Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. PES-06-289020
Kline, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Henry Stevens appeals from a judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court against him and in favor of respondent Yolanda Paul (Yolanda) on his petition to quiet title to property located on Newhall Street in San Francisco (Newhall). Appellant contends the court erred in determining that he had failed to prove the deed conveying the property from decedent Yvonne Paul (decedent or Yvonne) to her daughter Yolanda was forged. Specifically, he contends: (1) The trial court applied an incorrect standard of proof for weighing evidence of the authenticity of known exemplars of decedent’s signatures and comparing them with signatures on the questioned deed; (2) The court erred in concluding that appellant had failed to prove the deed was forged; (3) The statement of decision issued by the court was deficient in several respects, including: (a) the failure to find whether the presumption of ownership in decedent overcame the presumption of title in Yolanda, (b) the failure to find whether decedent intended to transfer the Newhall property by her will and not by a deed executed four years later, and (c) whether Yolanda procured decedent’s signature by undue influence; and (4) The court erred in determining that there was no credible evidence of adverse possession.
We shall affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Related actions
On August 10, 2006, appellant filed a petition for letters of administration in the probate division of the San Francisco Superior Court (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2006, No. PES-06-289020). On August 28, 2006, Yolanda filed objections to the petition and filed Yvonne’s will, dated January 23, 1984 and naming Yolanda executor. On September 5, 2006, appellant filed a reply to Yolanda’s objections to his petition and a supplemental petition for order under Probate Code section 850 and the Elder Abuse Act. On December 15, 2006, Yolanda petitioned for probate of the will and petitioned for letters of administration. On February 20, 2007, the court appointed the San Francisco Public Administrator as special administrator of the estate with the powers of a general administrator during the pendency of the will contest. On March 14, 2007, appellant filed a will contest.
The will left the Newhall property to Yolanda and her sister Paula, and the residue of the estate to all seven children. It expressly disinherited appellant.
On August 1, 2006, Yolanda served appellant with a “30 Day Notice of Termination of Guest Status.” In response, appellant filed a forcible detainer action against Yolanda (Super. Ct S.F. City and County, 2006, No. 06-619215). The court granted summary judgment for Yolanda in the forcible detainer action on May 2, 2007 and judgment was entered on May 31, 2007. On May 18, 2007, immediately following the court’s grant of summary judgment for Yolanda in the forcible detainer action, appellant filed an action in the superior court (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2007, No. CGC-07-463506), alleging causes of action for elder abuse, wrongful eviction pursuant to the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The trial court granted Yolanda’s anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 on October 10, 2007 (“Order granting defendant’s special motion to strike first, second, third and fourth causes of action pursuant to CCP § 425.16”). Appellant’s appeal from that order was dismissed by Division One of this court on April 23, 2008 (case No. A120588). Appellant’s petition for review was denied by the Supreme Court on July 10, 2008.
The instant action (case No. PES-06-289020)
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2006, appellant filed a “Verified First Amended Petition for Order Under Probate Code §§ 850 et seq., and the Elder Abuse Act–W&I Code §§ 15657 et seq.,” alleging the deed had been forged; that appellant had a community property interest in the property and had made contributions to mortgage payments and tax payments and repairs, entitling him to a credit in the estate administration; that Yolanda had fraudulently taken loans on the property; and that the deed and the will had been procured by fraud and undue influence. On October 15, 2007, appellant filed a “Verified Supplemental Petition to Quiet Title to Real Property (Adverse Possession), Supplementing Verified Petition for Order Under Probate Code, Sec. 850 et seq.” The supplemental petition sought to “quiet title in Decedent’s successors-in-interest” and to add allegations of adverse possession by Yvonne, and also, apparently, by appellant. “The basis of the claim to title is the actual, open, exclusive, hostile, and adverse possession of the above-described property by [appellant] and Decedent for more than five years preceding the commencement of this action . . . and the payment by Decedent of all taxes assessed against the property for more than five years preceding the commencement of this action.”
Appellant’s petition for leave to file an amendment, his verified supplemental petition to quiet title to real property, and Yolanda’s motion to strike the supplemental petition were advanced to be heard with other matters in the probate court on November 29, 2007. However, on August 21, 2007, the probate department referred the underlying petition pursuant to Probate Code section 850 and action for Elder Abuse, to the presiding judge to be set for trial on the master calendar. Because the matter was set for trial on the master calendar, any change of pleadings or related motions was required to be set for hearing in the law and motion department. The probate department declined to rule on appellant’s petition for leave to file an amendment, verified supplemental petition (adding the adverse possession claim), or Yolanda’s motion to strike. They were therefore dropped from the probate department calendar. The only matters heard in the probate department were the petition for the probate of Yvonne’s will, and appellant’s petition for letters of administration. (“Order re: verified supplemental petition to quiet title to real property, motion to strike and petition for leave to file amendment,” filed November 30, 2007.)
