein, plaintiff's have failed to allege facts in connection with the alleged federal claims which would entitle them to relief against the aforementioned defendants.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of the laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to the like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The United States Supreme Court has limited the scope of § 1981 to the protection of two distinct rights, the: (1) making and (2) enforcement of contracts. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1988). "Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts." Id. By its terms, § 1981 prohibits the refusal to offer or to enter into a contract with someone when such decision is based on that person's race. Id. at 177. The right to make contracts "does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions." Id.
Additionally, § 1981 protects the right to enforce the terms of a contract through access to the legal process. Id. The Patterson Court noted that § 1981:
prohibits discrimination that infects the legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights, by reason of his or her race, and this is so whether this discrimination is attributed to a statute or simply to existing practices. It also covers wholly private efforts to impede access to the courts or obstruct nonjudicial methods of adjudicating disputes about the force of binding obligations, as well as discrimination by private entities, such as labor unions, in enforcing the terms of a contract . . . The right to enforce contracts does not, however, extend beyond conduct by an employer which impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal process his or her established contract rights.Id. at 177-178.
Since it is clear that allegations which challenge the conditions of employment are not actionable under § 1981 and plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants prohibited Jerry Sheldon Wright from making and/or enforcing a contract, plaintiff's § 1981 claim must be DISMISSED.
III. Thirteenth Amendment
In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Thirteenth Amendment. However, a thorough review of the case law indicates that the Thirteenth Amendment does not provide a direct and independent cause of action. See Kaveney v. Miller, No. CIV. A. 93-0218, 1997 WL 298718 *2 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (citing Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Doe v. Keane 658 F. Supp. 216 (W.D.Mich. 1987)). See also Dolla v. Unicast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.Pa. 1996); Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Westray v. Porthole, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 834, 838-39 (D.Md. 1984). Typically, a Thirteenth Amendment claim is asserted as an underlying constitutional claim for a violation of a civil rights statute, such as § 1983. Kaveney v. Miller, No. CIV. A. 93-0218, 1997 WL 298718 *2 (E.D.Pa. 1993). The courts which have recognized an independent cause of action pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment have required that the plaintiff allege "the essential ingredient of involuntary servitude, which is the inability to avoid continued service." Dolla v. Unicast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (citing Atta v. Sun Co., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D.Pa. 1984) (citations omitted)). Accordingly, if a direct action is to be permitted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant compelled him or her to work against his will. Id. "A showing of compulsion is thus a prerequisite to proof of involuntary servitude." Id. (citing Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972))).
In this matter, assuming arguendo that this Court were to recognize an independent cause of action pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, plaintiff has failed to allege that Jerry Sheldon Wright was working for Louis Pinto and Sons against his will.
IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
In plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief, plaintiff requests that this Court construe the Supplemental Letter Brief as a Motion to Amend the Complaint to include a Section 1985(2) and 1985(3) cause of action. In light of plaintiff's request, this Court will grant plaintiff's request and construe plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief as a Motion to Amend the Complaint.
Section 1985 prohibits public and private conspiracies which deprive persons of their constitutionally protected rights. Boykin v. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 893 F. Supp. 378, 398 (M.D.Pa. 1995), aff'd 91 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Rogers v. Mount Union Borough by Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 314 (M.D.Pa. 1993)). The statute encompasses private conspiracies, as well as, conspiracies involving persons acting under color of state law. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971).
In this matter, plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief provides that the constitutionally protected rights being asserted, via § 1985, are those protected by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Section 1985(2) provides, in pertinent part, that a person may have a cause of action:
. . . if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws . . .42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
Section 1985(3) provides, in pertinent part, that a person may have a cause of action:
[i]f two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws . . .42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
In order to state a claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege "a conspiracy, motivated by a discriminatory based animus, for the purpose of depriving any person or class of the equal protection of the law and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, whereby a person is injured."Lee-Paterson v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, 957 F. Supp. 1391, 1403 (D.N.J. 1997). "Mere conclusory allegations that a conspiracy existed will not survive a motion to dismiss." Boykin v. Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, 893 F. Supp. 378, 398 (M.D.Pa. 1995), aff'd 91 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1996). See also Church of Human Potential v. Vorsky, 636 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that a § 1985(3) civil rights conspiracy claim must be pleaded with factual specificity in order to withstand a motion to dismiss); Soto v. Schembri, 960 F. Supp. 751, 759-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
In support of plaintiff's § 1985 claim in this matter, plaintiff alleges that "Caldwell and Labar conspired to harm the decedent because of his race." See Plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief dated May 4, 1999. Plaintiff further alleges, "that because of his race, the decedent was hated by the defendants Caldwell and Labar, that the employer defendant knew of Caldwell's and Labar's feelings towards the decedent, and that because of Caldwell's and Labar's actions on the day the decedent died, namely failing to provide immediate medical attention, the defendants intended to discriminate against the decedent." See Plaintiff's Supplemental Letter Brief dated May 4, 1999 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff's blanket allegations that defendants hated African Americans and, therefore, failed to provide immediate medical attention after they allegedly ran him over does not create an allegation of a conspiracy pursuant to § 1981(2). Without specific allegations, plaintiff's assertions amount to mere conjecture. Furthermore, plaintiff's claims that Jerry Sheldon Wright was called a "nigger" and a "monkey" during the course of his employment are insufficient to state a claim under the conspiracy statute. Although such words are of a repulsive nature, such terms alone do not meet the prerequisites for alleging a conspiracy claim. Therefore, plaintiff's § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) claims are DISMISSED.
Since this Court has dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).