Opinion
Case No. SA CV 21-01898-DOC-KES
03-16-2022
Robert ESPINOZA v. UNION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND DENTISTS, AFSCME LOCAL 206 et al.
Shella Sadovnik ALCabes, Timothy R. Snowball, Elena Marie Ives, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Robert Espinoza. Anne I. Yen, David A. Rosenfeld, Weinberg Roger and Rosenfeld, Emeryville, CA, Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Union of American Physicians and Dentists, AFSCME Local 206. Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for California Correctional Healthcare Services, Betty T. Yee. Anthony P. O'Brien, Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for Rob Bonta.
Shella Sadovnik ALCabes, Timothy R. Snowball, Elena Marie Ives, Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, for Robert Espinoza.
Anne I. Yen, David A. Rosenfeld, Weinberg Roger and Rosenfeld, Emeryville, CA, Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Union of American Physicians and Dentists, AFSCME Local 206.
Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for California Correctional Healthcare Services, Betty T. Yee.
Anthony P. O'Brien, Ryan Andrew Hanley, CAAG - Office of Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for Rob Bonta.
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS [30, 33]
DAVID O. CARTER, JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants California Correctional Healthcare Services, Betty Yee, and Rob Bonta's (collectively, "State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss ("State Defendants’ Motion" or "State Def. Mot.") (Dkt. 33) and Defendant Union of American Physicians and Dentists, AFSCME Local 206's ("UAPD") Motion to Dismiss ("UAPD Motion" or "UAPD Mot.") (Dkt. 30). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 ; C.D. Cal. R. 7-15. Having reviewed the moving papers submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS State Defendants’ Motion and GRANTS UAPD's Motion. The hearing scheduled for March 21, 2022, is VACATED .
I. Background
A. Facts
Plaintiff Robert Espinoza ("Plaintiff") is a physician employed at California Correctional Healthcare Services and became a member of UAPD in 2018. Complaint ("Compl.") (Dkt. 1-1) ¶¶ 9-16. The UAPD membership application states, in relevant part, that the joining member authorizes union dues as well as union fees paid to the Political Action Program to be deducted from wages. Id. ¶ 17. See also Compl. Ex. A, Dkt. 1-2.
Plaintiff submitted a UAPD membership application on April 23, 2018, and began having $217.33 deducted from his salary in May 2018. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18. In May 2018, Plaintiff learned that, of the total amount deducted, $16.00 per paycheck was being used for UAPD's Political Action Program, and participation in such program was entirely voluntary. Id. ¶¶ 19-22.
California Government Code section 1153 authorizes a State Controller to "[m]ake, cancel, or change a deduction ... at the request of the person or organization authorized to receive the deduction" and that "Employee requests to cancel or change [deductions] ... shall be directed to the employee organization rather than to the [State]. The employee organization shall be responsible for processing these requests." CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 1153(a), (h). Accordingly, a union member has the option to decline making contributions to the Political Action Program if UAPD receives notice. Compl. ¶ 21.
In 2020, Plaintiff inquired as to how the union dues and contributions to the Political Action Program were being spent, and eventually informed UAPD that Plaintiff wished to cease making union contributions. Id. ¶¶ 24-35. UAPD assured Plaintiff that his deductions would cease in July 2021. Id. ¶ 54. In total, Plaintiff alleges that UAPD has taken $1,551.96 of his wages to spend on political speech without consent, id. ¶ 64, and seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, id. ¶ 124.
B. Procedural History
On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally Compl.
Also on November 17, 2021, Plaintiff immediately moved for a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin UAPD and the State Defendants (collectively, "Defendants") from deducting membership dues and Political Action Program from his wages, (Dkt. 14), which this Court denied on November 22, 2021. (Dkt. 10). On December 3, 2021, Plaintiff moved for another Temporary Restraining Order, after alleging Defendants continued to deduct union dues from his wages. (Dkt. 21) The Court once again denied the motion on December 7, 2021, because the continued deductions were the result of administrative error. ("December Order") (Dkt. 27).