The “Verified First Amended Petition for Order Under Probate Code §§ 850 et seq., . . .” was assigned for trial on January 7, 2008. The parties filed trial briefs and a court trial began on January 8, before the Honorable Thomas Mellon, and concluded on January 9, 2008. At the end of the presentation of evidence, the court ruled for Yolanda and ordered her counsel to prepare a proposed statement of decision. A tentative statement of decision issued. Appellant also filed his own statement of controverted issues and request for hearing. The statement of decision was issued on January 30, 2008. Appellant filed his “Objections . . . To Proposed Statement of Decision” on February 4, 2008. Judgment was entered on February 25, 2008, and this timely appeal followed.
FACTS
Yvonne and her then husband, James Paul, purchased the Newhall property around 1969, taking title as joint tenants. James died in 1975, and on January 9, 1980, Yvonne recorded an affidavit of death of joint tenant. Yvonne married appellant in 1978. It was stipulated that at the time of the marriage to appellant and at all times until 1988, Yvonne held sole title to Newhall. After their marriage, appellant lived with Yvonne and six of her seven children. Throughout their marriage, neither Yvonne nor appellant was employed. Yvonne was retired due to disability from her job as a postal worker. Appellant’s income during his marriage came from social security. Yvonne’s children contributed significantly to the costs of maintaining the household. Among other things, Yvonne’s daughter Jacqueline Jones would buy things for the household and Yolanda, who had been gainfully employed since her graduation from high school, would take her mother shopping and buy her clothing. On many occasions, from the time she lived at home until Yvonne’s death, Yolanda would pay for property taxes and for anything her mother needed. Jacqueline testified that Yolanda would give Yvonne cash, which Jacqueline would help Yvonne deposit in her account. Appellant acknowledged that Yvonne was grateful for the help she received from Yolanda, as well as for Jacqueline’s help. Appellant also acknowledged that Yvonne had told him that Yolanda was the person Yvonne most relied upon. Yvonne also told appellant that she could not rely on her other children, particularly her sons.
At one time, for about one year, appellant’s name was on a bank account with Yvonne, but that was changed. Appellant did not know that Yvonne maintained bank accounts in her name and in the names of one or more of her daughters, including an account with Jacqueline at the Bank of America. Appellant never questioned Yvonne about her financial affairs. Yvonne had a safe, to which appellant did not have access; however the children knew the combination. Appellant had been hospitalized for alcoholism in 1984. He was again hospitalized for alcoholism when he became despondent after Yvonne’s death.
On May 20, 1988, Yvonne deeded Newhall to Yolanda by executing and delivering a grant deed to Yolanda. Yolanda was not living at home on that date. She was living in Sacramento and working for First Nationwide Bank in Sacramento. Yolanda testified that Yvonne told her that she (Yvonne) had prepared a deed, deeding the property to Yolanda, and wanted someone to notarize her signature. Yolanda arranged for Karlotta Demers, who worked with Yolanda at First Nationwide Bank in Daly City, to come to Newhall to notarize Yvonne’s signature. On May 20, 1988, Yolanda witnessed her mother sign the grant deed when it was notarized. Yolanda did not know who had typed the information on the deed, and she had not helped her mother get that information. She assumed her mother typed the deed, but did not know that for a fact. Yolanda did not request anyone to type the deed. Yvonne signed her name on a signature line under a declaration relating to documentary transfer tax, instead of the more conventional signature line for the grantor. The deed was notarized by Demers after Yvonne signed it. Yvonne took the deed and gave it to Yolanda, who took it with her. The deed was recorded on June 10, 1988. Yolanda was with her mother at the recorder’s office where Yolanda presented the deed to be recorded.
On April 19, 1994, the deed was re-signed by Yvonne, by signing it twice on the grantor line of the deed, and then re-recorded. Yolanda has a specific recollection of Yvonne signing the deed. Yvonne and Yolanda again took the deed to the recorder’s office. The deed contained the handwritten words “Being recorded to include signatures.”
Appellant presented evidence that the signatures on the deed were not Yvonne’s through appellant, who stated the signatures did not look like Yvonne’s, and through expert document examiner Patricia Fisher. Fisher testified that she had compared Yvonne’s signatures on the Affidavit of Death of Joint Tenant, the will, and checks Yvonne issued to the San Francisco tax collector with the signatures on the deed. It was her qualified opinion that “Mrs. Yvonne Paul did not sign the three signatures that appear on the grant deed with the two filings of June 1988 and April 1994.” The opinion was “qualified” because Fisher had not had an opportunity to examine the original of any documents and had not seen the original signatures on the deed until trial. The court questioned whether the exemplars containing the purported genuine signature of Yvonne had been established as authentic. It questioned whether appellant’s testimony to that effect would be sufficient, observing that it would not be “proof positive,” but would simply be evidence to be weighed. Appellant’s counsel agreed. Fisher acknowledged that in order to opine on the authenticity of a questioned signature, one has to have an established exemplar of an authentic signature.
