Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. P621565. Robert L. Hess, Judge.
Paula Letherblaire, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant.
Bright and Brown, James S. Bright and Sharon M. Apodaca for Objectors and Respondents Plains Exploration & Production Company, Torch Energy Advisors, Inc., and Novistar, Inc.
Hanna and Morton and Edward S. Renwick for Objectors and Respondents Union Oil Company of California and Chevron Corporation.
RUBIN, J.
The Estate of Odessa Marie Howard, and Paula Letherblaire as special representative of that estate, appeal from the probate court order dismissing their petition for an order requiring Unocal, Chevron, and several other oil companies to pay royalties allegedly owed under certain oil and gas leases. (Prob. Code, § 850.) Because the probate court correctly determined that Letherblaire lacked standing to bring the petition, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Odessa Marie Howard died without a will in 1976. In 1978, a Los Angeles probate court issued a final order which determined that her son, Kenneth Howard, and her grandson, Mitchell Mayfield, were her only heirs for purposes of intestate succession. The order identified certain assets of the estate, but also included a so-called omnibus clause that covered all of Odessa’s undescribed property, and distributed all of Odessa’s property equally between the two heirs. Odessa owned certain oil leases issued by Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) that were not described in the 1978 final distribution decree. Pursuant to the omnibus clause, however, those leases passed by intestate succession to Kenneth and Mayfield. (Estate of Dehgani-Fard (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 797, 804-805.) Mayfield died a few months later.
Mayfield was the only child of Odessa Howard’s daughter, who had died sometime earlier. Because several family members who play a part in this matter share the Howard surname, after an initial reference by first and last name, for ease of reference we will refer to each of them by their first names only.
According to Unocal, it was never notified of Odessa’s death and continued to send her royalty checks. When the checks kept getting returned, Unocal escheated them to the State of California. In 1994, Kenneth obtained those funds from the state. In 1996, Unocal transferred its rights in the leases to Nuevo Energy Company (Nuevo). Nuevo contends it made the royalty payments to Kenneth, but escheated those funds to the state because Kenneth never cashed the royalty checks.
Kenneth died in 2001. In December 2002 and January 2003, his children – Paula Letherblaire and Donald Howard – filed separate petitions in probate court. The first sought to reopen Odessa’s estate because of what they claimed were newly discovered assets – the oil leases – and to appoint Letherblaire as the estate’s special representative. The second sought to determine that Letherblaire and Donald were Odessa’s successors to the oil leases and royalty payments by way of intestate succession (the 2002 succession petition). (Prob. Code, § 13150 et. seq.) Those petitions were granted.
All further undesignated section references are to the Probate Code.
We will refer collectively to Odessa’s estate and to Letherblaire as appellants.
In April 2005, appellants filed a petition against Unocal, Nuevo, and other oil companies under section 850, contending that appellants were the rightful heirs of the oil leases and that respondents were withholding payments due under those leases. The trial of that action began March 8, 2006. The record on appeal does not include the reporter’s transcript from the trial, limiting us to certain minute orders issued by the probate court. On the first day of trial, the parties gave opening statements, Letherblaire testified, and several exhibits were marked for identification. When trial resumed the next day, the court dismissed the petition after finding that Letherblaire lacked standing to bring it. The basis for that finding was the court’s concomitant decision to vacate the order granting the 2002 succession petition (the 2002 succession order) which determined that appellants had succeeded to the oil leases as Odessa’s heirs. The minute order states: “Upon review of the matters presented to the Court, it appears that the Order Determining Succession to Real Property, filed December 20, 2002, was approved in error. The Order of Final Distribution of . . . [Odessa’s estate], filed February 10, 1978, had already adjudicated the succession to all property, listed and unlisted, which Odessa . . . owned at date of death, and it was divided between Mitchell Mayfield and Kenneth Howard. For this reason, the Order Determining Succession to Real Property, which purports to establish Paula Letherblaire and Donald Howard as direct successors in interest to Odessa . . ., is void and of no effect, and is ordered VACATED.”
