Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS073182, Ann I. Jones, Judge.
Law Office of Todd T. Cardiff and Todd T. Cardiff for Plaintiffs and Appellants Environmentalism Through Inspiration and Non-Violent Action, Grassroots Coalition and Daniel Cohen.
John Davis, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorney, Andrew J. Nocas and Timothy McWilliams, Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendants and Respondents.
Alston & Bird, Edward J. Casey and Neal P. Maguire for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
CROSKEY, J.
This mandamus proceeding involves the first phase of the Playa Vista development project and the approval by the City of Los Angeles of measures to mitigate methane gas on the project site. The city approved the methane mitigation measures in 2001, several years after its certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the first phase project in 1993. This appeal arises from a judgment discharging a writ of mandate that was issued by the trial court pursuant to our directions in a prior appeal. The writ of mandate ordered the City of Los Angeles to vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures for the purpose of determining whether a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR was required with respect to groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures, and proceed accordingly as required by CEQA.
The city vacated its approval of the methane mitigation measures, hired experts who reviewed the technical data, and determined that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts and that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required. The trial court concluded that the city had complied with the writ of mandate and discharged the writ.
Environmentalism Through Inspiration and Non-violent Action (ETINA), Grassroots Coalition and Daniel L. Cohen (collectively Petitioners) appeal the judgment discharging the writ of mandate. John Davis also appeals the judgment. The real parties in interest are the developer, Playa Capital Company, LLC (Playa Capital), and its related companies Playa Investments, LLC, Playa Commercial Debt Company, LLC, and Playa Phase One Apartments, LLC. Petitioners and Davis challenge the city’s determination that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required on several grounds and contend the city failed to comply with the writ of mandate. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the city’s determination that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts and that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required. Petitioners have shown no prejudicial abuse of discretion by the city and no prejudicial error by the trial court. We therefore will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
The city certified an EIR for and approved the first phase of the Playa Vista project in 1993, and construction proceeded. Several years later, in 2000, the city council’s Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee expressed concerns regarding the presence of methane gas on the project site in connection the city’s consideration of the proposed financing of public infrastructure improvements under the Mello Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (Gov. Code, § 53311 et seq.). As a result, the PLUM Committee directed the city’s Chief Legislative Analyst to investigate the matter. The Chief Legislative Analyst consulted with other city departments and outside experts, prepared and released a report, conducted a public hearing and proposed methane mitigation measures, including the installation of subterranean pipes to ventilate methane gas and dewatering devices to clear those pipes of water. The PLUM Committee recommended that the city council approve the recommendations by the Chief Legislative Analyst, and the city council did so in 2001.
2. Prior Appeal and Resulting Writ of Mandate
Petitioners and Davis challenged the city’s approval of the methane mitigation measures by filing a petition for writ of mandate in December 2001. The trial court denied the petition. On appeal, we concluded that groundwater dewatering in connection with the methane mitigation measures was a potentially significant project change and that the city had failed to determine whether such dewatering would result in new or substantially more severe significant environmental impacts, as required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). We therefore reversed the judgment with directions to the trial court to grant the petition and issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the city to vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures, determine whether conditions requiring the preparation of a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR were present with respect to groundwater dewatering, and proceed accordingly as required by CEQA. (Environmentalism Through Inspiration and Non-violent Action v. City of Los Angeles (Oct. 25, 2005, B174856) [nonpub. opn.] [pp. 27-28, 35] (ETINA I).)
The trial court on remand entered a judgment granting the petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate consistent with our directions.
3. The City’s Actions Pursuant to the Writ of Mandate
The city council approved a motion on January 11, 2006, authorizing the city’s Chief Legislative Analyst to hire consultants to (1) provide “a peer review and assessment” of reports prepared by other consultants relating to groundwater dewatering, and (2) determine whether groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause subsidence or exacerbate groundwater contamination. The city council also authorized the Chief Legislative Analyst to conduct two public hearings on the groundwater dewatering systems and report to the city council so the city council could comply with the writ. The city council approved a motion on March 31, 2006, vacating its approval of the methane mitigation measures for the express purpose of determining whether a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR was required with respect to groundwater dewatering. The city filed a return to the writ on July 10, 2006, describing its efforts to comply with the writ.
