Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Inyo County. Super. Ct.No. SICVPB0539966 Kenneth G. Ziebarth, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Jo Ann McDole for Petitioners and Appellants.
No appearance for Objector and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
In his will, Marvin Powell left just $1,000 to his wife Mavis Powell; he left the rest of his estate to his children from a previous marriage, Sheri Multer and Keith Powell. Just five days before dying of cancer, however, Marvin deeded his house to himself and Mavis, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship.
Sheri and Keith filed a petition to recover assets of the estate, allegedly including the house. (Prob. Code, § 850 et seq.) The trial court bifurcated the issues concerning the house from the issues concerning other personal property. After the first phase of trial, it found that Marvin had intended to convey a life estate in the house to Mavis, and the remainder to Sheri and Keith, and that Mavis had used undue influence to obtain the fee. It therefore ordered Mavis to convey a remainder to Sheri and Keith, while retaining a life estate for herself. It referred to this both as “reform[ing]” the deed and as imposing a constructive trust. After the second phase of trial, it additionally ordered that Mavis’s life estate would not terminate if she stopped living in the house and that Mavis would have the right to sue for partition of the house.
Sheri and Keith appeal. In general, they contend that, rather than allowing Mavis to retain a life estate, the trial court should have set aside the deed in its entirety, so that the house would be returned to Marvin’s estate (and would then pass to them). Specifically, they contend that:
1. In a proceeding under Probate Code section 850 et seq., the trial court lacked the authority either to reform the deed or to impose a constructive trust.
2. The trial court erred by imposing a constructive trust in favor of Mavis.
3. The trial court erred by reforming the deed, because:
a. Undue influence is not a statutory basis for reformation; and
b. Marvin and Mavis did not share the same intent.
4. Once having entered its order regarding the house after the first phase of trial, the trial court could not modify it.
5. The trial court erred by refusing to award double damages against Mavis pursuant to Probate Code section 859.
We find no prejudicial error. Hence, we will affirm.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The first phase of trial was not reported. We therefore take our statement of facts from the trial court’s statement of decision.
In 1987, Marvin and Mavis were married. At that time, Marvin already owned a house in Big Pine.
In 1992, Marvin executed a will in which he left $1,000 to Mavis, and all of his other assets to his children from an earlier marriage — Sheri and Keith.
In April 2005, Marvin learned that he had prostate cancer and that it was terminal. Mavis became his primary caregiver. In August 2005, he told at least five friends and family members that he was leaving his house to his children, but he wanted Mavis to live there for the rest of her life.
On August 29, 2005, Mavis met with Attorney James Douglas Buchanan. She told him that Marvin was too sick to come, so she was acting on his behalf. She explained that Marvin wanted to know how he could avoid having the house go to his children and could provide her with a place to live for the rest of her life. Buchanan told her that Marvin had three options: (1) he could execute a will leaving the house to Mavis; (2) he could execute a deed conveying the house to himself and Mavis, in joint tenancy; or (3) he could execute a deed conveying a life estate in the house to Mavis and the remainder to his children.
Mavis, however, did not want Marvin’s children to have any interest in the house. Accordingly, when she told Marvin about this conversation, she intentionally did not tell him that he had the option of giving her only a life estate in the house and giving his children a remainder.
On August 31, 2005, Mavis told Buchanan that Marvin wanted him to prepare a deed conveying the house to himself and Mavis in joint tenancy. On September 2, 2005, Buchanan brought such a deed to Marvin’s home. He explained to Marvin that it would mean transferring the house to Mavis and not to his children. Marvin confirmed that that was what he wanted to do. Marvin then signed the deed.
At this point, Marvin was weak, in pain, depressed, disoriented, and bedridden. He was under the influence of large doses of fentanyl, a powerful synthetic opiate, and risperdal, an anti psychotic drug that “can cause a ‘zombie-like’ effect.” He had significant memory loss, and his ability to make decisions was impaired. He was “completely dependent on others to do for him.”
Marvin died on September 7, 2005.
II
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2005, Sheri and Keith filed a petition for the administration of Marvin’s estate. Next, they filed a petition to determine title to specified real and personal property. (Prob. Code, § 850.) Concerning the house, they alleged that Marvin’s deed to Mavis was the product of undue influence. They requested a declaration that the house was the property of the estate and an order that Mavis reconvey the house to the estate. They also requested double damages for a bad-faith taking of property of the estate. (Prob. Code, § 859.)
The trial court bifurcated the issue of the ownership of the house and ordered it tried separately. It then held a bench trial on that issue.