Appellant was called to identify the signatures on the deed and the purported exemplars. He testified that signatures on the deed did not look like Yvonne’s signature. He testified that the signatures on the will and the marriage certificate looked like Yvonne’s. He further testified, with two exceptions, that various checks to the tax collector “look[ed] like Yvonne’s signature,” or were her signature. However, to his counsel’s surprise, he testified that the signature on the Affidavit of Death of Joint Tenant did not look like Yvonne’s, and that signatures on two checks to the tax collector dated April 5, 2004 and November 20, 1999 were not Yvonne’s signature.
Respondent called expert document examiner John Owen to opine that the signatures on the deed were genuine and that he accepted that the comparators were the “known” signatures of Yvonne. However, the court refused to allow Owen to testify because Yolanda had not produced the original deed in response to appellant’s request for production and Owen had the opportunity to examine the original deed, while Fisher did not.
Yvonne’s daughters Kathleen Ruffin and Jacqueline each testified that they had seen Yvonne’s handwriting many times and they recognized the signatures on the deed as their mother’s. Jacqueline testified that she had helped her mother since she was 16 years old, that she saw her mother write all her checks, and that she was with Yvonne when Yvonne took care of her business. She further testified that Yvonne had said she was deeding the property to Yolanda before the deed was signed. Jacqueline and her sisters all knew the property had been deeded to Yolanda and none of them objected.
Following the close of evidence, the court found in favor of Yolanda and against appellant that there was no evidence that Yvonne did not sign the deed.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence
Appellant first contends the trial court did not apply the correct standard of proof in weighing the evidence and second, that it erred in concluding that he had failed to prove the deed was a forgery. Appellant appears to rest this argument on the premise that the “correct standard of proof” required the court to accept the exemplars as known signatures of the decedent and either to accept Fisher’s qualified opinion that the signatures on the exemplars and the three signatures on the deed were not from the same person, or to conduct its own examination of the signatures. At one point, appellant argues that the testimony of three of Yvonne’s adult daughters that the signatures on the deed were decedent’s “was entitled to very little weight alongside the expert testimony . . . .” This argument exhibits fundamental misconceptions of the law regarding evidence of authenticity of writings and of the substantial evidence standard of review.
In the face of an objection, writings must be authenticated before they are received in evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1401 ; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 525-526; Jacobson v. Gourley (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1334; Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2008) ¶ 8:315 (Wegner).) “Upon timely challenge, a writing’s authenticity must be established as a prerequisite to its admissibility. It is a ‘preliminary fact’ upon which admissibility depends. [(§§ 400, 403, subd. (a))]” (Wegner, ¶ 8:327.) “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (§ 1400; see Wegner, ¶ 8:317.)
All statutory references are to the Evidence Code, unless otherwise indicated.
The preliminary finding of authenticity by the judge allows the writing to be admitted into evidence. With certain exceptions, the party offering the writing has the burden of offering sufficient evidence of a writing’s authenticity to sustain a finding of fact to that effect. (§ 403, subd. (a)(3); Wegner, supra, ¶¶ 8:328-8:329.) However, “[i]n some instances, a presumption of authenticity may also attach to a writing authenticated in a particular manner. . . . Where a presumption applies, the trier of fact is required to find that the writing is authentic unless the requisite contrary showing is made. [Citations.]” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com, 29B Pt. 4, West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 1400, p. 440.) A notarized deed is one example of a “ ‘self-authenticating’ writing.” Hence, a notarized deed is presumed to be authentic. The effect is to shift the burden of producing evidence to the party opposing the writing. Absent controverting evidence, the trier of fact must find the writing authentic. (Jacobson v. Gourley, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334; Wegner, ¶¶ 8:360-8:361.) “But if the party opposing the writing produces enough evidence to sustain a finding that it is not authentic, the presumption ‘disappears.’ [Italics in original.] In such event, the [trier of fact] determines the writing’s authenticity as a question of fact based on all the evidence. [(See §§ 1450, 604.)]” (Wegner, ¶ 8:360, italics added.)
Here, the court concluded that appellant had failed to prove the deed was a forgery. As a preliminary matter, it allowed the notarized deed into evidence as a “self-authenticating” writing. It also allowed the exemplars into evidence, although it ultimately was unconvinced that appellant had proved their genuineness. It nevertheless allowed the testimony of Fisher as to her qualified opinion that the deed was not signed by the same person who signed the exemplars.
As explained in Simons, California Evidence Manual (Thompson-West 2007) § 8:10 at page 518: “A writing may be authenticated by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker. (. . . § 1415.) Three methods of doing this exist:
“An expert witness may provide evidence of the genuineness, or the lack thereof, of a writing after a comparison of such writing with a writing exemplar. An exemplar is a writing that the adverse party has admitted or treated as genuine or has otherwise been proved genuine to the court’s satisfaction. (. . . § 1418.) [Italics added.]
