Opinion
A-13914
05-08-2024
FRED M. ESGUERRA, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Benjamin I. Whipple, Attorney at Law, Palmer, for the Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer Trial Court No. 3PA-14-01755 CI, John C. Cagle, Judge.
Benjamin I. Whipple, Attorney at Law, Palmer, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Fred M. Esguerra filed a second application for post-conviction relief. In his application, Esguerra principally argued that he was, or at least might have been, incompetent to stand trial. The superior court dismissed his application and Esguerra now appeals. We affirm the superior court's dismissal.
The superior court initially dismissed Esguerra's second application on timeliness grounds. Esguerra appealed, and this Court reversed the superior court's order and remanded for further proceedings. See Esguerra v. State, 2018 WL 5822515, at *1 (Alaska App. Nov. 7, 2018) (unpublished).
We begin by noting that it is not entirely clear, either from Esguerra's pleadings in the superior court or his appellate briefing, to what extent Esguerra is making an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, in addition to raising a freestanding claim that he was, or could have been, incompetent at the time of his criminal trial.
Esguerra's free-standing claim regarding his incompetence to stand trial is barred. Under Alaska law, an applicant is not permitted to raise a claim that "was, or could have been but was not, raised in a direct appeal," or a claim that "was decided on its merits or on procedural grounds in any previous proceeding." Here, Esguerra's trial attorney asked the trial court to hold a competency evaluation and that request was denied. Following his conviction, Esguerra appealed that denial to this Court, and we affirmed. This claim was therefore both "raised in a direct appeal" and "decided on its merits or on procedural grounds" in a prior proceeding and cannot be raised in an application for post-conviction relief.
AS 12.72.020(a)(2), (5).
Esguerra v. State, 2005 WL 19220 (Alaska App. Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished).
Esguerra may also be arguing that his first post-conviction relief attorney was ineffective - a claim he is permitted to raise under Grinols v. State. In order to succeed on this claim, however, Esguerra must demonstrate both that his trial attorney was ineffective in how he litigated the competency issue at trial and that his first postconviction relief attorney was ineffective when he failed to argue that Esguerra's trial attorney was ineffective. Esguerra's briefing on these issues is inadequate: he cites no relevant authority, relies on conclusory assertions, and fails to meaningfully discuss the superior court's dismissal of his second application. (We further note that the State argued on appeal that Esguerra inadequately briefed this issue and Esguerra declined to file a reply brief.)
Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600, 618 (Alaska App. 2000).
See id. at 619-20.
But even assuming that Esguerra adequately briefed the issue of ineffective counsel, we have reviewed the record, and we agree with the superior court that Esguerra failed to demonstrate that his attorneys were ineffective. Before dismissing Esguerra's application, the superior court permitted Esguerra to present additional evidence of his alleged incompetency at the time of his trial. Despite this opportunity, the superior court found that the record still demonstrated that Esguerra was not incompetent during his criminal trial. Given this finding, which was amply supported by the evidence, it is clear that Esguerra's trial and post-conviction relief attorneys were not ineffective in litigating Esguerra's claim.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.