Both the UAPD and the State Defendants moved to dismiss the case on January 21, 2022. Plaintiff filed the Opposition ("Opp'n") (Dkt. 37) on February 18, 2022. UAPD replied ("UAPD Reply") (Dkt. 39) on February 25, 2022, and the State Defendants replied ("State Defendants Reply") (Dkt. 40) on February 28, 2022.
II. Legal Standard
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss tests whether a complaint alleges grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear a case, and cannot be forfeited or waived. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment , 558 U.S. 67, 81, 130 S.Ct. 584, 175 L.Ed.2d 428 (2009) (citations omitted). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States , 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to set forth a set of facts that, if true, would entitle the complainant to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to dismiss). The pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the speculative level; a plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). On a motion to dismiss, a court accepts as true a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and construes all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). A court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is ordinarily limited to the contents of the complaint and material properly submitted with the complaint. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc. , 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) ; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1555, n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). Under the incorporation by reference doctrine, the court may also consider documents "whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading." Branch v. Tunnell , 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara , 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002). The court may treat such a document as "part of the complaint, and thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." United States v. Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
When a motion to dismiss is granted, the court must decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments, and thus leave to amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. , 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a court need not grant leave to amend when permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery , 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.").
III. Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff's claims are moot; and (2) the purported harm is not based on any state action. See generally State Def. Mot.; UAPD Mot. The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Plaintiff's Claims are Moot
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's claims are not justiciable because UAPD "has ceased all deductions and reimbursed Plaintiff for any overpayments for his dues," State Def. Mot. at 1, and that it is unlikely the practice will be reinstated, UAPD Mot. at 6-7. In contrast, Plaintiff alleges that the claims are not moot because UAPD's activities in confiscating Plaintiff's wages without authorization are "part of a larger systemic effort ... by public sector unions to circumvent the Supreme Court's clear holding in Janus . " Opp'n at 30. In Janus , the Supreme Court held that unions that compel members to subsidize the speech of others run afoul of the First Amendment. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not justiciable.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, possessing only the power authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the related statutes Congress has passed. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Standing is a jurisdictional limitation and is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of pleading and establishing Article III standing. Id. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130. "The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388, 396, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980) (internal quotation omitted). A case is moot when (1) "the issues presented are no longer live" or (2) the parties lack a "legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Once a case becomes moot, courts are "required to dismiss it." Dufresne v. Veneman , 114 F.3d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, UAPD ceased making deductions from Plaintiff and returned the erroneously taken wages. Opp'n at 27-28. Additionally, Plaintiff has no intention of rejoining UAPD. Id. at 27. For Plaintiff to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, he "must show that he has suffered or is threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm ... coupled with a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way." Canatella v. State of Cal. , 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Plaintiff concedes that he will not be harmed again in a similar way, Plaintiff's claim is moot.
Additionally, Plaintiff requests that "if the Court believes this case is mooted by UAPD's unilateral refund ... [Plaintiff] seeks leave to amend his complaint to seek class certification." Opp'n at 31-32. The Court denies this request because, as discussed below, seeking class certification would be futile as Plaintiff's harm cannot be legally attributed to either UAPD or State Defendants.
B. Plaintiff's Harm Was Not Based on State Action
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that (1) the defendant was acting under color of state law at the time the complained of act was committed, and (2) the defendant's conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Jensen v. City of Oxnard , 145 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted "under the color of state law under Cal Gov't Code § 1153." Compl. ¶¶ 79, 89. State Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiff's injuries "were not caused by section 1153." State Def. Mot. at 10-11. Instead, Plaintiff's harm "stem entirely from Plaintiff's decision to execute membership agreements with [UAPD] and [UAPD]’s subsequent enforcement of those agreements." Id. UAPD also contends that it was not acting "under color of law" because there was no constitutional deprivation that resulted from section 1153, nor is UAPD a state actor. UAPD Mot. at 9-10.
i. Acting Under Color of Law
To determine if a defendant is acting "under color of state law," the court uses a two-prong test. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The first prong is "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from ‘the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.’ " Ohno v. Yasuma , 723 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lugar , 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ). The second prong is "whether the party charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state actor." Id.