The Chief Legislative Analyst selected two geotechnical engineering and hydrogeology firms, Geocon Inland Empire, Inc. (Geocon), and Furgo West, Inc. (Furgo), as its peer reviewers. Geocon and Furgo reviewed reports previously prepared by Playa Capital’s consultants, Group Delta Consultants and Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., and other matters, and prepared reports concurring with the consultants’ conclusions that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts. The city’s Bureau of Engineering reviewed the reports by Geocon and Furgo and concurred with their conclusions. The reports by Geocon, Furgon, and the Bureau of Engineering were posted on the city’s website.
The Chief Legislative Analyst conducted a public hearing on the dewatering issue in August 2006 and received public comments. Geocon and Furgo prepared supplemental reports responding to the public comments, and the Bureau of Engineering reviewed and reported on those supplemental reports. Geocon and Furgo both reported that the comments and information received did not change their prior conclusions. The supplemental reports and supplemental report by the Bureau of Engineering were posted on the city’s website. The Chief Legislative Analyst then conducted a second public hearing in November 2006 and received further public comments. The Bureau of Engineering considered the further public comments and reported in February 2007 that the groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts.
The Chief Legislative Analyst prepared a report to city council dated February 7, 2007 (2007 CLA report), explaining the results of the prior appeal, the writ of mandate, and the actions taken by the city in an effort to comply with the writ, including the peer review process. The 2007 CLA report referenced the EIR, set forth the conditions under which a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR would be required under CEQA, and stated that the city must decide whether those conditions were present. The report set forth proposed findings stating that the groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts and that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required. Numerous documents were attached to the 2007 CLA report, including the peer review reports, consultants’ reports, public comments, and a CD-ROM of the EIR.
The city council’s Planning and Land Use Management (PLUM) Committee considered the 2007 CLA report and heard public comments at a public hearing in February 2007. The PLUM Committee adopted the proposed findings. The city council considered the 2007 CLA report and the PLUM Committee’s recommendation and heard public comments at a public hearing in February 2007. The city council found that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts and that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required. The city council therefore adopted the proposed findings and rescinded its vacation of its prior approval of the methane mitigation measures. The city filed a notice of determination in March 2007 regarding its decision.
4. Further Trial Court Proceedings and Discharge of the Writ
The city filed a supplemental return to the writ of mandate in March 2007 stating that it had complied with the writ by taking the actions described above. Petitioners filed objections to the supplemental return. The city and Playa Capital moved to overrule the objections and discharge the writ. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the city had failed to comply with the writ of mandate and failed to comply with CEQA. Petitioners moved to augment the administrative record, and the trial court denied the motion in July 2008. Petitioners filed a second motion to augment the administrative record in September 2008.
The trial court rejected Petitioners’ arguments and entered an order discharging the writ in November 2008. The court also denied Petitioners’ second motion to augment the administrative record at that time. The court entered a judgment on November 24, 2008, discharging the writ of mandate. Petitioners and Davis timely appealed the judgment.
CONTENTIONS
Petitioners contend (1) the city failed to identify the changes in the project before deciding that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required and failed to expressly find that it considered the EIR in conjunction with the 2007 CLA report, as required; (2) the 2007 CLA report is not an addendum, and the city’s decision that not even an addendum was required is not supported by the evidence; (3) the dewatering analysis in the 2007 CLA report was inadequate, and the city failed to consider cumulative impacts; (4) the city failed to consult with a trustee agency before deciding that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required; (5) a computer disk provided to Petitioners purportedly containing the groundwater dewatering data and model was unreadable; (6) the trial court’s refusal to consider evidence outside the administrative record was error; and (7) this court should reconsider and reverse its previous decision affirming the trial court’s ruling that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required with regard to the methane mitigation measures.
Davis contends (1) our prior opinion necessarily required the city to prepare either a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR, but the city failed to prepare either; (2) the city failed to effectively vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures, as required by the writ of mandate; (3) the city violated the Political Reform Act by failing to disclose political campaign contributions by Playa Capital and its agents; and (4) the city failed to identify the EIR and the notice of determination by the correct schedule number. Davis also joins in some of the contentions made by Petitioners.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable CEQA Requirements
A subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR may be required in certain circumstances if a public agency proposes a discretionary approval for a project after an EIR is certified. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21166; Guidelines, §§ 15162, subds. (a), (c), 15163.)
