Opinion
07-cv-471-bbc.
July 9, 2008
ORDER
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants in this case on June 12, 2008 (dkt. #49). On June 27, 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b) requesting partial reconsideration of my June 12 order (dkt. #48).
Motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) "must be filed no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." Although plaintiffs allege that judgment was entered on June 13, 2008, they are mistaken. The judgment was signed on June 12, 2008, and is listed on the docket sheet as "filed" on June 12, 2008. Excluding weekends and the day judgment was entered in accordance with Rule 6(a), ten days from June 12, 2008, was June 26, 2008. Plaintiffs filed this motion on June 27, one day late. Time to file Rule 59(e) motions cannot be extended. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2). Therefore, plaintiffs motion cannot be brought under Rule 59(e) and must be considered under Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to grant relief from judgment when a party brings a motion based on one of six specific grounds listed in the rule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); see also United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Rule 60(b) motions "must be shaped to the specific grounds for modification or reversal found in 60(b) — they cannot be general pleas for relief"). Specifically,
the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Plaintiffs do not specify which of the six grounds is applicable to their motion. A review of plaintiffs' contentions establishes that none could be categorized under grounds one through five. The only possible ground plaintiffs can be attempting to proceed on is ground six, that is, "any other reason that justifies relief."
Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is extraordinary relief and requires a showing of exceptional circumstances, none of which have been shown to exist in this case. See, e.g., Kagan v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 795 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986); Andrews v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 771 F.2d 184 (1985). Instead of presenting exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs have merely restated the contention they made on summary judgment, which was that there are sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to determine that defendant Hansen was aware that Chris Brown posed a substantial suicide risk. Plaintiffs reiterate that it should be left to a jury to decide defendant Hansen's state of mind. Plaintiffs' contention failed on summary judgment and it fares no better on reconsideration because "[a] motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind." Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion will be denied.