“The trier of fact may compare a questioned handwriting with a handwriting exemplar, as defined above, and determine whether the handwriting is genuine. (. . . § 1417.) Thus a jury may determine in a criminal as well as a civil case that a party signed a document by comparing the handwriting on the questioned document to an authenticated exemplar of the party’s handwriting. [(People v. Rodriguez (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 545, 553-554.)]
“A nonexpert witness may state an opinion as to whether a questioned writing is in the handwriting of a supposed writer if the witness has personal knowledge of that writer’s handwriting by any means including but not limited to: [¶] Having seen the supposed writer write, [¶] Having seen a writing purporting to be in the writer’s handwriting and on which the writer has acted or been charged, or [¶] Having received letters in the due course of mail purporting to be from the writer in response to letters duly addressed and mailed by the witness to the writer. (. . . § 1416.)” (Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual, supra, § 8:10, p. 518.)
Here, the court heard both the expert testimony of Fisher that the signatures on the deed were not made by the same person who signed the exemplars. It also heard the testimony of appellant that the signatures on the deed were not decedent’s. Finally, it heard the testimony of three of Yvonne’s adult daughters, all of whom testified that the signatures on the deed were those of decedent. Yolanda testified that she had a specific recollection of her mother signing the deed and that the signatures on the deed were her mother’s. Kathleen testified that she had seen her mother’s handwriting and she recognized the signatures as her mother’s. Jacqueline testified that she had helped her mother since she was 16 years old, that she saw her mother write all her checks and was with her when she took care of her business. She testified that the signatures on the deed were her mother’s. She further testified that decedent had said she was deeding the property to Yolanda before the deed was signed, and that Jacqueline and all her sisters knew about it and did not object. Kathleen and Jacqueline were particularly credible as they gained nothing by verifying their mother’s signatures on the deed.
After hearing all the evidence, the court also determined that the exemplars used as a basis for comparison of Yvonne’s signature and relied upon by Fisher were “not proven to contain Yvonne’s true signature.” It concluded that appellant had “failed to prove the deed from Yvonne to Yolanda is a forgery,” and further concluded that “the deed from Yvonne to Yolanda was executed and delivered by Yvonne to Yolanda with the intent to transfer title to Newhall to Yolanda.”
As we have observed above, an exemplar is a “writing (a) which the court finds was admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or (b) otherwise proved genuine to the court’s satisfaction.” (§ 1418.) The determination that the exemplar is genuine is for the trial court to make. Here, the court’s finding that the exemplars were not proven to contain Yvonne’s true signature is supported by substantial evidence. Appellant testified that some of the exemplars contained decedent’s signature. However, as the court recognized, he also testified the signatures on the affidavit of death of joint tenant and the checks to the tax collector written on April 5, 2004 and November 20, 1999 did not look like Yvonne’s signature. Nor do we agree with appellant that counsel for Yolanda “conceded” that the comparators were genuine. In response to the court’s question as to “who was writing the checks to pay the mortgage, the taxes, and any insurance on the property,” counsel stated that it was his understanding that “[a]t times, one of the daughters was writing a check. At other times, money was simply delivered to the collector of taxes, and payment of the taxes. [¶] My understanding is that Yvonne Paul was capable of writing checks, and once she had money put into her account by Yolanda, that she made payments—” This statement does not constitute a concession that the comparators introduced here were genuine. Although there may have been sufficient evidence that the exemplars were genuine to allow the court to so find, it was not compelled to conclude that they were genuine signatures of the decedent in the face of conflicting evidence.
We note that the finding that the exemplar is genuine, which must be established either by admission by the opponent of the exemplar or proved to the court’s satisfaction, is unlike the preliminary finding of authenticity made by a judge to allow a document to be considered by the trier of fact, which requires only “introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is.” (§ 1400, italics added.)
Appellant appears to argue that in the absence of contrary expert testimony, the court was required either to believe Fisher or to conduct its own comparison of signatures to establish the authenticity or lack thereof of the deed. This is not the case. No one method of authentication recognized by the statutes trumps any other. Substantial evidence as to whether a questioned writing is in the handwriting of a supposed writer may be provided by the opinion of a nonexpert witness, where the witness has personal knowledge of that writer’s handwriting by any means. (§ 1416.) Nor do any of the cases relied upon by appellant support a contrary conclusion.
Appellant relies upon Estate of Nielson (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 796, which held the trial court erred when it concluded that there was “ ‘no evidence’ ” presented as to the authorship of deletions and interlineations on the face of a will, because the court itself could compare the questioned handwriting in the will with handwriting conceded to be that of the testator. (Id. at p. 801.) “Where the issue is the questioned authorship of a will, the trier of fact can determine the issue by a comparison of the questioned writing with ‘genuine’ or admitted handwriting of the testator without the aid or the oral testimony of any witness. [Citations.] Thus, no handwriting expert or testimony was necessary. The court—the trier of fact—had the testator’s admitted handwriting before it in the proffered will. It was authorized by law to determine the authenticity of the ‘questioned handwriting by comparison’ with the conceded handwriting of the testator.” (Ibid.) Unlike Estate of Nielson, in the instant case, there was no need for the court to do its own comparison absent any other evidence of authorship. As we have stated, in this case there was more than substantial evidence that the deed was signed by Yvonne. Furthermore, the court was not required to accept the exemplars as genuine.