Also named were Novistar, Inc., Torch Energy Advisors, Inc., Bentley-Simonson, Inc., and Plains Exploration and Production Company. Bentley-Simonson’s role in this matter is not apparent from the record or the parties’ briefs and it has not appeared in this appeal. We will refer collectively to the other oil companies who were named in the section 850 petition and who have also appeared in this appeal as respondents.
The minute order also recounted how the court asked Letherblaire whether she was seeking to recover any unpaid oil lease royalties in any capacity separate from her status under the 2002 succession order. According to the court, “Ms. Letherblaire told this Court that she was seeking to do so only under the [2002 succession order]. [She] specifically denied that she was seeking to do so on behalf of the estate of either [Mayfield or Kenneth], or in her individual capacity as a successor in interest through either [Mayfield or Kenneth]. The Court further understood her to state, in substance, that although she believes all the heirs of [Mayfield and Kenneth] have transferred their interests in these royalties to the Odessa Howard Family Trust, she was not pursuing this action as trustee of that trust.” According to the court, Letherblaire and Donald were Kenneth’s sole beneficiaries under a living trust and will, and Letherblaire claimed they were also the sole heirs of Mayfield. The court also noted that all royalty payments sought by appellants in their section 850 petition were from after the 1978 final distribution decree of Odessa’s estate, and that, accordingly, those royalties belonged to the estates of Mayfield and Kenneth, not to the estate of Odessa.
The minute order said the court had tried to find some basis for concluding that Letherblaire had standing apart from the vacated 2002 succession order. Letherblaire “refused to assert any other basis than that Order because she wished to preserve the issue of the propriety of vacating the [2002 succession order] for appellate review.” Based on that, the probate court dismissed the petition for lack of standing because it had been brought on behalf of only Odessa’s estate. Appellants contend the trial court erred.
Appellants filed a petition for writs of mandate or prohibition that raised many of the same issues raised on appeal (case No. B198709). We summarily denied that petition on August 15, 2007.
DISCUSSION
There are just two issues on appeal: (1) whether the probate court erred by vacating the 2002 succession order on the ground that it was void; and (2) if not, did the vacation of that order divest appellants of standing to pursue their section 850 petition. In their appellate briefs, appellants have given only the slightest nod to these issues. At best, we have been able to locate in their reply brief a citation to Security-First Nat. Bk. v. Superior Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 749 (Security-First) for the proposition that a probate court does not act as a court with general equity jurisdiction and therefore lacks the power to vacate the final order of another probate court because of extrinsic fraud.
Appellants also appear to challenge orders quashing their attempts to conduct discovery. We deem the issue waived because appellants have failed to provide record citations to the challenged orders or any underlying discovery motions and have failed to make any cognizable appellate argument by way of discussion, analysis, or citation to authority. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.) Because we affirm the order dismissing the section 850 petition, we alternatively hold that any erroneous discovery orders were necessarily harmless.
We reject their reliance on this authority for two reasons. First, it was rejected by subsequent decisions more than 50 years ago (see Estate of Auslender (1960) 53 Cal.2d 615, 626, fn. 1, and cases cited therein) and was legislatively rejected in 1994 when section 800 was enacted to vest probate courts with general jurisdiction, including the ability to vacate orders procured by extrinsic fraud. (§ 800; Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 774.) Second, the record does not show that the 2002 succession order was vacated due to extrinsic fraud. Instead, under the rule that we construe a silent or ambiguous order in favor of affirming it (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631), we assume that the probate court vacated the 2002 succession order because it was void on its face, a rule that even the Security-First court recognized. (Security-First, supra, 1 Cal.2d at pp. 752-753 [probate court may vacate orders void on their face based upon inspection of the judgment-roll]; accord, Neubrand v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 311, 317.)
A judgment or order is void in the fundamental sense if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the inherent authority of the court to deal with the case or matter before it. (Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691.)
