Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. PR156503
RUSHING, P.J.
This is one of three appeals arising from litigation over an alleged promise by decedent Jane Ferraro to leave her property in equal shares to her two children, respondents Susan Camarlinghi and Michael Kelley, and her two stepdaughters, appellant Sandra Ferraro and her sister, Patricia Dean Ferraro Hull. The question here is whether the probate court erred by granting a petition to approve the final accounts of Susan, as personal representative of decedent’s estate. In one of the companion appeals, Ferraro v. Camarlinghi et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030890) ___ Cal.App.4th ___, we have held that appellant is entitled to pursue her claims arising from decedent’s alleged promise. It follows that the estate was not in a condition to be wound up. Accordingly, we will reverse the order here under scrutiny.
For reasons stated in the main opinion, we will sometimes refer to the parties by their first names.
Background
The history of this litigation is set forth in considerable detail in our opinion in Ferraro v. Camarlinghi et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030890) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (the main appeal). For present purposes it is enough to note that on February 2, 2006, the court below entered a stipulated order having the effect, among others, of admitting to probate decedent’s will of July 12, 1993, and appointing Susan as executor without bond. The order also contained the recital, “No part of the Trust or the estate shall be distributed or paid to Sandra Lynn Wise Ferraro.” Pursuant to the order, letters testamentary were issued to Susan on February 9, 2007.
On February 7, 2006, appellant filed a creditor’s claim seeking “1/4 of [decedent’s] estate.” An attached statement described the alleged agreement between decedent and Pat Ferraro, decedent’s husband and appellant’s father, whereby the survivor of them would leave his or her estate in equal shares to decedent’s children Susan and Michael, and Pat’s children Patricia and Sandra (appellant). Appellant sought relief on theories of breach of contract, breach of express trust, fraud, undue influence, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, conversion, interference with advantageous relations, declaratory and injunctive relief, and an accounting.
On March 24, 2006, Susan rejected this claim. On May 24, 2006, appellant brought a civil action, No. 106CV064293, naming Susan and Michael as defendants.
On July 14, 2006, Susan, as administrator of Jane’s estate, filed her first and final accounting and petition for final distribution. Appellant objected to the proposed distribution on the ground that the estate was not in a condition to be closed since various claims, including her own, remained unresolved. Susan responded that appellant’s claims were barred by her default, the court’s order denying her any relief, and the statute of limitations. On August 18, 2006, Susan and Michael moved to strike appellant’s complaint on substantially these same grounds.
On August 24, 2006, the court granted the petition for final distribution, overruling appellant’s objections. The order, which was prepared by counsel for respondents, recites: “Although [appellant] has purportedly filed a notice of appeal from the court’s March 23, 2006, order striking her cross-complaint and the court’s May 5, 2006, order denying her motion for leave to file her cross-complaint, [appellant] has not filed a notice of appeal from the court’s February 2, 2006, order denying [appellant’s] motion for joinder or for leave to file her complaint in intervention or from the court’s order approving settlement. Accordingly, both of those orders are final including this court’s February 2, 2006, order which states that: ‘No part of the Trust or the estate shall be distributed or paid to [appellant] Sandra Lynn Wise Ferraro.’ ”
As we conclude in the companion appeals, none of the cited orders were final or appealable.
Appellant moved to “correct clerical errors” in the order, asserting among other things that it included erroneous factual recitals. For instance, the order recited that “all of Patricia’s actions were dismissed,” when in fact, according to appellant, the actions had not yet been dismissed, though dismissal was called for by the settlement agreement. Further, the order contained a blanket recital that “all allegations of the petition for . . . settlement and for distribution are true,” but the petition included an allegation that appellant had not requested special notice, which was “simply untrue.” Further, the petition falsely alleged that appellant had not appealed from the motion to strike her cross-complaint. Appellant also sought a qualification of the order for distribution, such that administration of the estate would be closed “except as to any pending actions involving [appellant] Ferraro.” Susan filed a response to the motion, addressing only appellant’s attempt to “reargue” the status of her claims against the estate. The court denied the motion except to correct two typographical errors.
The stipulated order contained the paradoxical recital that “Patricia Dean Ferraro Hull and Judith Montoya shall dismiss with prejudice all of their actions, and all of their actions are hereby dismissed with prejudice . . . .” We discuss this self-contradictory recital at some length in Ferraro v. Ferraro; Camarlingh, et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030206) [nonpub. opn.], ultimately concluding that it must be construed to contemplate a future, not present, dismissal.
Appellant filed this timely appeal from the order granting final distribution (Camarlinghi v. Ferraro et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030777) [nonpub. opn.]). Meanwhile, on September 29, 2006, the court had granted the motion to strike appellant’s complaint “without leave to amend.” An appeal from that order followed (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030890) ___ Cal.App.4th ___). In that appeal, filed today, we reverse that order as modified to constitute an appealable judgment.
Discussion
“In ruling upon a petition for settlement of an executor’s account or final distribution of an estate, the probate court is vested with broad jurisdiction which will not be disturbed on appeal except when abused.” (Estate of Lock (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 892, 902; see Estate of Toler (1957) 49 Cal.2d 460, 468; but see Estate of Bennett (1939) 13 Cal.2d 354, 362 [rejecting contention that decision whether to allow credits for advances to beneficiaries was within probate court’s discretion].) Of course, insofar as the ruling depends on factual determinations, they will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence, viewed most favorably to the court’s findings. (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 359, p. 408.) Insofar as the judgment rests on pure questions of law, we will address those questions de novo. (Id., § 316, p. 354.)
Here as in the trial court, appellant contends that the estate was not in a condition to be closed because her claims against the estate and respondents Susan and Michael had not been adjudicated. This was unquestionably true at the time of the order under review; appellant’s complaint against Susan and Michael was then very much alive, although they had attacked it by a motion to strike. In nonetheless granting the petition for a final distribution, the court presumably anticipated that the motion to strike would be granted, as indeed it was. However, our reversal of that order appears to have eliminated the premise on which the court relied in rejecting appellant’s objections to the petition. It seems to follow that the present order must also be reversed. Certainly respondents offer no other basis on which to affirm the judgment; their sole argument is that the court below could disregard appellant’s complaint because it was barred by earlier orders and by the statute of limitations. We have rejected both of those contentions in Ferraro v. Camarlinghi et al. (Mar. 27, 2008, H030890) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ for reasons there stated at length. Since no other basis for affirmance appears, the present order will also be reversed.
Disposition
The order overruling appellant’s objections and approving the petition for final distribution is reversed. Insofar as the appeal is also taken from the order denying appellant’s motion to correct clerical errors in the order of distribution, it is dismissed as moot. Appellant will recover her costs on appeal
WE CONCUR: ELIA, J., McADAMS, J.