All references to Guidelines are to the CEQA Guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.) developed by the Office of Planning and Research and adopted by the Resources Agency. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21083, 21087.) “[C]ourts should afford great weight to the Guidelines except when a provision is clearly unauthorized or erroneous under CEQA.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 391, fn. 2.)
“Once a project has been approved, the lead agency’s role in project approval is completed, unless further discretionary approval on that project is required. Information appearing after an approval does not require reopening of that approval. If after the project is approved, any of the conditions described in subdivision (a) occurs, a subsequent EIR or negative declaration shall only be prepared by the public agency which grants the next discretionary approval for the project, if any. In this situation no other responsible agency shall grant an approval for the project until the subsequent EIR has been certified or subsequent negative declaration adopted.” (Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (c).)
A subsequent EIR is required only if (1) substantial changes proposed in the project require major revisions to the EIR due to new significant environmental effects or a substantial increase in the severity of effects identified in the EIR; (2) substantial changes in the circumstances surrounding the project require major revisions to the EIR for the same reasons; or (3) new information of substantial importance that was not known and with the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been known when the EIR was certified shows that (i) the project will have a significant effect not discussed in the EIR, (ii) significant effects discussed in the EIR will be substantially more severe, (iii) a mitigation measure or alternative found to be infeasible will be feasible and would substantially reduce a significant effect, but the project proponents have rejected the measure or alternative, or (iv) a mitigation measure or alternative considerably different from those discussed in the EIR would substantially reduce a significant effect, but the project proponents have rejected the measure or alternative. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21166; Guidelines, § 15162, subd. (a).)
The California Supreme Court has stated, “In the case of a certified EIR, which is a prerequisite for application of section 21166, section 21167.2 mandates that the EIR be conclusively presumed valid unless a lawsuit has been timely brought to contest the validity of the EIR. This presumption acts to preclude reopening of the CEQA process even if the initial EIR is discovered to have been fundamentally inaccurate and misleading in the description of a significant effect or the severity of its consequences. After certification, the interests of finality are favored over the policy of encouraging public comment.” (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1130.) “Section 21166 is intended to provide a balance against the burdens created by the environmental review process and to accord a reasonable measure of finality and certainty to the results achieved.” (Bowman v. City of Petaluma (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1065, 1074; accord, Friends of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1018.)
A supplement to an EIR may be prepared in lieu of a subsequent EIR if only minor changes or additions to the EIR are necessary to address the project changes, changed circumstances, or new information. (Guidelines, § 15163, subd. (a).) If a subsequent EIR or supplement to an EIR is prepared, the same notice and opportunity for public review of the document must be provided as is required for a draft EIR. (Guidelines, §§ 15162, subd. (d), 15163, subd. (c).) If the agency determines that project changes, changed circumstances, or new information requires changes or additions to the EIR that are not so substantial as to require the preparation of a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR, it must prepare an EIR addendum. (Guidelines, § 15164, subd. (a).) An addendum need not be circulated for public review and comment. (Id., subd. (c).) If the agency prepares an addendum, the agency should include a brief explanation of its decision not to prepare a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR either in the addendum, in its findings on the project, or elsewhere in the record. (Guidelines, § 15164, subd. (e).)
2. Standard of Review
The standard of review of an agency’s decision under CEQA is abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion means the agency failed to proceed in a manner required by law or there was no substantial evidence to support its decision. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21168, 21168.5; County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, 945.) Whether the agency failed to proceed in a manner required by law is a question of law. A court determines de novo whether the agency complied with CEQA’s procedural requirements, “ ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements’ (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564 [276 Cal.Rptr. 410, 801 P.2d 1161]).” (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435.)
We review an agency’s determination that the conditions requiring the preparation of a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR are not present under the substantial evidence standard. (Guidelines, §§ 15162, subd. (a), 15164, subd. (e); American Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of American Canyon (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1083; Friends of Davis v. City of Davis, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) “Substantial evidence” under CEQA “includes fact, a reasonable assumption predicated upon fact, or expert opinion supported by fact.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (e)(1); see Guidelines, §§ 15384, subd. (b), 15064, subd. (f)(5).) “Substantial evidence is not argument, speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, evidence that is clearly inaccurate or erroneous, or evidence of social or economic impacts that do not contribute to, or are not caused by, physical impacts on the environment.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (e)(2); accord, id. § 21082.2, subd. (c).)