Section 1153 does not deprive Plaintiff of any constitutional right. Section 1153, in pertinent part, requires that a State Controller "[m]ake, cancel, or change a deduction ... at the request of the person or organization authorized to receive the deduction" and that "Employee requests to cancel or change [deductions] ... shall be directed to the employee organization rather than to the [State]. The employee organization shall be responsible for processing these requests. " CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 1153(a), (h) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff "alleges First Amendment injuries as a result of the deduction of both union dues and political action contributions from his paycheck, as well as Fourteenth Amendment injuries as a result of a deduction scheme lacking in adequate procedural safeguards," are caused by section 1153. State Def. Mot. at 10-11. However, section 1153 merely authorizes UAPD to make deductions, it does not compel them. See Gilb v. Chiang , 186 Cal. App. 4th 444, 474 n.14, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (2010). Moreover, Plaintiff authorized UAPD to make those deductions until he revoked consent. Compl. ¶¶ 24-35. To the extent that UAPD's deductions were unlawful, "private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State." Collins v. Womancare , 878 F.2d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Lugar , 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ). As such, it cannot be said that section 1153 deprived Plaintiff of any constitutional right.
As to the second prong, Plaintiff's contention that UAPD was acting under color of law because section 1153 "does not permit the state employer to communicate with its own employees and requires it to accept as gospel only what UAPD certifies [as true,]" is unavailing. Opp'n at 18.
Generally, private parties, such as unions, cannot be sued for Constitutional violations unless it can be shown that the union "acted ‘in concert’ with the state ‘in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional right[.]’ " Belgau v. Inslee , 975 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) ). As the Supreme Court explained in Blum v. Yaretsky:
[The] mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State .... [Plaintiff] must also show that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when ... the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The importance of this assurance is evident when ... the complaining party seeks to hold the State liable for the actions of private parties.
457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534, (1982) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Joint action between a state and a union can be shown two ways: "the government either (1) ‘affirms, authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional conduct through its involvement with a private party,’ or (2) ‘otherwise has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the non-governmental party,’ that it is ‘recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.’ " Belgau , 975 F.3d at 947 (quoting Ohno , 723 F.3d at 996 ).
Although authorized by section 1153, the State is not responsible for any of UAPD's deductions. Here, UAPD is a private party authorized to deduct dues pursuant to Section 1153. Plaintiff opted to join UAPD and signed the membership agreement. The union, as authorized, began deducting dues as permitted before Plaintiff revoked consent. At no time did the government "affirm[ ], authorize[ ], encourage[ ], or facilitate[ ], UAPD in making any unconstitutional deduction. Belgau , 975 F.3d at 947 (internal citation omitted).
Additionally, the government has not "so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [UAPD.]" Id. The State Defendants do not have a role in the alleged scheme apart from the ministerial processing of requests. State Def. Mot. at 14-15. As this Court stated in its December Order,
[T]he Ninth Circuit has found in similar circumstances that a union is not a state actor when the state's role "to deduct dues from Employees’ payrolls was ‘made by concededly private parties,’ and depended on ‘judgments made by private parties without standards established by the State.’ " Belgau v. Inslee , 975 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan , 526 U.S. 40, 52 [119 S.Ct. 977, 143 L.Ed.2d 130] (1999) ). As the Ninth Circuit explained, the state's "role in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct was ministerial processing of payroll deductions pursuant to Employees’ authorizations." Id. at 948.
Here, State Defendants’ actions constitute the ministerial processing of authorized deductions, State Def. Mot. at 15, which does not amount to state action.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS UAPD's Motion to Dismiss and the State Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Now, the Court must determine whether to dismiss with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only when "further amendment would be futile." Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery , 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). Here, further amendment would be futile because section 1153 does not deprive Plaintiff of any constitutional right and Plaintiff's harm was not based on state action.
IV. Disposition
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants California Correctional Healthcare Services, Betty Yee, and Rob Bonta's Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS Defendant UAPD's Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complaint.