Opinion
No. 97-566-A.
December 21, 1998
Appeal from Providence County, Cresto, J.
William Filippo, for the plaintiff.
Brent Canning, Laura A. Pisaturo, Robert Corrente, for the defendant.
ORDER
This appeal from a final judgment in a breach-of-contract case came before the Court for oral argument on December 7, 1998, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in the plaintiff's appeal should not be summarily decided. The plaintiff, the estate of Alice L. Sweeney, appeals from the grant by the trial justice of a reserved decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of the defendants, Edward O. and Mary Frances Charpentier following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff's estate. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by the appeal should be summarily decided.
The original plaintiff, Alice Sweeney, filed this complaint in 1989. Upon her death in 1994, her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.
Alice L. Sweeney, her daughter Mary Frances Charpentier and her son in law Edward O. Charpentier, in February 1987, decided to purchase a home in which they would live together. The plaintiff contributed $100,000 toward the purchase price, the Charpentiers contributed $30,000 and assumed a $75,000 mortgage on the home. The deed to the property was recorded in defendants' names only; plaintiff's name was not placed on the deed nor was plaintiff's contribution memorialized by any document. The parties then moved into the house and lived together harmoniously through the spring of that year.
In July 1987, after Alice began to complain of problems between her and Edward, the parties signed a document that stated that Alice had contributed $100,000 toward the purchase of the house in Cumberland, "with the stipulation that [Alice] has the right to live at the above mentioned premises for her lifetime." The document further stated that if the home were to be sold, Alice's $100,000 would be returned to her. Alice left the house in December 1987, returned for a week in February, and then moved out permanently.
On March 3, 1989, Alice filed a complaint in Superior Court in which she alleged that the defendants had "intentionally behaved in a manner so as to make [her] occupancy of said premises unbearable" and sought the return of the $100,000 that she had contributed toward the purchase of the property. After trial, a jury found in favor of Alice in the amount of $75,000, the defendants appealed. Subsequently, this Court remanded the matter for a new trial. After a second jury trial, once again the trial jury found in favor of Alice and again awarded her the same amount, $75,000, as in the first trial. The trial justice, who had reserved decision on the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, then granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, finding that there was no competent evidence of damages and that the jury's award of $75,000 was based on speculation. In this appeal, Alice's estate, now the plaintiff, asserts that the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on restitution and erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants.
See Estate of Sweeney v. Charpentier, 675 A.2d 824 (R.I. 1996).
This Court has long recognized that "a damage award must rest upon legally competent evidence and not on speculation or conjecture. * * * But as long as damages are based upon reasonable and probable estimates, mathematical exactitude is not required." Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 929 (R.I. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
A review of the record before us reveals that there was more than ample evidence upon which the trial jury could conclude not only the breach, but as well the damages arising from the breach of the contract between Alice and the Charpentiers to support the verdict. The jury had before it evidence that Edward's conduct had forced Alice to move out of the home that she had purchased with the Charpentiers and that she was required to make alternative living arrangements during the course of the years of her remaining lifetime. The jury reasonably estimated the cost of those alternative living arrangements to be in the amount of $75,000. That finding, based on the trial evidence, was both permissible and reasonable.
The trial justice erred in granting judgment as a matter of law to the defendants. We need not address the plaintiff's contention that the trial justice erred by failing to instruct the jury on restitution as an alternative remedy to damages. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's appeal is sustained and the judgment is reversed. The papers are remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter final judgment upon the verdict as returned by the jury.