Opinion
Case No. 1:05CV2147.
March 6, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion of MBNA Corporation for Summary Judgment (ECF DKT #3) and Supplement (ECF DKT #8); Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (ECF DKT #7); and the Motion of MBNA Corporation for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (ECF DKT #14). For the reasons that follow, the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment are granted; Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is overruled; and the Motion of MBNA Corporation for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is granted in part only.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This complaint was removed to Federal District Court from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on September 9, 2005 on the grounds of diversity and the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Shortly after removal, Defendant MBNA filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion went unopposed for months. Ultimately, the Court, as a sanction for failing to cooperate in the parties' planning meeting and for failing to appear at the scheduled Case Management Conference, prohibited Plaintiff's counsel from filing an opposition brief on his client's behalf.
Plaintiff Erholm was employed with MBNA since 1999 and was a Senior Account Manager. On January 20, 2005, MBNA announced it was offering a Voluntary Severance Program ("VSP"), a welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA. On March 7, 2005, Plaintiff elected to participate in the VSP. He would leave the bank's employ and would be eligible to receive approximately Forty-Five Thousand Dollars ($45,000) in severance benefits.
On March 11, 2005, before Plaintiff left the company, he received an e-mail memorandum that all officers were eligible to interview for the position of Customer Contact Department Manager. Plaintiff believed he was qualified for the position, which meant a promotion and a salary increase for him. Therefore, on March 12, 2005, Plaintiff revoked his VSP election and applied for the opening. Plaintiff alleges that an interview was scheduled for April 4, 2005. Yet, on April 1, 2005, Plaintiff was informed that certain job requirements would bar him from consideration. The interview was cancelled.
Consequently, on April 13, 2005, Plaintiff resigned and asked to have his revocation withdrawn. In an April 19, 2005 letter, MBNA informed Plaintiff that the VSP terms did not allow withdrawal of the revocation.
On June 23, 2005, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Plan Administrator, claiming that since he had revoked his VSP election in reliance upon MBNA's promise of eligibility for the job interview — in fairness — his election should be reinstated.
In a July 12, 2005 letter, Plaintiff's counsel demanded a response from the Plan Administrator by July 20, 2005 or Plaintiff would file a lawsuit. MBNA informed Plaintiff that the Plan Administrator was allowed a period of ninety (90) days under the VSP to investigate and respond to the claim. Nevertheless, Plaintiff filed his suit in Common Pleas Court on August 2, 2005, seeking damages for breach of contract and for fraud in the inducement.
During the pendency of this action, on September 20, 2005, the Plan Administrator of the MBNA Voluntary Severance Plan issued its initial denial of Plaintiff's claim for severance benefits and delivered the denial to Plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff was advised that he had sixty (60) days to appeal the denial. No appeal was filed.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A fact is material only if its resolution might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must view all evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, in order to determine whether or not there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 255. An opponent of a motion for summary judgment may not rely on the mere allegations of the complaint, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 248. Summary judgment should be granted if the party bearing the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F. 3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. 317).
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, MBNA establishes that Plaintiff Erholm was advised that the VSP granted the Plan Administrator ninety (90) days in which to review a claim for severance benefits. Although armed with that knowledge, Plaintiff went forward and instituted a lawsuit, alleging breach of contract and fraud in the inducement and claiming damages in the amount of the severance plan benefits. Moreover, the Plan Administrator served its initial denial of Plaintiff's claim upon Plaintiff and his counsel on September 20, 2005 and advised of the sixty-day appeal period. No appeal was pursued. Plaintiff's claim for relief arises out of the VSP governed by ERISA — regardless of how the claim is framed in a pleading. Clearly, Plaintiff Erholm filed this lawsuit before the first level of review was completed and neglected to appeal the Plan Administrator's denial in the designated time frame. Plaintiff has not established that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, nor that he is otherwise able to pursue a lawsuit despite the failure to exhaust. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant MBNA.
Motion to Strike
Plaintiff argues that Defendant's dispositive motion should be stricken because his counsel was never served in violation of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 5. He further asserts that the Clerk of Courts had an incorrect electronic mailing address listed for his attorney. On or about September 9, 2005, Plaintiff's counsel was served by ordinary U.S. mail with copies of the removal papers. Thereafter, defense counsel accomplished all filings and service as required, through the Court's electronic docketing system. Despite Plaintiff's counsel's claim, in December of 2005, that his address was inaccurate, it was not corrected until February 8, 2006.
Once Plaintiff's counsel was served with the removal paperwork, he became obliged to monitor the docket for entries, notices of hearings and orders. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.5(i), it is the attorney's obligation to ensure that the Clerk's Office has an accurate business and e-mail address. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is, therefore, overruled.
Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1132(g)(1), the Court may, in its discretion, allow reasonable fees and costs to either party in an ERISA action. Defendant seeks the costs reasonably related to what it terms the "improper prosecution" of this lawsuit. In light of this Court's determination that Plaintiff pursued this lawsuit, in spite of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendant's request is granted in part. Defendant, MBNA, is awarded costs only, in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). Plaintiff, Scott A. Erholm, shall pay this award on or before March 27, 2006.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon due consideration of the briefs, arguments and applicable law, the Motion and Supplemental Motion of Defendant MBNA Corporation for Summary Judgment are granted; Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is overruled; and the Motion of Defendant MBNA Corporation for Attorneys' Fees and Costs is granted as to costs only in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).
IT IS SO ORDERED.