In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 545, relying on Estate of Nielson, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 796 and section 1417, the court held that the jury in a criminal case could determine that the defendant signed a document by comparing handwriting on a questioned document to an authenticated exemplar of defendant’s handwriting and that the comparison of the signature on the defendant’s driver’s license with the questioned claims forms provided substantial evidence that defendant signed the forms. (Id. at pp. 547, 552-553.) Again, the case did not hold that the trier of fact was required to compare the writings where other evidence of genuineness was present, but merely that it might do so.
Nor does Corn v. State Bar (1968) 68 Cal.2d 461, advance appellant’ argument. There, the petitioner in a state bar disciplinary hearing admitted that two different endorsements had been signed by him. Handwriting experts opined that the average lay person looking at the two signatures would think they had been written by two different persons. The ultimate question was the petitioner’s state of mind in signing the second endorsement and whether he intended to disguise his handwriting, allowing the average lay person to think that it had been signed by his wife. The case stands for the unremarkable proposition that an expert opinion is not inadmissible merely because it coincides with an ultimate fact and that a handwriting expert’s opinion properly may be based upon comparison of writings. (Id. at pp. 465-466.)
In this case, the authenticity of the deed was an ultimate issue of fact for the court to determine as the trier of fact. Even assuming that Fisher’s testimony was sufficient to overcome the self-authenticating presumption of authenticity of the deed (and there is considerable doubt as to this, given the somewhat confusing testimony about the genuineness of the exemplars used as a basis for comparing Yvonne’s signature), appellant is wrong in his conclusion that Yolanda “failed to come forward with evidence sufficient to meet her burden on the genuineness of [the deed].” Ample evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant had failed to prove the deed was forged and that Yvonne executed the deed to Yolanda.
Appellant cites Herbert v. Lankershim (1937) 9 Cal.2d 409, in support of the proposition that Fisher’s opinion was entitled to greater weight than the testimony of Yvonne’s three daughters regarding the genuineness of the deed. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, although the evidence was somewhat conflicting, an implied finding of the trial court that the confidant of an aged and feeble old man had rebutted the presumption that she had secured a $500,000 note from him by fraud, was unsupported. The Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-confidant, observing that the expert testimony evidence (borne out by its own scrutiny of the instrument at issue) “cannot be arbitrarily ignored or nullified by the jury’s verdict based upon the testimony of a single witness as to the execution of said instrument, if the testimony of said witness contains within itself such evidentiary weaknesses and abnormalities as to render it too unreasonable and inherently improbable to support the judgment, particularly in the light of the facts of this case, which, under all authority, must be jealously scrutinized.” (Id. at p. 429, italics added.) It is clear from the italicized language and from the entire discussion of the case that the court doubted that the verdict was supported by substantial evidence. (See id. at p. 476.) The circumstances here are far different and the court’s findings relating to the deed are clearly supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, we agree with the later observations of the court in Lake v. Jackson (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 372, as follows: “Although [appellant’s] contentions are stated in several different ways in her brief, appellant’s basic contention is that the evidence does not support the findings. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient, and that the judgment must be affirmed. [¶] . . . It seems to be almost impossible for counsel for an appellant, in this or any other case, to believe that his case falls within the long established rule governing the function of an appellate court in determining whether the evidence supports the findings. In case after case counsel seems to have become so convinced that his side is the only possibly correct one that he simply will not accept the contrary evidence that was accepted by the trier of fact. Many times, as here, the case of Herbert v. Lankershim, [supra, ] 9 Cal.2d 409, is cited and some portion of the opinion is quoted. Reliance upon that case is almost tantamount to an admission that the evidence does support the finding, plus a hope that the court will nevertheless overturn the judgment. The case, however, has been so often ‘distinguished’ that it is almost sui generis. As was said by Mr. Justice Peters, speaking for this court in Roeder v. Roeder [(1953)] 118 Cal.App.2d 572, 582, ‘that case has been “frequently relied upon [by litigants] but seldom followed [by the courts].” ’ ” (Lake v. Jackson, at pp. 374-375, fn. omitted.) “Certainly the case does not stand for the proposition that the appellate courts can or should reweigh the evidence or upset findings based on substantial credible evidence or upon reasonable inferences therefrom. The case has no application to the facts here presented.” (Roeder v. Roeder, at p. 582.)
The evidence that the deed was not forged, but was signed by Yvonne, was not only substantial, but may be characterized as strong. This evidence includes the fact that the deed was notarized, Yolanda’s direct testimony that she specifically recalled witnessing her mother signing the deed and giving it to Yolanda, evidence of Yolanda’s contributions to sustaining her mother over the years, the testimony of two other daughters of decedent that they recognized Yvonne’s signatures on the deed, and Jacqueline’s testimony that Yvonne had told her that she was deeding the house to Yolanda before she did so and that afterward Jacqueline and all the other sisters knew about it and did not object.
