But to the extent Smith argues that he was denied bathroom, water, cooling-off, and meal breaks, see id. at 40, there's no evidence of that in the record. See Espinoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[A] pro se party's ‘bald assertion,' completely unsupported by evidence, is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F.Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))).

If the plaintiff successfully presents a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to defendants to proffer one or more legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. Espinoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). A defendant's burden at this stage is “light,” Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1998), and the defendant “does not need to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the rationale was not discriminatory, but must present a clear explanation for the action.

"An inference of discrimination can be proven through a variety of methods, including 'the employer's criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee's protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff's discharge.'" Espinoza v. New York City Dep't of Transportation, 304 F. Supp. 3d 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312). Plaintiff has failed to provide any factual allegations of this nature that would support an inference that any of the acts taken by the City after September 28, 2016 were motivated even in part by Plaintiff's race, national origin, or color.

Castellano v. Bd. of Trustees, 937 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)); see also Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial in federal court, the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine, will point toward the federal court declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.") (citation omitted) . Thus, district courts routinely decline to exercise jurisdiction over related state claims once summary judgment is granted for the defendant on all of the federal claims. See, e.g., Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction after granting summary judgment); Espinoza v. New York City Dep't of Transportation, 304 F. Supp. 3d 374, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Courts in this District routinely decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's NYCHRL claims after dismissing all federal claims." (collecting cases)); Brooklyn Heights Ass'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 818 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining supplemental jurisdiction after granting summary judgment as to federal claims).

Accordingly, courts in this circuit frequently analyze a plaintiff's federal and NYSHRL claims together - thus implicitly exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. See, e.g., Thelwell v. City of New York, 733 F. App'x 561, 562 (2d Cir. 2018); Espinoza v. New York City Dep't of Transportation, 304 F. Supp. 3d 374, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Ehrbar v. Forest Hills Hosp., 131 F. Supp. 3d 5, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that "courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal and state law claims[.]"). And while some courts have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over both NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims after dismissal of all federal claims, those courts have generally not explained their reasons for declining to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's NYSHRL claims.

“A plaintiff, even when proceeding pro se, may not raise new allegations for the first time in opposition to summary judgment.” Pierre v. City of N.Y., 531 F.Supp.3d 620, 628 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); see Espinoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 378 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Accordingly, the Court declines to consider those allegations.

"[A]s a general proposition... if [all] federal claims are dismissed before trial . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well." Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004); Espinoza v. New York City Dep't of Transportation, 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting courts in this district routinely decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and collecting cases).

“Courts in this District routinely decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff's NYCHRL claims after dismissing all federal claims.” Espinoza v. New York City Dep't of Transportation, 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); see also Harris v. NYU Langone Med. Ctr., No. 12-CV-0454(RA), 2014 WL 941821, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2014) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over NYHSRL and NYCHRL claims); Algarin v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-1264 (LTS), 2012 WL 4814988, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over New York State Executive Law § 296 and NYCHRL claims); Mabry v. Neighborhood Def. Serv., 769 F.Supp.2d 381, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims).

The Court broadly construed Plaintiff's complaint and put Defendants on notice of Plaintiff's assertion that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated based on the facts set forth in his complaint. See Espinoza v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Transportation, 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Although a complaint need not correctly plead every legal theory supporting the claim, at the very least, plaintiff must set forth facts that will allow each party to tailor its discovery to prepare an appropriate defense") (quoting Beckman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 79 F.Supp.2d 394, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that language in the pro se plaintiff's "submissions is 'broad enough to cover' the negligent guard theory....This language must be liberally construed"); Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts must construe pro se pleadings broadly, and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest").

2. Discrimination “Under Title VII and the NYSHRL, discrimination claims based on race, color, religion, and national origin are analyzed under the familiar three-step burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Espinoza v. N.Y.C. DOT, 304 F.Supp.3d 374, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). See Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (stating that Title VII and NYSHRL claims are governed by the McDonnell Douglas standard); Ruiz v. Cty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d. 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010) (same for Section 1981 claims).