3. The City Complied with the Writ of Mandate
a. Substantial Evidence Supports the City’s Determination that No Subsequent EIR or Supplement to the EIR Was Required
We concluded in our prior opinion that groundwater dewatering in connection with the methane mitigation measures was a potentially significant project change and that the city had failed to determine whether such dewatering would result in new or substantially more severe significant environmental impacts, as required by CEQA. (ETINA I, supra, B174856 [pp. 25-26, 28].) Accordingly, the writ of mandate ordered the city to vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures, determine whether conditions requiring the preparation of a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR were present with respect to groundwater dewatering, and proceed accordingly as required by CEQA.
The city completed a comprehensive peer review process involving two geotechnical engineering and hydrogeology firms, Geocon and Furgo. The two firms reviewed the EIR, reports prepared by Playa Capital’s consultants, groundwater data, and other information, and prepared written reports. They also considered public comments and additional materials submitted with the comments. Based on this information, the peer reviewers concluded that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts. We conclude that the analysis and conclusion by the peer reviewers and the information on which that conclusion was based, all of which is part of the administrative record, constitutes substantial evidence supporting the city council’s determination that groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures would cause no significant environmental impacts and that, therefore, no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required.
Petitioners and Davis do not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the city’s determination, but instead argue that the city failed to comply with CEQA or with the writ of mandate in other respects. We reject Petitioners’ arguments based on the city’s purported failure to properly identify the project changes before deciding that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required and its failure to expressly find that it considered the EIR in conjunction with the 2007 CLA report. The project changes for which the city was required to determine whether a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR was required involved groundwater dewatering in connection with the newly approved methane mitigation measures, as stated in our prior opinion and as explained in the 2007 CLR report. The impact of that groundwater dewatering was plainly identified as the focus of the city council’s inquiry. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, there was no need to further “identify and compare” the project changes with the project discussed in the EIR.
Moreover, the city council need not make an express finding that it considered the EIR in connection with its determination that the groundwater dewatering would cause no significant environmental impacts and that, therefore, no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required. Guidelines section 15164, subdivision (d) states that an agency preparing an addendum “shall consider the addendum with the final EIR or adopted negative declaration prior to making a decision on the project, ” but does not state that the agency must make an express finding that it did so. An agency need not make express findings in connection with its determination that no subsequent EIR or supplement to an EIR is required, as long as substantial evidence supports its implied findings. (Citizens for a Megaplex-free Alameda v. City of Alameda (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 91, 114-115; 2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar. 2d ed. 2010) § 19.46, p. 920.) Although express findings would facilitate judicial review and therefore are preferred, the record here supports the implied finding that the city council considered the EIR in connection with the 2007 CLA report because the EIR was attached to the 2007 CLA report that was provided to the city council and was referenced in that report.
Save San Francisco Bay Assn. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 908, 935, construed Guidelines section 15165, subdivision (d) (formerly subd. (c)) as requiring an express finding that the agency had reviewed the EIR before determining that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required, but held that the omission was insignificant because the record clearly showed that the agency had reviewed the EIR. To the extent that Save San Francisco Bay Assn. suggests that such an express finding is required, we decline to follow that opinion.
We also reject Petitioners’ argument that the 2007 CLA report is not an addendum and that the evidence does not support the city’s implied finding that not even an addendum was needed. In our view, a document need not be expressly labeled an addendum to constitute an addendum pursuant to Guidelines section 15164. The 2007 CLA report explains the city council’s decision not to prepare a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR (see Guidelines, § 15164, subd. (e)), and the city council considered the 2007 CLA report with the EIR before deciding to rescind the vacation of its approval of the methane mitigation measures (see id., subd. (d)). We conclude that the 2007 CLA report serves the purposes of an addendum and constitutes an addendum.
