Opinion
33 MDA 2021
08-17-2021
ESTATE OF: CAROL L. STONE TEEL APPEAL OF: TODD TEEL
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered October 7, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Civil Division at No(s): 2016-00034
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM
NICHOLS, J.
Appellant Todd Teel appeals pro se from the order that denied his objections and motion to compel and approved an interim account and distribution in this estate matter. On appeal, Appellant contends that the orphans' court erred and abused its discretion in its interpretation of a will and codicil. Following our review, we affirm on the basis of the orphans' court's October 7, 2020 findings of fact and conclusions of law.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this matter as follows:
Carol L. Stone Teel (Decedent) died testate on February 10, 2016. Pursuant to Decedent's Will, dated October 8, 2009, and subsequent Codicil, dated June 2, 2015, Decedent's heirs were her six children: Tammy Kresege, Deborah Tavernia, David Teel, John Teel, Timothy Teel, and Appellant. The Will named Barbara Fuhrey and William Fuhrey (collectively, co-executors) as co-executors of Decedent's Estate. The primary assets of the Estate included a farmhouse with an appraised value of $125, 000.00, a tenant house and one acre of surrounding land with an appraised value of $115, 000.00, the balance of farmland (153.85 acres) with an appraised value of $393, 000.00, and the oil, gas, and mineral rights in the real estate, as well as cash and personal property. The Will and Codicil were admitted to probate.
On May 5, 2017, the co-executors filed an interim account and a petition for adjudication/statement of proposed distribution of the Estate's property (proposed distribution). On July 10, 2017, Appellant, Tammy Kresege, and Deborah Tavernia filed objections to the interim account and proposed distribution. Appellant, Tammy Kresege, and Deborah Tavernia filed amended objections to the interim account and proposed distribution on June 6, 2018. Tammy Kresege and Deborah Tavernia subsequently reached a settlement of their personal claims against the Estate and no longer wished to pursue their objections to the interim account and proposed distribution. Appellant, however, continued to pursue pro se the objections to the interim account and proposed distribution.
On November 15, 2018, the co-executors filed an amendment to paragraph 9 of the proposed distribution that addressed the oil, gas, and mineral rights in Decedent's real estate. After a hearing on Appellant's objections to the interim account and proposed distribution, the orphans' court ordered Appellant to submit "a list of all assets [he believed] were not properly inventoried as part of the [E]state." Orphans' Court Order, 4/4/19. Appellant filed pro se his list of assets with the orphans' court judge's chambers on April 22, 2019.
On June 11, 2019, the orphans' court dismissed Appellant's objections and approved the interim account and proposed distribution of the Estate's property. On July 11, 2019, Appellant filed pro se a "motion to compel a complete [interpretation] of [the] Will by [the orphans'] court and stay [its] dismissal and approval of interim account" (motion to compel). This motion to compel bears a timestamp of entry on the docket of July 11, 2019, at 10:15 a.m. Later that same day, Appellant filed pro se a notice of appeal of the order entered "the 12th day of July, 2019." A review of the record demonstrates that Appellant intended to appeal the order entered June 11, 2019. The notice of appeal bears a timestamp of entry on the docket of July 11, 2019, at 10:35 a.m.
On July 16, 2019, the orphans' court denied Appellant's motion to compel on the ground that Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which stayed all matters pending appeal. Orphans' Court Order, 7/16/19. That same day, the orphans' court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within 21 days. Appellant timely complied. On October 4, 2019, in lieu of its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans' court entered an order stating that its June 11, 2019 order was not a final order and Appellant failed to request an interlocutory appeal. Orphans' Court Order, 10/4/19.Estate of Teel, 1306 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 1867006 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 20, 2020) (unpublished mem. at 1-4) (footnotes omitted, some formatting altered).
The prior panel concluded that it had jurisdiction because the order was immediately appealable as an orphans' court order confirming an account, interpreting a will and codicil, and determining an interest in real property under Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(1), (3), and (6). Id. at 6. After review, the panel remanded this matter to the orphans' court "to make findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to Appellant's issues, specifically resolving the issue of ambiguity with the use of the word 'other' as it appears in the [c]odicil." Id. at 9.
For these same reasons, we conclude that the order underlying the instant appeal is immediately appealable and that we have jurisdiction in this matter.
On October 7, 2020, the orphans' court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, denied Appellant's objections and motion to compel, and approved the interim account and proposed distribution. Order, 10/7/20. Appellant filed a timely appeal, and the orphans' court directed Appellant to file concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on December 29, 2020. On February 4, 2021, the orphans' court filed a Rule 1925(a) statement relying on and incorporating its October 7, 2020 findings of facts and conclusions of law.
Initially, we note that in his pro se brief, Appellant's statement of questions presented spans thirteen pages. However, it bears nearly no correlation to Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement. It is well settled that any issues not included in a timely filed court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement are waived on appeal. M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2017). Moreover, we note that although the argument portion of Appellant's brief is very broad in scope, it consists of conclusory statements, accusations, and assertions of Appellant's beliefs that are not supported by argument, the record, or relevant legal authority. This Court has stated:
While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because he lacks legal training. As our Supreme Court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing.Branch Banking and Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006) (formatting altered and citation omitted). "The Rules of Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority." Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 319 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (setting forth the requirements for the argument portion of an appellate brief). "When issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a Court will not consider the merits thereof." Branch Banking and Trust, 904 A.2d at 942-43 (citation omitted). "We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument; instead, we will deem [the] issue to be waived." Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
Here, the only issue Appellant addressed meaningfully and argued somewhat cogently was the issue concerning the ambiguity in the codicil that was part of the basis for this Court's prior remand. Appellant's Brief (Argument Section, at 1-17). Accordingly, that is the only issue we deem preserved on appeal. See Milby, 189 A.3d at 1079; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119.
Appellant states that the codicil made a specific bequest of Decedent's real estate to Appellant's brother David, and then the codicil concluded: "The rest is for the other unless Todd has lost the ground he had given to him." Appellant's Brief (Argument Section, at 4) (verbatim) (quoting Decedent's Codicil, 6/2/15 (verbatim)). Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that that the reasonable interpretation is that there was a specific bequest to David, and the remainder of the real estate was to be divided among "the other" children of Decedent, i.e., all of Decedent's children other than David. Id. at 5-17. Rather, Appellant argues that he alone is "the other" child, and Appellant should receive all the real estate that was not bequeathed to David. Id. at 4, 15.
We note that this argument differs from the issue Appellant raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement wherein Appellant asserted that he should receive all of the real estate except the real estate that was bequeathed to David and bequeathed specifically to his siblings in Decedent's will. Rule 1925(b) Statement, at 4. We could find this issue waived because the argument in Appellant's brief differs from his Rule 1925(b) statement. See M.G., 155 A.3d at 1092. However, we are able to glean the crux of Appellant's argument, which focuses on the interpretation of Decedent's use of the word "other," in the codicil bequest.
Following our review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the well-reasoned conclusions of the orphans' court, we affirm on the basis of the orphans' court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 10/7/20, at 1-11. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the orphans' court's decision. Accordingly, we affirm the October 7, 2020 order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
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