[1, 2] We must start with the holding that chapter 70 is a general statute governing all appointments and removals to and from positions in the public service in Iowa; and chapter 365 is a special statute relating only to civil service appointments and removals in cities. We so held in Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 275, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601. Nor does the plaintiff otherwise contend.
In Ervin v. Triplett , we held that the exception did not apply to a veteran who worked as a police detective—a job that certainly requires skill, judgment, trust, and confidence. 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599, 602 (1945).
See Iowa Code § 8A.401(1). In making this argument, Copeland relies on the supreme court's decision in Ervin v. Triplett, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601-02 (Iowa 1945), overruled on other grounds by Andreano v. Gunter, 110 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 1961), which considered whether a detective on a police force held a confidential relationship with the commissioner of public safety. The Ervin court found no such relationship existed, reasoning:
While he could recommend disciplinary actions, this was subject to review by his supervisor, and he was not permitted to approve or require overtime. In support of his claim that he is not in a strictly confidential relationship with Director Phipps, Machamer likens his case to Ervin v. Triplett, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601-02 (Iowa 1945) (finding a police detective was not in a strictly confidential relationship with the commissioner of public safety), and Dennis v. Bennet, 140 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1966) (concluding the chief of the fire department was not in a confidential relationship with superintendent of public safety). We find both cases distinguishable from this case.
[4] In dealing with the matter of appointments, we have heretofore held there is no conflict between the civil service law (Code chapter 365), and the soldiers preference law (Code chapter 70). Geyer v. Triplett, 237 Iowa 664, 22 N.W.2d 329; Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599; and Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869, 14 N.W.2d 717.
The governing principle is likewise laid down, with a considerable citation of authorities, in Crawford v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 247 Iowa 736, 739, 740, 741, 76 N.W.2d 187; and in Liberty Consolidated School District v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 1065, 70 N.W.2d 544, 547 ("the special Act will be considered an exception to or qualification of the general statute and will prevail over it, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment"). To the same effect are State ex rel. McPherson v. Rakey, 236 Iowa 876, 878, 879, 20 N.W.2d 43, 45; Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601; and State ex rel. Rankin v. Woodbury County, 231 Iowa 356, 1 N.W.2d 223, 224. See also 59 C.J., Statutes, section 623, 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 299, and 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 564.
[4] When we have as a part of our legislative law, a general statute such as section 472.18, amended by a special statute, such as section 472.19, the provisions of the special statute prevail. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 4 N.W.2d 869; Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601, and citations; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 564; 59 C.J., Statutes, section 623; Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 331 Mich. 337, 49 N.W.2d 318, 331; In re Miller's Estate, 261 Wis. 534, 53 N.W.2d 172, 173; Yarn v. City of Des Moines, 243 Iowa 991, 54 N.W.2d 439; Iowa Mutual Tornado Ins. Assn. v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165; Liberty Consolidated Sch. Dist. v. Schindler, 246 Iowa 1060, 70 N.W.2d 544. [5] A general analysis of this legislative situation appears in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, section 369: "For purposes of interpretation, legislative enactments have long been classed as either general or special, and given different effect on other enactments dependent as they are found to fall into one class or the other.
The rules just mentioned that a special statute will prevail over a general one apply only where the two are repugnant or inconsistent. Of course it is not necessary to apply such a rule where the two acts are consistent. See authorities, supra, and Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601. It would seem that if section 518.35 does not impose the tax here involved and section 432.1 purports to do so, the two provisions would conflict and 518.35 would control. It is perhaps not important here that section 518.35 would prevail in the event of conflict with 432.1 because we think neither section imposes the added tax plaintiff paid under protest.
Other questions were involved and discussed; but upon the one thought by plaintiff to be analogous here the court held a mere transfer from one department, leaving the duties the same, did not abolish the office. Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 18 N.W.2d 599, is not factually in point. It concerned the matter of a police officer who had been promoted to the position of detective, and whose superior officer attempted to return him to the lower rank of patrolman.
[6] A fundamental rule applicable here is that where a general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as a special act and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered an exception to the general statute, whether it was passed before or after the general enactment. Ervin v. Triplett, 236 Iowa 272, 276, 18 N.W.2d 599, 601, and citations; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 564; 59 C.J., Statutes, section 623. See also Ziegler v. Witherspoon, supra, 331 Mich. 337, 49 N.W.2d 318, 331; In re Miller's Estate, 261 Wis. 534, 53 N.W.2d 172, 173.