We also reject Petitioners’ arguments that the analysis in the 2007 CLA report was inadequate because it relied on estimates of dewatering rather than “actual data” and that the 2007 CLA report failed to consider cumulative impacts. A challenge to the scope of the analysis in an EIR, the methodology for studying an impact, or the reliability or accuracy of the data presents a question of fact. Such a challenge therefore must be rejected if substantial evidence supports the agency’s approach and the EIR is not clearly inadequate or unsupported. (City of Long Beach v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 889, 898; Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1259.) We conclude that the same rule applies to an analysis set forth in an addendum. (See Guidelines, § 15164, subd. (e) [“The explanation must be supported by substantial evidence”].) Petitioners have not shown that the experts’ reliance on modeling and estimates was clearly inadequate or unsupported and therefore have shown no prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Regarding cumulative impacts, Petitioners cite no authority for their argument that the requirements for the discussion of cumulative impacts in an EIR also apply to an addendum. An addendum need only briefly explain the agency’s decision that no subsequent EIR or supplement to an EIR is required (Guidelines, § 15164, subd. (e)) and need not be as thorough as the impacts analysis in an EIR. The 2007 CLA report provided a reasoned explanation of its conclusion, and the attachments to the report explained in detail the methodology of assessing the groundwater flow and evaluating the potential impacts of groundwater dewatering associated with the methane mitigation measures. Petitioners have not shown that the methodology employed failed to account for other groundwater dewatering (which would tend to affect and be reflected in the groundwater flow) or that the analysis was clearly inadequate. We conclude that the explanation provided in the 2007 CLA report was adequate and supported by substantial evidence and that Petitioners have shown no prejudicial abuse of discretion.
We also reject Davis’s contention that our prior opinion necessarily required the city to prepare either a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR. We concluded in ETINA I, supra, B174856, that that the city had failed to determine whether groundwater dewatering in connection with the methane mitigation measures would result in new or substantially more severe significant environmental impacts, as required by CEQA. (Id. [p. 28].) We therefore reversed the judgment with directions to the trial court to grant the petition and issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the city to vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures and make that determination, and proceed accordingly as required by CEQA. (Id. [p. 35].) Having determined based on substantial evidence in the administrative record that no significant impacts would result from the groundwater dewatering, the city council was not required to prepare either a subsequent EIR or a supplement to the EIR.
b. The City Properly Vacated its Approval of the Methane Mitigation Measures
Davis contends the city failed to effectively vacate its approval of the methane mitigation measures, as required by the writ of mandate. We disagree. The city council vacated its prior approval of the methane mitigation measures by adopting a motion to vacate its approval. No more was required. Neither our prior opinion nor the writ of mandate required the suspension of project activities. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.9.)
c. The City Was Not Required to Consult with a Trustee Agency
An agency must consult with responsible agencies and trustee agencies before preparing an initial study for the purpose of determining whether to prepare an EIR. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.3, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (g).) But an agency need not prepare an initial study before determining whether a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR is required (Friends of Davis v. City of Davis, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018) and need not consult with responsible or trustee agencies in making that determination. (See Guidelines, § 15164.) We therefore reject Petitioners’ argument that by failing to consult with a trustee agency the city failed to proceed in the manner required by law.
4. Petitioners Have Shown No Error in the Trial Court’s Refusal to Consider Evidence Not Contained in the Administrative Record
Petitioners moved to augment the administrative record with several categories of documents, including documents from the city’s Department of Sanitation indicating the volume of permitted discharge under industrial waste discharge permits issued for the project and documents from the Regional Water Quality Control Board indicating waste discharge requirements for the project. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Petitioners argue that the documents were in existence at the time of the city council’s decision and were in the city’s possession, and that Petitioners had notified the city that such information was essential to an informed decision. Petitioners argue that the documents therefore should be admissible in this proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (e) and Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559 (Western States).
Evidence outside the administrative record generally is not admissible in a traditional mandamus proceeding where the agency provided notice and a hearing and made its determination based on evidence in the record. (See 2 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the Cal. Environmental Quality Act, supra, § 23.56, pp. 1194-1196.) The court may consider relevant extra-record evidence in such a proceeding, however, if the evidence was in existence at the time of the administrative decision but, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been presented to the agency before the decision was made. (Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 578.) The same rule applies in administrative mandamus proceedings. (Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 120; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e).) Petitioners do not argue and have not shown that they were unable to present the evidence to the city council before the decision was made and therefore have failed to establish the exception.