On May 4, 2006, the trial court issued a statement of intended decision. It proposed to find that Mavis had exercised undue influence by failing to disclose to Marvin all three of the options that Attorney Buchanan had described and, in particular, by failing to disclose to Marvin that he had the option of conveying a life estate in the house to her and a remainder to his children. It therefore proposed to “set aside” the deed and to declare it “null and void.” However, it also proposed to “reform” the deed “to comply with the expressed desire of Marvin to grant a life estate to [Mavis] with the remainder interest to Keith and Sheri . . . .” To that end, it proposed to order Mavis to “execute a new deed forthwith that complies with Marvin’s wishes . . . .”
Sheri and Keith objected to the statement of intended decision on the sole ground that the deed was void and therefore could not be reformed; hence, the only appropriate remedy was to return the house to the estate.
On June 15, 2006, the trial court responded to Sheri and Keith’s objection by amending its statement of intended decision so as to declare the deed “voidable” rather than “null and void.” It explained that it was appropriate to reform the deed because Marvin had “mistakenly executed the type of deed that he executed as the result of the undue influence of Mavis . . . .” It also stated that “the most appropriate remedy . . . is to impose a constructive trust on Mavis and require her to execute a new deed which provides a life estate . . . to her and a remainder interest to other parties . . . where that was what the parties intended.” It adopted the statement of intended decision, as amended, as its final statement of decision.
Accordingly, on July 14, 2006, the trial court entered an order stating that the deed “is set aside and shall be reformed by the immediate execution of a new deed by Mavis Powell conveying to herself a life estate . . . with a remainder interest to Sheri Multer and Keith Powell.” The order further stated: “ . . . Mavis Powell’s life estate shall terminate upon her death or upon her failure to reside on the premises, whichever first occurs.” (Italics added.)
Mavis immediately requested “clarification” of the order. Among other things, she asked, “[C]an she sue for partition? Can she temporarily live elsewhere (voluntarily or otherwise) . . . without losing her life estate? . . . Can she permanently live elsewhere, renting the house for income and to maintain it, but personally downsizing to a place she can better afford?”
On September 12, 2006, the trial court directed Mavis to sign a deed conveying a life estate to herself and a remainder to Sheri and Keith; it reserved ruling on the issues Mavis had raised. Accordingly, on September 15, 2006, Mavis recorded such a deed.
The trial court proceeded to hold a trial on the bifurcated issues concerning the personal property. At the end of that trial, it asked the parties to file briefs concerning any further order it should make regarding the house.
Mavis filed a brief in which she argued, among other things, that she should be “entitled to rent the [house] or sue for partition of her interest.”
Sheri and Keith filed a brief arguing that the life estate should terminate if Mavis moved out. They also argued that “[t]he July 14, 2006 order is binding,” because Mavis had not objected to the statement of intended decision and because she had not moved to set the order aside under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.
On March 16, 2007, the trial court issued a second statement of intended decision in which, among other things, it proposed to order: “The life tenant, Mavis Powell, shall be entitled to enjoy the rents and profits from the [house] even if she decides at some point in the future not to continue to occupy the premises . . . .” It also proposed to order: “If Mavis Powell should decide . . . that she wishes to sell her interest in the [house] and [Sheri and Keith] are either unwilling or unable to purchase her interest, she shall have the right to file an action in partition to have the court determine the fair market value of the respective interests of the parties at that time . . . .”
Sheri and Keith objected to the statement of intended decision, arguing, among other things, that the trial court could not modify either its June 15, 2006 statement of decision or its July 14, 2006, order.
On April 17, 2007, the trial court overruled these objections. It therefore entered an order consistent with its statement of intended decision.
On July 30, 2007, the trial court entered a judgment on the Probate Code section 850 petition. It stated: “[Sheri and Keith] requested monetary damages pursuant to Probate Code section 859. The Court finds though there had been undue influence, the facts of the case do not give rise to a finding of bad faith or that anything was wrongfully taken, concealed or disposed. Based thereon, the Court denie[s] [the] request for monetary damages . . . .”
III
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court’s Statutory Authority.
Sheri and Keith contend that, in a proceeding under Probate Code section 850 et seq., the trial court was not authorized to reform the deed or impose a constructive trust.
Preliminarily, we note that they forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below. Even if not forfeited, however, the contention lacks merit.
Sheri and Keith’s petition was filed pursuant to Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(2)(D). Under that statute, “[w]here the decedent died having a claim to real or personal property, title to or possession of which is held by another,” “any interested person” “may file a petition requesting that the court make an order under this part . . . .” (Id., subd. (a).)
“An action brought under [Probate Code section 850] may include claims, causes of action, or matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are related factually to the subject matter of [the] petition . . . .” (Prob. Code, § 855.) “[I]f the court is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make an order authorizing and directing . . . the person having title to or possession of the property[] to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting other appropriate relief.” (Prob. Code, § 856.)
