Summary
In Ensco Marine, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding that, when a plaintiff and a third-party defendant settle all claims between them, any claim that a plaintiff may have against from another third-party defendant in contribution is extinguished.
Summary of this case from In re Complaint of Daigle Towing Serv.Opinion
Civil Action No: 03-489, Section: "R" (3).
November 1, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
The plaintiff and the third-party defendant move the Court to dismiss all claims against the third-party defendant. The third-party defendant also moves the Court for summary judgment. The defendant opposes the motions. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and DENIES the motion for summary judgement as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Ensco Marine Company, contracted with the defendant, Bird-Johnson Company and Rolls-Royce Naval Marine (collectively Bird-Johnson), to repair the controllable pitch propeller system of the M/V ENSCO TITAN. Bird-Johnson directed and supervised the repairs, which took place between April and October of 2000 in Harvey, Louisiana. On March 21, 2000, the M/V ENSCO TITAN suffered a catastrophic failure of the controllable pitch propeller system. On February 14, 2003, ENSCO sued Bird-Johnson in admiralty for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence.
On August 20, 2003, Bird-Johnson impleaded third-party defendants Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., Bollinger Quick Repair, LLC, and Bollinger Shipyards Lockport, LLC (collectively Bollinger) under Rule 14(c). Bird-Johnson alleges that ENSCO also contracted with Bollinger to perform repair work on the M/V ENSCO TITAN. As third-party plaintiff, Bird-Johnson asserts that Bollinger failed to properly and adequately plan, perform, direct, and supervise repairs to the M/V ENSCO TITAN. Therefore, according to Bird-Johnson, Bollinger is liable to ENSCO for the damages ENSCO seeks from Bird-Johnson. Notably, Bird-Johnson alleges no independent claims against Bollinger. All claims Bird-Johnson asserts against Bollinger are in favor of ENSCO.
On June 17, 2004, ENSCO and Bollinger moved the Court ex parte to dismiss all claims against Bollinger under Rule 41. On June 24, 2004, the Court denied the motion. The Court reasoned that Rule 14(c) entitles a defendant "to insist that the plaintiff proceed to judgment against the third-party defendant." FED. R. CIV. P. 14 advisory committee's note. Therefore, to permit ENSCO and Bollinger to dismiss claims against Bollinger via ex parte motion would undermine the purpose of Rule 14(c).
ENSCO and Bollinger again move the Court to dismiss all claims against Bollinger, this time because they entered into a settlement agreement on July 23, 2004. They have provided the Court with adequate evidence of their settlement agreement. The settlement agreement releases Bollinger from all claims arising out of the repairs to the M/V ENSCO TITAN. Additionally, on August 10, 2004, Bollinger moved the Court for summary judgment. Bird-Johnson opposes both motions.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
Rule 41 provides that "an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." FED. R. CIV. P. 41 (a) (2). At issue is whether it is proper to dismiss claims against a third-party defendant tendered to an action under Rule 14(c). Rule 14(c) provides:
When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant . . ., as a third-party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, in which event the third-party defendant shall make any defenses to the claim of the plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the manner provided in Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff had commenced it against the third-party defendant as well as the third-party plaintiff.
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 14 indicates that section (c) was modeled on Admiralty Rule 56. The significance of Admiralty Rule 56 "was that the defendant was entitled to insist that the plaintiff proceed to judgment against the third-party defendant." FED. R. CIV. P. 14 advisory committee's note.
To force ENSCO to judgment against Bollinger here, however, would produce an absurd result. ENSCO and Bollinger have settled all of their claims arising out the failure of the M/V ENSCO TITAN. The settlement between ENSCO and Bollinger extinguishes any claim that ENSCO may have against Bollinger. See McDetmott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 209 (1994). Moreover, any damages Bird-Johnson owes will be proportional to its share of fault, and Bird-Johnson will not be able to sue Bollinger for contribution. See id. Therefore, to force Bollinger to remain a party to the action amounts to an unreasonable interpretation of Rule 14(c).
A reasonable interpretation of Rule 14(c) is that the defendant may insist that the plaintiff proceed to judgment against the third-party defendant only when the third-party defendant may be liable to the plaintiff under the law. Bollinger cannot be held liable to ENSCO because it settled with ENSCO, and it therefore makes no sense to require Bollinger to stay in the case. Other courts encountering the same or similar issues have refused to interpret Rule 14(c) to permit the defendant to force the plaintiff to judgment against the third-party defendant when the third-party defendant cannot be liable to the plaintiff. See Chilean Nitrate Corporation v. M/V Hans Leonhardt, 1993 WL 432351, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 1993) (permitting voluntary dismissal of a third-party defendant tendered under Rule 14(c) because the third-party defendant, the assured, could not be liable to the plaintiff, the insurer, under the law); see also Cliffe v. Sportsman's Cove, Inc., 2003 WL 22415997, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2003) (denying a motion to amend the complaint to implead a third-party defendant under Rule 14(c) because the plaintiffs had already sued the third-party defendant and lost, rendering such proceedings barred under res judicata).
Bird-Johnson relies on F/V Capt. Wool, Inc. v. Wagner Maritime, Inc., 1996 WL 895461 (E.D. Va. Dec. 4, 1996) to support its argument that the Court should deny the motion to dismiss. Capt. Wool, however, is not inconsistent with the Court's ruling. In that case, the plaintiff and the third-party defendant moved to dismiss the third-party defendant from the action because they agreed that there was no duty of care running from the third-party defendant to the plaintiff. Capt. Wool, 1996 WL 895461, at *1. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. The court reasoned that dismissing the third-party defendant on the grounds asserted by the plaintiff and the third-party defendant would have required the court to make a premature factual finding. Id. In contrast, the Court makes no factual findings in dismissing Bollinger from this action. Instead, the Court dismisses Bollinger because Bollinger is not liable to ENSCO or Bird-Johnson because of the July 23, 2004 settlement agreement.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Bollinger moves the Court for summary judgment in its favor. Bollinger urges the same arguments in the motion for summary judgment that Bollinger and ENSCO urge in the motion to dismiss. Because the Court grants the motion to dismiss Bollinger from the action, the motion for summary judgment is moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss and DENIES the motion for summary judgment as moot.