5. Petitioners and Davis Have Shown No Prejudicial Abuse of Discretion with Regard to the Computer Disk or the Purported Failure to Properly Identify the EIR and Notice of Determination
Petitioners contend a computer disk that they were provided purportedly containing the groundwater dewatering data and model was unreadable and neither the city nor the city’s consultants provided a replacement disk. Petitioners argue that the failure to provide that information to them in an accessible form violated CEQA’s “information disclosure requirements, ” citing Public Resources Code section 21005. Petitioners do not argue, however, that the relevant information is absent from the administrative record or that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the city council’s determination. The city complied with the information disclosure requirements applicable to an addendum (see Guidelines, § 15164), as we have stated. Petitioners have shown no prejudicial abuse of discretion on this ground.
Davis contends the schedule number on both the EIR and the notice of determination (see Pub. Resources Code, § 21152, subd. (a); Guidelines, § 15094, subd. (b)) regarding the city’s determination that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required was not the number assigned by the State Clearinghouse of the Office of Planning and Research, as required by Guidelines section 15081, subdivision (e). Davis cites several documents in the trial court record, but those documents do not show that the schedule number on the EIR and the notice of determination was incorrect. We therefore reject his contention and need not consider it further.
6. Davis Has Shown No Error with Respect to the Political Reform Act
Davis sets forth no reasoned argument regarding the Political Reform Act in his appellant’s opening brief, but instead relies on incorporating by reference arguments made in hundreds of pages of papers filed in the trial court. Such incorporation by reference in an appellate brief is improper. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a); Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 109.) Absent reasoned argument and citation to legal authorities in his opening brief, Davis has abandoned any claim of error on this ground. (Valov v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1132; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.)
7. Petitioners Have Shown No Basis for this Court to Reconsider Our Previous Decision Concerning the Methane Mitigation Measures
We stated in our previous opinion, “A new or more severe significant effect does not require the preparation of a subsequent EIR or a supplement to an EIR, however, if adopted mitigation measures will reduce the impact to a level of insignificance.” We cited River Valley Preservation Project v. Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 154, 168, and other authorities in support of this statement, and declined to follow Mira Monte Homeowners Assn. v. County of Ventura (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 357, 364-365, to the extent that opinion was inconsistent with our conclusion. (ETINA I, supra, B174856 [p. 15 & fn. 6].) We concluded that the city had impliedly determined that the methane mitigation measures would reduce the concentrations of methane to an insignificant level, and that substantial evidence supported that implied finding. We therefore concluded that no subsequent EIR or supplement to the EIR was required with respect to purported new information concerning the discovery of thermogenic methane gas. (Id. [pp. 21-22].) Petitioners contend our reasoning was flawed and this court should reconsider and reverse our decision on this point.
The law of the case doctrine holds that if an appellate opinion states a principal or rule of law that is necessary to the decision, that principle or rule of law becomes the law of the case and must be followed by the trial court in the same case and in any subsequent appeal. (Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202, 211.) Thus, a reviewing court ordinarily will not reconsider the merits of its prior opinion. (Id. at pp. 211 212.) The principal purpose of the doctrine is one of judicial economy. (Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, 435.) In exceptional circumstances, however, a reviewing court may depart from the law of the case. Such exceptional circumstances must involve a manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice, or a subsequent change or clarification in the controlling rules of law, as distinguished from a mere disagreement with the prior appellate opinion. (Clemente, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 212; Searle, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 434-435; see Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 490-491.)
The above-quoted statement in our prior opinion was necessary to the decision and constitutes the law of the case. Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, the presence of methane gas does not constitute exceptional circumstances. We will adhere to the law of the case and decline to reconsider our prior decision on this issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The city and Playa Capital are entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
We Concur: KLEIN, P. J., ALDRICH, J.
“(a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state that noncompliance with the information disclosure provisions of this division which precludes relevant information from being presented to the public agency, or noncompliance with substantive requirements of this division, may constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion within the meaning of Sections 21168 and 21168.5, regardless of whether a different outcome would have resulted if the public agency had complied with those provisions.
“(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that, in undertaking judicial review pursuant to Sections 21168 and 21168.5, courts shall continue to follow the established principle that there is no presumption that error is prejudicial.
“(c) It is further the intent of the Legislature that any court, which finds, or, in the process of reviewing a previous court finding, finds, that a public agency has taken an action without compliance with this division, shall specifically address each of the alleged grounds for noncompliance.”