Opinion
NO. 09-10-00202-CR
03-07-2012
MATTHEW BEAUCHAMP EPPLER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 258th District Court
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 20906
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Matthew Beauchamp Eppler appeals his conviction for injuring C.E., a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). In two issues, Eppler argues an accomplice's testimony is not sufficiently corroborated to sustain his conviction and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he was not the only person who had access to the child during the period the child suffered an injury. Because corroborating evidence supports the testimony of Eppler's accomplice, and because the jury could reasonably infer that Eppler was aware of the child's injury regardless of who caused it, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Eppler's conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
We cite to the current version of the Texas Penal Code because the amendment to the cited section does not affect the issues on appeal.
Background
Tiffany Eppler, Eppler's spouse, testified that she and Eppler were C.E.'s parents. C.E. was approximately three months old when his injury occurred. Tiffany explained that she left C.E. and her daughter with Eppler while she was working on July 21, 2008. Around 9:00 p.m., when Tiffany came home, she woke C.E. up to play with him. According to Tiffany, C.E. appeared "really" sleepy, "his face was just kind of glazy," and he did not react to her in his normally happy manner. Candy Grantham, Tiffany's mother, arrived shortly after C.E. woke. When Candy played with C.E.'s foot, something Candy explained she always did when she saw C.E., Candy noticed that C.E. did not respond. Candy also noticed that C.E.'s eyes appeared different: Candy asked Tiffany and Eppler what was wrong with C.E. and then instructed Eppler and Tiffany to take C.E. to the emergency room.
Tiffany explained that at approximately 9:30 p.m., she and Eppler took C.E. in Eppler's truck to Lufkin, intending to have C.E. examined at a hospital. According to Tiffany, during the trip Eppler reached in the backseat to check on C.E. At that point, Eppler told Tiffany that C.E. grabbed Eppler's hand and stuck it in C.E.'s mouth, which led to Eppler insisting that C.E. was fine. Tiffany explained that, although she never saw C.E. grab or suck Eppler's hand, nor did she turn around and check on C.E. herself, Eppler convinced her that C.E. was fine.
After deciding not to take C.E. to the hospital in Lufkin, Tiffany and Eppler continued to Lufkin, where Eppler stopped to get gas and then located where he was to have a job interview the next day. Around 10:30 p.m., they returned home and put C.E. in his bed. Before retiring for the night, Tiffany heard C.E. "starting to whimper like he was about ready to eat." She got up and held C.E. while Eppler made a bottle. Tiffany explained that she attempted to feed C.E., but noted that he did not seem "all that hungry." Tiffany explained that she tried to burp C.E., but could not; she then handed him to Eppler, who tried to burp him as well. Tiffany testified that Eppler walked off with C.E., and he then called her from another room to come and check on C.E. because C.E.'s "arm was moving all by itself." Around 11:00 p.m., Tiffany and Eppler left again to take C.E. to have him examined at a hospital in Lufkin, arriving there between 11:30 p.m. and midnight.
At the hospital, C.E. was diagnosed with having suffered seizures and having an interventricular subdural hematoma. The hospital in Lufkin transferred C.E. by air to Texas Children's Hospital, where he was hospitalized for about a month. One of the nurses who had cared for C.E. in Lufkin testified that she heard Eppler comment that he was upset about potentially missing his job interview because he was at the hospital. Additionally, after being told that C.E. needed to be transferred to Texas Children's, two of the nurses testified that they heard Eppler say: "'Just one more thing to add to all this mess[.]'"
Although Eppler did not testify at trial, his videotaped interview with the police was admitted. Eppler's account about what happened on July 21, as it relates to C.E., is consistent with Tiffany's account. During the interview, Eppler acknowledges that Candy told him to take C.E. to the hospital. Eppler also explained that during the initial trip to the hospital, C.E. seemed to be acting normally, so the two of them decided to not take C.E. to the hospital. Eppler's account of what occurred between the decision not to have C.E. examined at the hospital and what led them to change course and take C.E. to the hospital is also consistent with Tiffany's account.