We conclude that the court did not apply an incorrect standard of proof in weighing the evidence and did not err in concluding Yvonne executed the deed.
II. Statement of Decision
Appellant contends the statement of decision issued by the court was defective in several respects. We shall conclude it adequately addressed the disputed issues of ultimate fact in the case.
A. Statements of decision
“Ordinarily, when the court’s statement of decision is ambiguous or omits material factual findings, a reviewing court is required to infer any factual findings necessary to support the judgment. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 (Arceneaux); SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 462.) . . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
“[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 634 provides: ‘When a statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue, or if the statement is ambiguous and the record shows that the omission or ambiguity was brought to the attention of the trial court . . . prior to entry of judgment . . ., it shall not be inferred on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue.’ . . . Section 634 ‘does not specify the particular means that the party may use to direct the court’s attention to the claimed defects in the statement.’ (Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1134.)” (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 494-495; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 8:23.2, p. 8-10.)
Appellant filed timely objections to the statement of decision.
“To bring defects in a statement of decision to the trial court’s attention within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 634, objections to a statement of decision must be ‘specific.’ (Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. [(1993)] 20 Cal.App.4th [1372,] 1380.) The alleged omission or ambiguity must be identified with sufficient particularity to allow the trial court to correct the defect. (See Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1138.) ‘By filing specific objections to the court’s statement of decision a party pinpoints alleged deficiencies in the statement and allows the court to focus on the facts or issues the party contends were not resolved or whose resolution is ambiguous.’ (Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., supra, at p. 1380.)” (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 498; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, ¶ 8:23.3a, p. 8-11.)
“However, a trial court is not required to respond point by point to issues posed in a request for a statement of decision. ‘ “The court's statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court’s determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case.’ (Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co.[, supra, ] 20 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1380 . . .; see also Bauer v. Bauer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1118 [trial court “is not required to make an express finding of fact on every factual matter controverted at trial, where the statement of decision sufficiently disposes of all the basic issues in the case”]; In re Marriage of Garrity & Bishton (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 675, 686-687 [trial court’s statement of decision is required only to state ultimate rather than evidentiary facts].)’ (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 736-737, fn. 15.)” (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 500, italics added; see Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs, supra, ¶ 8:25.1, pp. 8-14 to 8-15.)
Thus, the proposed statement of decision is not necessarily deficient merely because it does not address each of the issues identified in appellant’s objections.
B. Analysis
Following the filing of the statement of decision, appellant submitted a 37-page “Objections of Henry Stevens to Proposed Statement of Decision; Request for Hearing.” He contends on appeal that the statement of decision was deficient in that the court: (1) failed to address applicable authority regarding the sufficiency of authentication by content or other means; (2) failed to find whether the presumption of ownership in decedent overcame the presumption of title in Yolanda and failed to resolve whether the burden shifted to Yolanda to prove the signatures on the deed were in fact decedent’s; (3) failed to find whether decedent intended to transfer the Newhall property by her will and not by a deed executed four years later; (4) failed to find whether Yvonne procured the decedent’s signature by undue influence; and (5) failed to find whether title to Newhall should be quieted in decedent’s estate by adverse possession.
The statement of decision “fairly discloses the court’s determination” (Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1380) that Yvonne “deeded [Newhall] to her daughter, Yolanda . . . by a grant deed, Ex 14.” The statement of decision found that Yvonne signed the deed below a statement relating to the documentary transfer tax and that the signature was acknowledged by a notary and recorded on June 10, 1988. The deed was re-signed on each of the grantor lines and re-recorded on April 19, 1994. It was in the possession of Yolanda since the time it was first recorded and “[o]ver several years, Yolanda made financial contributions to Yvonne including payments of real property taxes due on Newhall.” The statement of decision also relates that “[t]he filing for record of a deed in the public records is prima facie evidence of the existence and content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by the person who executed it.” As to the issue of the genuineness of the signatures, the statement of decision discusses the testimony of expert witness Fisher and her qualified opinion that the deeds were not signed by decedent. However, it determined the exemplars were “were not proven to contain Yvonne’s true signature” and observes that appellant testified two of the exemplars used were not decedent’s handwriting. The statement of decision relates the evidence that decedent’s three adult daughters all testified they were familiar with decedent’s handwriting and that the signatures on the deed were genuine. The court found there was “no evidence” that decedent was “fraudulently induced to sign the deed or that Yvonne was unaware of the nature of the transaction. There is no credible evidence that anyone at any time in any manner acquired prescriptive title.” It denied appellant’s petition to invalidate the deed, concluding that “Stevens has failed to prove that the deed from Yvonne to Yolanda is a forgery. The deed from Yvonne to Yolanda was executed and delivered by Yvonne to Yolanda with the intent to transfer title to Newhall to Yolanda.” These findings were adequate as they fairly disclose the court’s resolution of the ultimate issues in the case: that decedent executed the deed and delivered it to Yolanda with the intent to transfer the property. These findings also resolved against appellant his claims that the signature was forged, that Yolanda had exercised “undue influence” over decedent to obtain the deed, and that decedent had reacquired ownership by adverse possession.