A probate court “is a court of general jurisdiction and . . . has the same power and authority with respect to the proceedings as otherwise provided by law for a superior court . . . .” (Prob. Code, § 800.) “In the exercise of its legal and equitable powers [citations], a superior court sitting in probate that has jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the claim. A claimant is not required to sever and litigate a multifaceted claim in separate proceedings once all the necessary parties are before the court.” (Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, 197.) “To deny a superior court sitting in probate the power to determine the whole controversy between the parties before it is pointless.” (Ibid.; see also Estate of Fincher (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 343, 350.)
Sheri and Keith’s petition alleged that Mavis had obtained the house through undue influence and that it properly belonged to the estate. This was an appropriate petition under Probate Code section 850. Once the dispute was properly before the court, however, it could consider any other factually related matters. Moreover, under Probate Code section 856, it could “order. . . the person having title to or possession of the property[] to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto . . . .” Thus, it properly determined that Mavis was entitled to a life estate in the house; however, she had obtained the remainder through undue influence, and the remainder properly belonged to Sheri and Keith. It was therefore authorized to order Mavis to execute a deed conveying a life estate to herself and the remainder to Sheri and Keith, rather than to the estate
B. The Remedy of a Constructive Trust.
Sheri and Keith contend that the trial court erred by imposing a constructive trust. While their argument on this point is far from clear, it appears to have three prongs.
First, they argue that “the court could not impose a constructive trust in Mavis’ favor . . . .” That, however, is not what the trial court did. By virtue of Marvin’s deed, Mavis already held record title to the house. That title could be viewed as a life estate plus a remainder. Basically, the trial court found that Mavis did not use undue influence to obtain the life estate; Marvin would have wanted her to have that in any event. However, she did use undue influence to obtain the remainder, which Marvin would have wanted to go to his children. The trial court therefore imposed a constructive trust on the remainder, in favor of Sheri and Keith. However, it did not impose a constructive trust on the life estate in favor of Mavis; she continued to own that under the deed.
Second, they argue that Mavis was not entitled to any “equitable relief” because she had “unclean hands.” Once again, this has matters backwards. The trial court awarded Sheri and Keith equitable relief against Mavis (just not all they wanted). It did not award her any equitable relief against them. It simply let her retain that portion of her interest in the house that she had obtained without any undue influence.
Third, they argue that the trial court set aside the deed from Marvin to Mavis, and therefore Mavis had no interest in the house on which a constructive trust could be imposed. This reads too much into the isolated words, “set aside.” Once again, under the deed from Marvin, Mavis did have an interest in the house — she had the fee. The effect of the trial court’s rulings, when taken as a whole, was to “set aside” the grant of the remainder to Mavis by imposing a constructive trust on it and, hence, by ordering Mavis to convey it to Sheri and Keith.
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by imposing a constructive trust on the remainder (and only the remainder) and ordering Mavis to convey it to Sheri and Keith.
C. The Remedy of Reformation.
Sheri and Keith contend that there were insufficient grounds for reformation of the deed.
Preliminarily, any such error was harmless because the trial court could and did achieve the same result by imposing a constructive trust. (Civ. Code, § 2244.) Even assuming the trial court erred by using the label “reformation,” Sheri and Keith are not entitled to reversal because they cannot show that the error was prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 801-802.)
However, we also reject this contention on the merits.
First, Sheri and Keith contend that reformation is available as a remedy for fraud or mistake, but not for undue influence. (See Civ. Code, § 3399.) The trial court, however, essentially found both undue influence and mistake. It explained that Marvin “mistakenly executed the type of deed that he executed as the result of the undue influence of Mavis . . . .” It further explained that Mavis was aware of Marvin’s mistake: “ . . . Mavis knew that the type of deed that she had the attorney prepare for Marvin’s signature did not carry out Marvin’s expressed intention.”
Second, Sheri and Keith contend that Marvin and Mavis did not share the same intent. Admittedly, the overall purpose of reformation is to “express the intention of the parties . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3399.) However, an instrument can be reformed not only for “mutual mistake,” but also for “a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected . . . .” (Ibid.) This is true even though, in that event, the parties do not actually have the same intention. “When the mistake of one party is . . . known or suspected by the other party, the other party’s intention to enter into the transaction on the basis of the unmistaken facts is presumed. [Citations.] This presumed intention is based on an estoppel resulting from the other party’s inequitable conduct. [Citation.]” (La Mancha Dev. Corp. v. Sheegog (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 9, 17, fn. omitted.)
