Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11556 No. 6181
05-06-2015
JOSHUA RYAN ERICKSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Jane B. Martinez, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. A. James Klugman, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 3AN-11-13711 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Pamela Scott Washington, Judge. Appearances: Jane B. Martinez, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. A. James Klugman, Assistant District Attorney, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Kossler, Judges. PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted Joshua Ryan Erickson of fourth-degree assault for assaulting a fellow inmate at the Anchorage jail. Erickson appeals his conviction, arguing that the State failed to disprove that he acted in self-defense and that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. He also argues that the court erred in finding him a worst offender and that his 365-day sentence is excessive. Because the evidence at Erickson's trial supported the jury's verdict, and because Erickson's criminal history and the facts of this case support the maximum sentence, we affirm Erickson's conviction and sentence.
AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
Erickson's first claim is that the State did not present sufficient evidence to disprove his claim of self-defense. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if reasonable jurors could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Erickson's assault was recorded by security cameras, and the State played the video of the assault for the jury. We have reviewed this evidence and the other evidence in the record, and we hold it was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Erickson was not acting in self-defense when he committed the assault.
Morrell v. State, 216 P.3d 574, 576 (Alaska App. 2009).
See Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska App. 2008).
Erickson also challenges the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, a motion claiming that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In ruling on such a motion, the trial court applies a two-part analysis. First, the trial court "must assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses without deference to the jury's view of these matters." If the court agrees with the jury's assessment of the evidence, it should deny the motion for a new trial. But even if the court disagrees with the jury's verdict, it should grant a new trial only if the evidence "is so one-sided that the jury's contrary view of the case is plainly unreasonable and unjust." Applying the above test, District Court Judge Pamela Scott Washington determined that the verdict was "certainly not contrary" to the evidence at trial.
White v. State, 298 P.3d 884, 885 (Alaska App. 2013).
Taylor v. State, 269 P.3d 232, 234 (Alaska App. 2011), quoted in White, 298 P.3d at 885.
When we review a trial judge's ruling that the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence, our role as an appellate court is limited to determining whether there was any evidentiary basis for the jury's decision. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence introduced at trial provided a strong evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Erickson's motion for a new trial.
White, 298 P.3d at 886.
At sentencing, the district court found Erickson a worst offender and sentenced him to 365 days to serve, the maximum penalty for fourth-degree assault. Erickson argues that the court erred in finding him a worst offender.
See AS 11.41.230(b); AS 12.55.135(a).
The district court based its worst-offender finding on Erickson's criminal history and his current offense. The court noted that Erickson had thirteen prior convictions, four of which were assault convictions. Moreover, at the time Erickson committed the assault in this case, he was awaiting trial for second-degree murder for beating a man to death, and he subsequently pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide for that conduct.
See Weitz v. State, 794 P.2d 952, 958 (Alaska App. 1990).
In addition, the district court characterized Erickson's assault in this case as "unprovoked by either word or deed," and commented that "the video [of the assault] was very hard to watch." The court emphasized that the assault occurred in jail while Erickson was awaiting trial: a situation in which Erickson would be expected to be on his best behavior, in a place with "lots of rules designed to keep order and ... to stop criminal behavior." We conclude that the district court's worst-offender finding is supported by the record and is not erroneous.
Erickson also argues that his sentence is excessive. When addressing an excessive sentence claim, this Court reviews whether the sentence imposed is clearly mistaken — that is, whether the sentence is within a permissible range of reasonable sentences, given the facts of the crime and the offender's history. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence imposed by the district court is not clearly mistaken.
See State v. Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230, 1232, 1237 (Alaska 2000).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.