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Esser v. Ciarmella

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Apr 21, 1994
203 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)

Opinion

April 21, 1994

Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.).


We agree with the IAS Court that this personal injury action should be transferred to Suffolk County where the accident occurred, and where both the eyewitnesses and the police officers who investigated the accident reside. Plaintiffs' nonparty witnesses are doctors whose testimony will bear only on the issue of damages, and whose convenience is subordinate to that of nonparty witnesses who will be testifying on the issue of liability (Torres v Larsen, 195 A.D.2d 285).

Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Wallach and Nardelli, JJ.


Apparently, plaintiffs are to be deprived of their right to have this action tried in a properly designated County of their choice (CPLR 509) for frivolous reasons supported neither by the moving papers nor the well established precedent of this Court. It is undisputed that plaintiffs, students at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York, were both permanent residents of New York County at the time this action was commenced and, thus, designation of this County for trial of the action was entirely proper (CPLR 503 [a]). The affidavits of defendant's counsel, submitted in support of a change in venue, are devoid of any explanation of how defense witnesses will be inconvenienced by having to travel to New York City to testify (Arbelo v Levin, 202 A.D.2d 365, citing Harris v Havanera Tropical Mkt. Corp., 160 A.D.2d 344). Thus, they are insufficient to support defendant's application (Clark v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 170 A.D.2d 271; Lalka v Massafra, 167 A.D.2d 265, 267; Firoozan v Key Food Supermarket, 151 A.D.2d 334). As we recently observed in Pittman v Maher ( 202 A.D.2d 172, 177). "A presumption that a witness will be inconvenienced merely because the courthouse is located in a different county is unwarranted (see, Kurnitz v New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Center, 166 A.D.2d 390; Scott v Ecker Mfg. Corp., 161 A.D.2d 347)."

A change of venue in this matter is not only without foundation, but will operate to plaintiffs' prejudice. As I stated in Stonestreet v General Motors Corp. ( 201 A.D.2d 350, 352 [dissenting memo]), "This Court should not overlook the considerable expense for compensation of a medical witness for an appearance at trial." Some four decades ago, the Appellate Division, Third Department noted that "in these days the difficulty of obtaining the presence of doctors in court, even in the same city where they are practicing, is common knowledge" (Kaufman v State of New York, 286 App. Div. 912, 913). More recently, that Court stated its view that the convenience of treating physicians "is a particularly strong consideration weighing in favor of venue in [the county where they practice]" (Kucich v Leibowitz, 68 A.D.2d 1002, 1003, citing Hilgers v Hyde, 6 A.D.2d 963, 964). The situation is greatly exacerbated when, as here, venue is placed in a relatively remote location, requiring that the physician devote an entire day to travel in order to appear as a witness at trial.

Whereas her attorney has stated no reason why defendant's prospective witnesses would be inconvenienced in travelling to New York City to testify (Moye v H.L. Green, Inc., 159 A.D.2d 242), plaintiffs' counsel specifically address the inconvenience and expense to plaintiffs' treating physicians as well as the hardship which travel to Riverhead will entail to plaintiffs as a consequence of the severe injuries they sustained in the accident (Messinger v Festa, 94 A.D.2d 792). Specifically, the amputation of Raymond Esser's leg resulted in "difficulties attendant on the inability of his stump to support a prosthesis". This condition has prevented him from resuming his studies at Stony Brook. Likewise, the affidavit of plaintiff Haroon Rashid states that he is undergoing physical therapy and "contemplating having further surgery performed".

Plaintiffs also point out that transfer of this action to Suffolk County will occasion considerable delay in the trial. Their opposition papers state, and defendant does not dispute that, in Suffolk County, there is a two-year calendar delay from the time a note of issue is filed before a case comes up for trial, whereas the comparable period in New York County is less than one year and as little as several months. Thus, it cannot be said that the ends of justice will be promoted by the proposed change in venue (CPLR 510).

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward H. Lehner, J.), entered May 19, 1993, which granted defendant's motion to change venue from New York County to Suffolk County, should be reversed, on the law, and the motion denied, without costs.


Summaries of

Esser v. Ciarmella

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Apr 21, 1994
203 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
Case details for

Esser v. Ciarmella

Case Details

Full title:RAYMOND ESSER, Appellant, v. SUZANNE M. CIARMELLA, Respondent. HAROON…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: Apr 21, 1994

Citations

203 A.D.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
610 N.Y.S.2d 260

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