(1) In the context of his argument that the court applied an erroneous standard of proof to the issue of the genuineness of the signatures, and that it erroneously determined that the deed was not forged, appellant’s opening brief complains that the statement of decision did not address applicable authorities regarding the sufficiency of the authentication of the signatures on the exemplars by other means and specifically by the “content” method. He also states that the statement of decision fails to resolve the question whether the burden shifted to Yolanda to prove the signatures on the deed were in fact decedent’s. We conclude that the statement of decision adequately addresses the ultimate facts at issue.
The court was not required to relate in the statement of decision every possible permutation of the authentication or burden of proof issues and how it determined each. All that was required was the statement of the court’s determination of the ultimate issue in the case—here, that the deed was in fact executed by decedent. It was not forged. Moreover, the court went further than required, by also relating that it was not persuaded by Fisher’s expert testimony relating to the genuineness of the signatures, in part because of its determination that appellant had failed to prove the exemplars were genuine, but also referring to the testimony of decedent’s daughters regarding the genuineness of the signatures.
(2) The court was not required to determine “whether the presumption of ownership in decedent overcame the presumption of title in respondent,” as appellant asserts. Appellant argues the court failed to determine whether the evidence presented by Yolanda overcame various rebuttable “presumptions” set forth in the Evidence Code. He argues these presumptions were supported by the evidence that appellant and decedent lived at Newhall for 28 years, until decedent’s death, and that decedent wrote checks to pay the mortgage and nearly all property tax bills and utilities on the property. The statement of decision was not required to reflect the court’s resolution of every “presumption” presented by the litigation. Burdens of proof and presumptions are not the “ultimate” issues of fact in this case. The statement of decision adequately sets forth the court’s determination that Yvonne executed the deed and that the deed was not forged. It cites the evidence it found persuasive—the three daughter’s testimony—and discloses its determination that it was not satisfied that the exemplars were decedent’s signature. The court need not make an express finding on every controverted fact. (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.) Whichever way the court resolved the various rebuttable presumptions here, it is clear that at the end of the day, the court found in favor of Yolanda and against appellant on the ultimate issues presented.
Appellant cites the following rebuttable presumptions: “The things which a person possesses are presumed to be owned by him” (§ 637), and “[a] person who exercises acts of ownership over property is presumed to be the owner of it” (§ 638).
(3) Appellant contends the court failed to find whether Yvonne intended to transfer the Newhall property by her 1984 will and not by a deed executed four years later. Appellant contends the will and the evidence that the recorder was directed to return the executed deed to the Newhall address at a time when Yolanda was not living there, were evidence that Yvonne intended to transfer her property by will and that Yvonne was to maintain control of the deed.
Appellant states that the “court was aware that one of [appellant’s] theories of the case was that Yvonne did not intend a present transfer of Newhall in 1988, but rather, a transfer in trust to take effect on death.” The page of the trial transcript cited by appellant is insufficient to demonstrate that appellant adequately raised this issue at trial or that the trial court was aware it was an issue at trial. During appellant’s counsel’s examination of Yolanda regarding recording of the deed and her possession of it, counsel asked what was the purpose of Yolanda’s borrowing money on the security of Newhall before the deed was recorded in 1994. Yolanda’s counsel raised a relevancy objection and appellant’s counsel explained: “If the money was being—if—if Yvonne Paul was signing a deed, for the purpose of allowing someone to borrow against the property for her benefit would be one thing. [¶] It would be another thing if the borrower was using the money for their benefit.” The court allowed the testimony, stating: “He is suggesting that the transfer was in some kind of a trust, or might have been in some kind of a trust. Fine. Go ahead.” (Italics added.) This is the only record reference made by appellant to support his argument. It is inadequate to demonstrate that the claim that Yvonne intended the deed to effect a transfer in trust to take effect on her death was squarely before the court. The parties did not discuss this issue in either opening statements, during trial, or in any summation. Nor does the record here contain copies of the parties’ trial briefs. Appellant did raise the issue in his objections to the statement of decision. However, it appears to us that the issue was waived by the failure to raise it at any other point during the trial.
Moreover, were we to determine the issue was adequately raised below, we would conclude that the statement of decision effectively resolves the issue by relating the court’s findings that the deed was executed by Yvonne, recorded and thereafter possessed by Yolanda, and that Yvonne intended by executing and delivering the deed to transfer the property to Yolanda.
