Moreover, courts have recognized that the mere fact that an adult male fathers a child with a minor cannot be the only basis for denying the father contact with that child. See In re Brandie W., 157 Cal.App.3d 110, 114, 203 Cal.Rptr. 537, 540 (1984) (the best interests of the child are served when an adult father, who could have been prosecuted for statutory rape against the minor mother, is allowed visitation with the child that was born because of the affair); cf. E.R. v. D.T, 77 Misc.2d 242, ___, 353 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1974) (reviewing court recognized a father's right to visit a child born out of wedlock but denied the 61-year-old father visitation given the father's age and the animosity between the 61-year-old father and the parents of the 13-year-old mother). The State argues that the trial court's order should be affirmed because evidence that respondent sexually abused another minor, M.M., is sufficient to establish an injurious environment.

Frail v. Frail, 54 Ill. App.3d 1013, 12 Ill.Dec. 680, 370 N.E.2d 303 (1977); F. Keezer, Law of Marriage and Divorce § 723 (3rd Ed. 1946). In the case of putative parents, for example, visitation has been denied in cases in which: (1) the duration, nature, and extent of the relationship between the mother and father was not sufficient to warrant recognition of the father's status as a parent, E.R. v. D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242, 353 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1974) (child conceived when sixty-one year old father raped thirteen year old mother); Sullivan v. Bonafonte, supra, (father refused to marry mother and urged her to have an abortion); (2) lack of interest was shown by the non-custodial parent in the child's life, Baehr v. Baehr, 56 Ill. App.3d 624, 14 Ill.Dec. 401, 372 N.E.2d 412 (1978) (father did not try to see his child for six years); (3) visitation would have detrimental emotional effects upon the child, Baehr v. Baehr, supra, (psychologists established that visitation by natural father would have been disruptive to son's adjustment and development, since father had shown no interest in son for over six years; child testified that he did not want a relationship with his natural father because he was afraid his father would leave him again). See generally State ex rel. Wingard v. Sills, supra.

( Quilloin v. Walcott, supra.) We feel the trial court must consider such relevant factors as (1) the duration and nature of the relationship between the mother and father of the illegitimate child ( Matter of Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc.2d 613, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403 [mother and father lived together for over three years — visitation allowed]; E.R. v. D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242, 353 N.Y.S.2d 612 [child conceived when thirteen-year-old mother raped by sixty-one-year-old father — visitation denied]); (2) the interest shown by the father in the child's life ( Matter of Pierce v. Yerkovich, supra [child lived with both parents until she was almost three years old — visitation allowed]; In re Lathrop, supra [father's right to child cannot be severed when he is involuntarily kept away from child]); (3) whether paternity is admitted by father or is judicially established ( People ex rel. Vallera v. Rivera, supra at 778; Gardner v. Rothman, supra); (4) whether the father has contributed support to the child ( Bagwell v. Powell, supra; Baker v. Baker, supra; Matter of Pierce v. Yerkovich, supra [father established a $59,000 irrevocable trust for the child]; Matter of Anonymous, 12 Misc.2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186); and (5) the emotional effect the visits would have on the child ( People ex rel. Heller v. Heller, 184 Misc. 709, 54 N.Y.S.2d 734). We caution that these guidelines are by no

Since the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Stanley v Illinois ( 405 U.S. 645), it is clear that the father of a child born out of wedlock has a right to association with his child "which is cognizable and, indeed must be recognized, by the courts" (Matter of Pierce v Yerkovich, 80 Misc.2d 613, 614). It is undisputed that the courts of this State have the authority to grant visitation rights to the father of a child born out of wedlock and, in several cases, have granted those rights to the father of such a child (see Anonymous v Anonymous, 34 A.D.2d 942; People ex rel. "Francois" v "Ivanova", 14 A.D.2d 317; Matter of "Z" v "A", 36 A.D.2d 995; Matter of Pierce v Yerkovich, supra). The best interest of the child is the ultimate standard to be applied in determining the question of visitation (Anonymous v Anonymous, supra;E.R. v D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242). However, it must be noted that none of those cases involved an application by the father of a child born out of wedlock to visit the child after his adoption by the natural mother and a new spouse.

( McMahon v Thompson, 68 A.D.2d 68; Matter of Juan R. v Necta V., 55 A.D.2d 33.) At the forefront of these guidelines again is the best interests of the child. (See, e.g., E.R. v D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242; Matter of Anonymous v Anonymous, 50 Misc.2d 43.) However, in addition, courts must be careful to protect and encourage reasonable visitation not only as a phase of a parent's right to custody of his child but also as a phase of the developing body of children's rights.

The traditional rule has been that the denial of visitation rights is no defense to an action for support and does not constitute a basis for excusing the noncustodial parent's child support obligations. (Landes v Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358; E.R. v D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242.) However, recent cases have concluded that when the noncustodial parent has been deprived of his visitation rights the suspension of support payments applies to child support, as well as alimony.

the right of the legitimate and illegitimate child to inherit in intestacy may constitutionally be preserved ( Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532; Matter of Hendrix, 68 Misc.2d 439; Matter of Belton, 70 Misc.2d 814). The courts of this State have undoubted authority to grant visitation rights to the father of an illegitimate child ( People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova", 14 A.D.2d 317; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 34 A.D.2d 942; Family Ct. Act, §§ 511, 549) and, in a proper case, have frequently recognized the right of a father to visit his illegitimate child (see, e.g., Matter of "Z" v. "A", 36 A.D.2d 995 [remitted to Family Court for consideration of visitation rights]; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 34 A.D.2d 942, supra [remanded for additional evidence]; People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova", supra [granted]; Matter of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.2d 711 [granted]; Matter of Anonymous, 12 Misc.2d 211 [granted]; Matter of Cornell v. Hartley, 54 Misc.2d 732 [granted if mother consents]; cf. E.R. v. D.T., 77 Misc.2d 242 [right of father to visit in appropriate case recognized and approved, but because of special circumstances denied]). It is conceded, however, that there are cogent social considerations militating against the granting of visitation privileges to the father of an illegitimate child (see dissenting opn., CARSWELL, J. in People ex rel. Meredith v. Meredith, 272 App. Div. 79, 87-90.