Separately and alternatively, we also note that a deed given as a gift can be reformed based on the intent of the grant or alone. (Tyler v. Larson (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 317, 319-320.) “Under [Civil Code section 3399] a mistake of one of the parties alone is not sufficient ground for reformation. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 319.) “‘But the section was never intended to overthrow well-settled principles upon which equity has been administered under the common law. The section certainly does not contain all the law with respect to the correction of mistakes in courts of equity.’” (Ibid., quoting Enos v. Stewart (1902) 138 Cal. 112, 115.) “It is old and well-established law that equity, at the instance of a grant or, his heirs, devisees, or representatives, will reform a voluntary conveyance, where, by mistake of law or fact, a larger estate or more land has been granted than was intended to be conveyed; and it is immaterial that the grantee is cognizant of the mistake. The grantee has given nothing for the conveyance; he is deprived of nothing; and he cannot complain if the mistake is corrected. [Citations.]” (Tyler, at pp. 319-320.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by ordering reformation.
D. Modification of the July 14, 2006, Order.
Sheri and Keith contend that the trial court erred by modifying its July 14, 2006, order in its April 17, 2007, order so as to provide that Mavis did not have to live in the house and could sue for partition.
“[T]rial courts have the inherent power to reconsider and correct their own interim decisions in order to achieve substantial justice. [Citations.]” (Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 388.) “Even after a court has issued a written decision, the court retains the power to change its findings of fact or conclusions of law until judgment is entered. [Citation.] ‘Until a judgment is entered, it is not effectual for any purpose [citation], and at any time before it is entered, the court may change its conclusions of law and enter a judgment different from that first announced. [Citations.] Moreover, a judge who has heard the evidence may at any time before entry of judgment amend or change his findings of fact. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Bay World Trading, Ltd. v. Nebraska Beef, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 135, 141, quoting Phillips v. Phillips (1953) 41 Cal.2d 869, 874; see, e.g., Solis v. Contra Costa County (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 844, 846-847.)
Sheri and Keith therefore contend that the July 14, 2006, order was, in fact, a judgment. Parenthetically, this seems to be shooting themselves in the foot; if they are correct, they cannot challenge the July 14, 2006, “judgment” at all, because they failed to file a timely appeal from it.
Actually, however, the July 14, 2006, order was interlocutory and nonappealable. Sheri and Keith’s petition sought an order determining the ownership not only of the house, but also of personal property. The trial court bifurcated the issues regarding the house and ordered them tried separately. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 598, 1048.) “Generally, if a trial is bifurcated . . ., there is no appealable ‘final judgment’ until all phases of the trial have concluded. Except to the extent otherwise authorized by statute [citation], the interim, bifurcated determinations are not separately appealable. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 2:50; accord, Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743 [“an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately”].) Thus, the July 14, 2006, order was not a judgment.
Sheri and Keith also rely on Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 464. There, the trial was bifurcated into a court trial on one party’s indemnification claims and a jury trial on the opposing party’s breach of contract and tort claims. (Id. at pp. 486-487.) At the beginning of the jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it was bound by the factual findings the court had already made. (Id. at p. 487.) The appellate court held that this was not error. (Id. at pp. 487-489.) It explained, in part: “Issues adjudicated in earlier phases of a bifurcated trial are binding in later phases of that trial and need not be relitigated. [Citations.] No other rule is possible, or bifurcation of trial issues would create duplication, thus subverting the procedure’s goal of efficiency. [Citation.] ‘[D]uplication of effort is the very opposite of the purpose of bifurcated trials.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 487, quoting Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888.)
Thus, Arntz simply held that an issue determined in the first phase of a bifurcated trial need not be redetermined in the second phase. That is a far cry from holding that it cannot be redetermined. Moreover, in Arntz, there was the complication that the decision maker in the second phase was different from the decision maker in the first phase. It is not controlling here, where the decision maker in both phases was the same.
Significantly, “[w]here there has been an interlocutory judgment rendered by one judge, and that judge then becomes unavailable to decide the remainder of the case, a successor judge is obliged to hear the evidence and make his or her own decision on all issues, including those that had been tried before the first judge, unless the parties stipulate otherwise. [Citation.] This is because an interlocutory judgment is subject to modification at any time prior to entry of a final judgment. [Citation.]” (European Beverage, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1214, italics added.)
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err by modifying its July 14, 2006, order.
E. Refusal to Award Double Damages.
Sheri and Keith contend that the trial court erred by refusing to award them double damages pursuant to Probate Code section 859.
Probate Code section 859, as relevant here, provides: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to the estate of a decedent, . . . the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered by an action under this part.” (Italics added.)
Of course, as we already discussed in part III.A, ante, the trial court ruled that the house did not belong to the estate at all; rather, the life estate belonged to Mavis, and the remainder belonged to Sheri and Keith. Arguably Mavis may have taken the remainder wrongfully and in bad faith. It necessarily follows, however, that she did not take any “property belonging to the estate” wrongfully and in bad faith.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Mavis is awarded costs on appeal against Sheri and Keith.
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P.J., MILLER, J.