(4) Appellant contends the statement of decision fails to resolve whether Yolanda procured Yvonne’s signature by fraud or undue influence. Appellant also argues that the statement of decision does not consider whether a “presumption” of undue influence arose in the circumstances. We disagree. Although there was evidence that Yvonne, who was elderly and suffered from diabetes, relied upon and trusted Yolanda and that Yolanda assisted decedent in having the deed notarized and recorded, that evidence is insufficient to establish that decedent was unduly influenced, that she lacked the capacity to transfer the property, or that her signature was procured by fraud. Nor would the evidence presented have supported a finding that decedent’s will was subjugated so that she was influenced “to make a disposition of his property contrary to and different from that [s]he would have done had [s]he been permitted to follow [her] own inclination or judgment.” (Estate of Franco (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 374, 382.) The statement of decision finds: “There is no evidence that Yvonne was fraudulently induced to sign the deed or that Yvonne was unaware of the nature of the transaction.” The statement of decision also finds “[t]he deed from Yvonne to Yolanda was executed and delivered by Yvonne to Yolanda with the intent to transfer title to Newhall to Yolanda.” These findings adequately resolve the material issue of undue influence against appellant. The court need not recite whether it found the presumption inapplicable, or whether it found the presumption, if applicable, was overcome by the ample evidence in the record to the contrary. In any event, our review of the record persuades us that appellant did not present sufficient evidence to raise a presumption of undue influence. There was no evidence whatsoever that Yolanda would unduly benefit by the deed.
Although the phrasing of the statement of decision that there was “no evidence” is unfortunate, it is adequate to convey that the court was not persuaded there was evidence sufficient to support a finding of undue influence.
In the will context, the presumption of undue influence arises if the challenger shows that “(1) the person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in procuring the instrument’s preparation or execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument.” (Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 97.) The challenger must also prove this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. (Estate of Gelonese (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 854, 863.)
(5) Appellant argues the statement of decision is inadequate as it fails to find whether title to Newhall should be quieted in decedent’s estate by adverse possession. The statement of decision states: “There is no credible evidence that anyone at any time in any manner acquired prescriptive title.” This was sufficient to resolve the ultimate issue in the circumstances.
Appellant argues that the evidence demonstrated that decedent continued to live in the house and to make tax payments and other payments for at least 17 years after the deed was first recorded. The court was not required to recite the elements of a prescriptive claim, to make findings on each element, or to cite the evidence in support or opposition in order to reject the claim. Moreover, contrary to appellant’s contention that the foregoing was “sufficient to establish a prescriptive title,” was the testimony of Yolanda, and Jacqueline’s testimony that Yvonne had said she was deeding the property to Yolanda before the deed was signed and that Jacqueline and her all sisters knew about it and did not object. There was no support in the record for appellant’s claim that Yvonne’s possession was always adverse to the record owner (Yolanda) and was “ ‘ “ ‘ “unaccompanied by any recognition, express or inferable from the circumstances, of the right in the latter.” ’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (California Maryland Funding, Inc. v. Lowe (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1798, 1806.)
Yolanda also asserts that any adverse possession claim is negated by appellant’s having previously filed verified pleadings in which he stated that after the death of decedent, “all decedent’s children continued to have access to and beneficial use of the Paul family home.” This verified pleading, Yolanda maintains, establishes the absence of the elements of open, notorious and hostile possession that would constitute notice to Yolanda (the owner) of any adverse possession by decedent in the period following her execution and delivery of the deed. We need not determine whether this pleading alone would negate the elements of adverse possession, as we have found the statement of decision adequate.
The statement of decision adequately resolved any question of adverse possession against appellant and in favor of Yolanda.
Yolanda also contends that the adverse possession claim was determined against appellant in other actions in the superior court and that it was never properly before the trial court in this matter:
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Yolanda is awarded her costs on this appeal.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.
(1) In arguing that the adverse possession claim was previously determined against appellant, Yolanda relies upon the summary judgment granted in her favor in the forcible detainer action filed by appellant against her (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, supra, No.06-619215), and the trial court’s order granting her anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) on October 10, 2007 as to appellant’s action for elder abuse, wrongful eviction pursuant to the San Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, supra, No. CGC-07-463506). Neither of these two trial court orders provides on its face a basis for Yolanda’s claim that the superior court had previously determined the adverse possession issue. She has failed to show (or to even present a legal argument) that any previous ruling of the probate court in these or other proceedings was res judicata or collateral estoppel on the adverse possession issue.
(2) Yolanda further maintains on appeal, that the adverse possession issue was not properly before the trial court in this action. At trial, Yolanda argued that appellant’s ex parte application to file his supplemental petition alleging adverse possession was never considered or granted by the probate court or any other court. The probate court noted it had dropped the matter from its calendar on or about October 5, 2007. At the outset of trial in this action below, the trial court stated it would hear the evidence and entertain arguments in writing on the subject of whether the adverse possession or other issues were before it. Yolanda admitted that the court had jurisdiction to hear the issues. In ruling on the question, the court appears to have determined the issue was before it.