Esmieu v. Schrag

13 Citing cases

  1. Esmieu v. Schrag

    88 Wn. 2d 490 (Wash. 1977)   Cited 54 times
    In Esmieu v. Schrag, 88 Wn.2d 490, 498, 563 P.2d 203 (1977), we observed that a trustee's fiduciary "duty includes the responsibility to inform the beneficiaries fully of all facts which would aid them in protecting their interests."

    The defendants' appeals from the denial of their motion to vacate and from the approval of the trustees' report were consolidated for determination. The Court of Appeals, at 15 Wn. App. 260, determined that the trial court's consideration of ex parte evidence denied the defendants procedural due process and dismissed the appeal, vacated the trial court's orders, and remanded the case to the trial court. Supreme Court: Granting discretionary review, the court holds that the question of procedural due process is reviewable even though not raised in the trial court and that both due process and the trustees' fiduciary duty were violated.

  2. Estate of Stevens

    94 Wn. App. 20 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 41 times
    Emphasizing that the movant "consistently directed the trial court to the rules and case law under CR 60"

    Citing Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), aff'd, 88 Wn.2d 490 (1977), Curtis argues that the trial court's judgment on the petition for interpleader and declaratory relief is void because it does not comport with procedural due process. As indicated above, however, because Curtis was already adjudged in default, she was not entitled to notice of the settlement agreement.

  3. Esmieu v. Schrag

    92 Wn. 2d 535 (Wash. 1979)   Cited 6 times

    On June 27, 1974, the Superior Court issued a pretrial order which incorporated the provisions of both agreements. Subsequent orders which approved a specific exchange of property were vacated on due process grounds in Esmieu v. Schrag ( Esmieu I), 15 Wn. App. 260, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), aff'd, 88 Wn.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977). Neither the Court of Appeals nor this court discussed the validity of the June pretrial order which is the subject of this case.

  4. Dolan v. King Cnty.

    No. 44982-0-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    Because the final approval order's viability rests on the ruling binding DRS to it, we reverse the final approval order in its entirety.Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn.App. 260, 266, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), aff'd, 88 Wn.2d 490 (1977).

  5. Marriage of Maxfield

    47 Wn. App. 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that contemnor must have knowledge of the existence and substantive effect of the order

    If procedural safeguards are inadequate, a court lacks jurisdiction over the defendant and cannot enter a valid order against him. Ware v. Phillips, 77 Wn.2d 879, 468 P.2d 444 (1970); Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), aff'd, 88 Wn.2d 490, 497, 563 P.2d 203 (1977); State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wn. 283, 207 P. 23 (1922). In a contempt proceeding, notice is sufficient if it informs the accused of the time and place of the hearing, and the nature of the charges pending.

  6. Marriage of Ebbighausen

    42 Wn. App. 99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 15 times

    Judgments entered in a proceeding failing to comply with the procedural due process requirements are void. In re Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980); Baxter v. Jones, 34 Wn. App. 1, 3, 658 P.2d 1274 (1983); Halsted v. Sallee, 31 Wn. App. 193, 195, 639 P.2d 877 (1982); In re Clark, 26 Wn. App. 832, 837, 611 P.2d 1343 (1980); Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976). [2] It has long been recognized that the family entity is the fundamental element upon which modern civilization is founded.

  7. In re Moseley

    34 Wn. App. 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 66 times
    Applying test

    Notice, open testimony, time to prepare and respond to charges, and a meaningful hearing before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding are all elements of civil due process. In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975); Moore v. Burdman, 84 Wn.2d 408, 526 P.2d 893 (1974); In re Luscier, supra; In re Messmer, 52 Wn.2d 510, 326 P.2d 1004 (1958); In re Ross, 45 Wn.2d 654, 277 P.2d 335 (1954); In re Petrie, 40 Wn.2d 809, 246 P.2d 465 (1952); In re Darrow, 32 Wn. App. 803, 649 P.2d 858 (1982); Halsted v. Sallee, 31 Wn. App. 193, 639 P.2d 877 (1982); In re Akers, 22 Wn. App. 749, 592 P.2d 647 (1979); Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), aff'd, 88 Wn.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977); In re Houts, 7 Wn. App. 476, 499 P.2d 1276 (1972); In re Martin, 3 Wn. App. 405, 476 P.2d 134 (1970). Under this test, if it appears from the record that an attorney was not effective in providing a meaningful hearing, due process guaranties have not been met. The burden of proof lies with the petitioner.

  8. In re Clark

    26 Wn. App. 832 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 16 times
    Stating that imprisonment is not sufficient by itself to terminate parental rights

    [6] In In re Akers, 22 Wn. App. 749, 753-57, 592 P.2d 647 (1979), the court reversed a child deprivation order because the judge had interviewed the children and taken testimony from a caseworker outside of court. In Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), the court set aside an exchange of property between a trust and the trustees. The court stated:

  9. In re Akers

    22 Wn. App. 749 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 8 times

    (Italics ours.) In Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), this court held that a trial court's ex parte consideration of one party's evidence which is presented without notice to the other party denies the other party's right to procedural due process. On page 265 of Esmieu, this court set aside an exchange of property between the trust and the trustees held on an ex parte record, and stated as follows:

  10. Veradale Valley v. County Comm'rs

    21 Wn. App. 1007 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 34 times
    Finding that a favorable zoning decision creates a property right that triggers procedural due process

    It follows that a person who has acquired a valuable property right as a result of a favorable zoning administration decision must be given notice when judicial review of that decision is sought.Esmieu v. Schrag, 15 Wn. App. 260, 265, 548 P.2d 581 (1976), affirmed, 88 Wn.2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1978).Andrus v. County of Snohomish, 8 Wn. App. 502, 507, 507 P.2d 898 (1973); Hennigh v. Board of County Comm'rs, 168 Colo. 128, 450 P.2d 73 (1969); State ex rel. Vieux Carre Property Owners Assocs. v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 197 So.2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Stokes v. Township of Lawrence, 111 N.J. Super. 134, 268 A.2d 10 (1970).