Once a decree to distribute a decedent’s estate has become final, the probate court loses jurisdiction over the estate’s property except as necessary to carry out that order, and any other orders are null and void. (Estate of Dow (1957) 48 Cal.2d 649, 652-654; Estate of Baird (1919) 181 Cal. 742, 744-745; Estate of Reiss (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 128, 130-131.) The 2002 succession order was granted pursuant to sections 13150-13158, which provide an expedited mechanism for transferring without estate administration proceedings the assets of estates under $100,000 to persons who qualify as a decedent’s successors by way of either will or intestate succession. (§§ 13151, 13152, 13154; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54 West’s Ann. Prob. Code (1991 ed.) foll. tit., ch. 4, div. 8, p. 420.) These provisions are subject to section 13006, which defines a decedent’s successor as either a beneficiary under a will or as one who succeeded to the property “under” section 6402, which governs the right to take by intestate succession. (See § 13000, making section 13006 applicable to sections 13150-13158.) Therefore, a necessary predicate to granting the 2002 succession order was a finding that Letherblaire and Donald were Odessa’s heirs by intestate succession. However, both issues were conclusively determined by the 1978 final decree in Odessa’s estate, which found that Mayfield and Kenneth were her only heirs by intestate succession, then distributed all of her estate’s assets to them. As a result of that ruling, the probate court lost all jurisdiction over those assets, including the oil leases, which then passed to Mayfield and Kenneth. In short, the probate court that made the 2002 succession order had no authority over assets of Odessa’s estate and that order was void, a defect that was readily apparent from the judgment roll. We therefore hold that the probate court in this matter properly vacated the 2002 succession order. We next consider whether the invalidity of that order deprived appellants of standing.
In general terms, standing means the plaintiff is able to allege an invasion of his legally protected interests, and every action must be brought by the real party in interest. (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 175.) Standing rules for statutory actions may vary according to the Legislature’s intent and the purpose of the statute. (Ibid.) Standing goes to the existence of a cause of action and may be raised at any time, even at trial or on appeal. The focus of the standing issue is on the plaintiff, not the issues plaintiff wants determined. (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 1000-1001.)
Appellants contend that respondents lack standing to appear before us and argue in support of the probate court’s dismissal order. In addition, they have filed a petition asking us to strike respondents’ briefs for the same reason. The contention merits little discussion. Respondents were, in essence, “defendants” in an action brought to determine that they owed money to appellants. As such, the fact that the petition was dismissed because Letherblaire lacked standing does not strip respondents of their legally protected interest to defend themselves and argue for an affirmance. Accordingly, appellants’ petition to strike respondents’ briefs is denied.
The precise basis of appellants’ section 850 petition is not identified by appellants, but their reference in their petition to section “850(D)” and the petition’s request that respondents surrender possession of the oil leases allegedly held by them without right lead us to believe that they proceeded under section 850, subdivision (a)(2)(D), which allows the personal representative of an estate to petition for relief “[w]here the decedent died having a claim to real or personal property, title to or possession of which is held by another.” As the probate court suggested to Letherblaire, if she believed respondents were wrongly withholding royalties under the oil leases, she could have pursued her petition as the personal representative of Kenneth’s and Mayfield’s estates, which obtained title to the leases as Odessa’s heirs. She expressly declined to do so, insisting that she wanted to press her claim solely on the ground that she was entitled to relief as Odessa’s intestate heir under the 2002 succession order. Once that order was vacated, she did not have a legally protected interest in the oil leases, which belonged only to Odessa’s heirs, by intestate succession and her refusal to claim relief on any other basis necessarily meant she did not have standing. Accordingly, the probate court’s ruling to that effect was also proper and is affirmed.
Our decision should not be taken to indicate that appellants might not yet still have some other avenue of relief open to them in order to establish their right to any unpaid royalties.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the order dismissing appellants’ section 850 petition is affirmed. Respondents to recover their appellate costs.
WE CONCUR: COOPER, P. J. FLIER, J.
To the extent appellants might contend they have advanced any other issues apart from those we address, we deem them waived. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1117 [unintelligible argument deemed waived]; see In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 425 [instead of penalizing appellant because counsel advanced incoherent argument, appellate court extracted what appeared to be efforts to raise two particular issues].)