Prior to Eppler's trial, Tiffany was also charged with having injured C.E. Before Eppler's trial occurred, in carrying out a plea bargain agreement, Tiffany pled guilty to recklessly injuring C.E. by failing to seek medical attention for him. Tiffany was given deferred adjudication, and she was placed on community supervision for six years.
Following Eppler's trial, the jury found him not guilty on the charge that he injured C.E. by act, but found him guilty on the charge of injuring C.E. by omission. The trial court assessed a sentence of forty years in prison.
Accomplice Testimony
In issue one, Eppler contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because Tiffany's testimony is not corroborated as required by article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (West 2005). Article 38.14 requires that convictions based on the testimony of an accomplice be "corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed[.]" Id.
When evaluating whether non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the accused to the commission of the offense for purposes of appellate review, we are deferential to the jury's function as the fact-finder. See Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("The direct or circumstantial non-accomplice evidence is sufficient corroboration if it shows that rational jurors could have found that it sufficiently tended to connect the accused to the offense."). Additionally, the corroborating evidence need not directly connect the accused to the crime nor be sufficient by itself to establish guilt; it need only tend to connect the accused to the offense. See Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Trevino v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
After carefully reviewing the non-accomplice testimony addressing the delays in C.E.'s receipt of medical treatment, we conclude that Tiffany's testimony is corroborated by evidence tending to connect Eppler with C.E.'s delayed treatment. Tiffany's testimony concerning Candy's instructing them to take C.E. to the hospital was corroborated by Candy, who testified that she told them to do so. Tiffany's account that Eppler changed his mind about whether C.E. needed to be examined is corroborated by Eppler's videotaped statement, in which he discusses why he changed his mind. Thus, the testimony of Candy and of Eppler sufficiently connects Eppler to having delayed C.E.'s receiving medical treatment. We hold that Eppler's conviction can be upheld under article 38.14. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442; Cathey, 992 S.W.2d at 462; Trevino, 991 S.W.2d at 851. We overrule Eppler's fist issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, Eppler contends that "[t]he evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of [i]njury to a [c]hild as indicted in [c]ount [t]wo of the indictment[,]" injury to a child by omission. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a). Eppler argues that, given the twenty-four hour time frame during which the injuries occurred, the State's circumstantial evidence is insufficient absent proof that he was the only adult with access to C.E. Because the evidence shows that Eppler was not the only one with access to C.E., Eppler concludes that his conviction must be reversed.
In reviewing the evidence, we give deference to the jury's responsibility to resolve any conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from facts. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Significantly, Eppler does not cite any cases that support his claim that the State's evidence is insufficient absent the State's proving that he was the only person with access to the child. Here, the State's evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, sufficiently established that something was wrong with C.E., that Eppler made a decision that those symptoms required the child to be examined at a hospital, and then he made decisions that delayed C.E.'s timely receipt of treatment. See Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
A person commits the offense of injury to a child "if he intentionally, knowingly, [or] recklessly by omission, causes to a child . . . serious bodily injury[.]" Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1). A parent has the duty to care for, to control, to protect, and to provide medical care to their children. See Vasquez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 667, 669 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.); Luna v. State, 264 S.W.3d 821, 825 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2008, no pet.); see also Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(b), (d); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.001(a)(2), (3) (West 2008). Based on C.E.'s symptoms, Candy told Eppler and Tiffany to take C.E. to the hospital. Although Eppler started to do so, he then changed his mind because he felt C.E.'s symptoms improved, an assertion that the jury could reasonably reject in light of all of the evidence admitted before it. Circumstantial evidence showing that Eppler had a job interview on the day after C.E.'s injury, along with testimony that Eppler was concerned over potentially losing that interview, allowed the jury to infer that Eppler decided not to promptly take C.E. to be examined despite being on notice that he was injured.
Even if Eppler did not cause the child's injury by act, an issue on which the jury determined the State failed to meet its burden, the jury was free to believe that Eppler was involved in the decision to delay C.E.'s treatment. We are not persuaded by Eppler's argument that the State needed to prove that only he had access to the child to prove that Eppler was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of having injured a child by omission. Because we reject the only argument Eppler makes in support of issue two, we overrule it, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Do Not Publish Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.