In order to satisfy the statute, the written memorandum must “correctly state[ ] the oral undertaking of the party sought to be charged.” Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 75 N.E.2d 238, 239 (1947); seeHarrington v. Fall River Housing Authority, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 301, 538 N.E.2d 24, 29 (1989) (memorandum “must contain all the provisions of the oral contract with which the plaintiff is seeking to charge the defendant”); see also Simon v. Simon, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 705, 625 N.E.2d 564, 567 (1994) (writing must set out the essential provisions of the oral agreement). Ordinarily, the written memorandum must therefore: “(1) reasonably identify the subject matter of the contract, (2) indicate that a contract with respect to this subject matter has been made between the parties, (3) state with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the unperformed promises in the contract, and (4) be signed by or on behalf of the party to be charged.” Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp. v. IRC, Inc., 764 F.Supp.2d 274, 298–299 (D.Mass.2011) (citing Massachusetts cases).

Hopedale also attacks paragraph four of the judgment on the basis that the remedy set out therein constitutes an impermissible revision of the land swap agreements. See e.g., Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 675-676 (1947); Hook Brown Co. v. Farnsworth Press, Inc., 348 Mass. 306, 312-313 (1965); Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies of New England, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authy., 361 Mass. 131, 142-143 (1972); Sancta Maria Hosp. v. Cambridge, 369 Mass. 586, 595-596 (1976); King v. Allen, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 868, 870 (1977), all cases in which the relief ordered by the court was disallowed on appeal as it effectively altered the exchange between the parties. The remedy fashioned by the judge in the case before us violates no express terms of the land swap agreements.

Cf. Doryon, 142 Cal.Rptr. at 380; Lang, 21 P.3d at 1122. In Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 75 N.E.2d 238 (Mass. 1947), the court noted:The effectiveness of a contract for the sale and purchase of real [property] is not impaired by the absence of the elaborate stipulations often found in such contracts providing for the kind of deed to be given, the division of charges against the property, the disposition of mortgages and other encumbrances, and similar matters.

Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 429, 432 (1947). See Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 675 (1947). In the instant case, the parties fixed the purchase price and added an adjustment clause which prescribed the method by which the adjusted price was to be calculated.

To satisfy the statute of frauds, the writing must state correctly the oral undertaking of the party sought to be charged. Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 75 N.E.2d 238 (1947). As the Tufenkjian memorandum speaks only to negotiations which took place for the purpose of entering into a new and separate undertaking, it cannot be construed as a sufficient writing memorializing the oral agreement on which the plaintiff sues.

Murray, of course, was pressing for performance even though the scheduled closing date had come and gone. When, as here, the conduct of the parties demonstrates an intention to waive the time set for performance, Gentile Bros. v. Rowena Homes, Inc., 352 Mass. 584, 589-590 (1967); Flynn v. Wallace, 359 Mass. 711, 715-716 (1971), the parties may set, or the court will establish for them, a reasonable time for performance. See Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 675 (1947). See also Moskow v. Burke, 255 Mass. 563, 566-567 (1926); Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Congregation Kehillath Jacob, 370 Mass. 828, 833-834 (1976).

Sancta Maria Hosp. v. Cambridge, 369 Mass. 586, 595 (1976). Compare Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 676 (1947); Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies of New England, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authy., 361 Mass. 131, 142-143 (1972). The judgment is reversed, and a new judgment is to be entered in accordance with the motion therefor filed by the plaintiff.

Des Brisay v. Foss, 264 Mass. 102, 109. Michelson v. Sherman, 310 Mass. 774, 775. Cousbelis v. Alexander, 315 Mass. 729, 730. Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 675. Pino v. Yenof, 353 Mass. 775. The endorsement clearly indicates the nature of the transaction, the parties, the locus of the property, and the purchase price. No essential element of a contract for the sale of land was omitted.

The letter memorandum did not contain many provisions which might have been appropriate for inclusion in a formal sealed lease. See analogy of Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673, 675 (agreement to sell land). The testimony, however, showed only two matters which were dealt with in conversations but not specifically dealt with in the letter, viz. (a) the space to be occupied by Hook, a matter covered in detail by the floor plan submitted to Berman prior to the transmission of the latter's letter and impliedly incorporated by reference in the letter (see Corbin, Contracts, §§ 512, 515), and (b) the times of payment of the rent, which were shown by Brown's somewhat ambiguous statement that the rent was to be "the same terms that we were . . . paying . . . Wharf.

Dennett v. Norwood Housing Assn. Inc. 241 Mass. 516, 521. Parkhurst v. Maynard, 285 Mass. 59, 63. It constitutes no unwarranted extension of this result to impose on sellers who impair their own title a similar obligation. Relief to the purchaser so ordered does not produce injustice or oppression to the seller ( Morad v. Silva, 331 Mass. 94, 99) and is not an unfair extension of the provisions of the contract (see Epdee Corp. v. Richmond, 321 Mass. 673). In Barrett v. Carney, 337 Mass.