Opinion
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing April 27, 1972.
Opinions on pages 422 to 485 omitted.
HEARINGS GRANTED
For Opinion on Hearing, see 105 Cal.Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457.
[101 Cal.Rptr. 55]Abramson & Church, Pioda, Stave, Bryan, Ames & McInnis, Salinas, for plaintiffs and respondents, Oshita, Inc., et al.
Noland, Hamerly, Etienne & Fulton, Salinas, for remaining plaintiffs and respondents.
Cohen, Farnsworth, Denison & Carder, Salinas for defendants and appellants.
TAYLOR, Presiding Justice.
These consolidated appeals are taken by the individual defendants, Cesar Chavez and the other principal officers of defendant, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (hereafter collectively UFWOC), from eight orders granting substantially identical preliminary injunctions to respondents, 27 growers and shippers of agricultural products in the Salinas Valley (hereafter collectively referred to as Growers), who are members of the Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association of Central California (hereafter Vegetable Association).
The appeals of seven growers (No. 29101, Englund; No. 29102, Eckel; No. 29103, Merit; No. 29104, Garin; No. 29144, Growers Exchange; No. 19145, Stewart; No. 29186, Mann) were consolidated with the appeals of the 20 Growers involved in No. 19185. The appeals were dismissed as to two of the original plaintiffs in No. 29185, Cel-A-Pac, Inc., and D'Arrigo Bros. Co. of California.
UFWOC contends that the injunction should not have been issued pursuant to the California Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab.Code, §§ 1115-1122), as there was no 'jurisdictional dispute' since the Growers entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union that neither represented nor had the authority to represent the field workers; and that the injunction prohibiting all picketing infringed on UFWOC's freedom of speech and association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United [101 Cal.Rptr. 56] States. The case is one of first impression.
United Farm Workers Organizing Committee A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 556, 94 Cal.Rptr. 263, 483 P.2d 1215, specifically did not raise the first question here presented (see fn. 2, p. 560, 94 Cal.Rptr. 263, 483 P.2d 1215) and involved a differently worded injunction (see fn. 6 at pp. 561-562, 94 Cal.Rptr. 263, 483 P.2d 1215).
"The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.' [Citations.] The general purpose of such an injunction is the preservation of the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. [Citations.] Thus, the court examines all of the material before it in order to consider 'whether a greater injury will result to the defendant from granting the injunction than to the plaintiff from refusing it; . . .' [Citations.] In making that determination the court will consider the probability of the plaintiff's ultimately prevailing in the case and, it has been said, will deny a preliminary injunction unless there is a reasonable probability that plaintiff will be successful in the assertion of his rights. [Citations.] As was said in Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 235, 242, 342 P.2d 10, 15. 'In the last analysis the trial court must determine which party is the more likely to be injured by the exercise of its discretion [citation] and it must then be exercised in favor of that party [citation]." (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 771, 439 P.2d 889, 899.)
The following chronology of facts appears from the verified pleadings and affidavits available to the trial court in determining the petition for a preliminary injunction.
In 1961, the 400,000 member Western Conference of Teamsters (hereafter Teamsters), became the collective bargaining agent for all field workers employed by Bud Antle, Inc. (hereafter Antle), a Salinas Valley grower not involved in these proceedings. In the course of settling a dispute that arose between UFWOC and Antle in 1968, the attorney for Antle received a letter from the attorney for UFWOC that stated, in part: 'As you know from our telephone conversation of Wednesday, September 25, 1968, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO has a jurisdictional agreement with the Western Conference of Teamsters.
'Part of their agreement reads as follows:
"The parties agree that they will not raid or participate in a raid upon any firm that is presently under an agreement with the other party, or which in the future comes under agreement with the other part.'
'As I told you during our telephone conversation, Wednesday, September 25, 1968, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO has no intention of violating its agreement with the Western Conference of Teamsters. As a matter of fact, the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO is currently enjoying most cordial relations with the Western Conference of Teamsters and hopes that it can act in the future for the mutual enhancement of both the Western Conference of Teamsters and for itself.'
USWOC's answers in the instant proceedings denied the existence of both the 1968 and 1970 agreements, as alleged in the complaints. We are required to follow the trial court's resolution of the conlicting pleadings in the current tentative posture of the case (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, supra, p. 527, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889).
Another similar agreement between the Teamsters and UFWOC was executed on August 12, 1970, and provided, so far as here pertinent: 'II. JURISDICTION
'A. U.F.W.O.C. agrees not to organize, attempt to organize, or assist others in organizing [101 Cal.Rptr. 57] or raiding among workers in the following areas:
'1. Canneries and creameries;
'2. Frozen food processing plants;
'3. Produce markets and warehouses;
'4. Professional truck drivers;
'5. Dehydrators and/or driers, provided, however, that smaller dehydrators, driers, or storage sheds which are owned by and operated as an integral part of a ranch operation are conceded to be in the jurisdiction of the U.F.W.O.C.
'B. The Teamsters agree not to organize, attempt to organize, or assist others in organizing or raiding agricultural workers not listed in another section of this provision II, and workers in all classifications in the grape industry except professional truck drivers and those employees working in commercial driers.
'C. The parties are in disagreement as to the jurisdiction over the following classifications of workers involved in the agricultural process:
'1. Drivers of field to shed trucks not under agreement.
'2. Workers processing food in the fields.
'3. Workers presently performing operations under contract with Teamsters that move into the field.
'4. Workers in the livestock and dairy industry.
'The foregoing does not negate the provisions of Article I, prohibiting raiding; it is agreed that Teamsters may organize classifications of workers in 'A' and 'C' above and U.F.W.O.C. may organize classifications of workers in 'B' and 'C' above.' (Emphasis supplied.)
All of the 27 Growers involved in this proceeding were members of the Vegetable Association, an organization certified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as an appropriate multi-employer unit for collective bargaining with the Teamsters who represented their truck drivers and packing shed workers. In June and July, 1970, the Vegetable Association and the Teamsters were engaged in re-negotiating the truck drivers' contract that expired on July 15, 1970. As no new agreement was reached by that date, the Teamsters commenced a strike that was settled by a new agreement reached on July 23, 1970.
Throughout the negotiations relating to the truck drivers' contract and strike, the Teamster's bargaining representative, William Grami (hereafter Grami) asserted that his organization was also interested in negotiating with the members of the Vegetable Association, industrywide collective bargaining agreements concerning their field workers in the Salinas Valley and beyond. Recognition of the Teamsters as the exclusive agent for the field workers was not considered by either side as an issue in the truck drivers' strike. Grami indicated that since the Teamsters represented truck drivers and food processing workers who would be affected if the field workers went on strike, the Teamsters wanted to protect the flow of agricultural products that was the basis of the jobs of the Teamsters' members. Grami indicated that the Teamsters 'intended to take in the field workers and would fight to do so.'
After the conclusion of the new truck drivers' agreement on July 23, 1970, some of the members of the Vegetable Association executed limited powers of attorney authorizing an approach to the Teamsters concerning representation of the field workers. On July 24, 1970, at a general membership meeting of the Vegetable Association, a committee 'established to approach the Teamsters,' reported that the Teamsters were 'interested and receptive.' It was also announced that any interested Grower could sign an immediate recognition agreement designating the Teamsters as the exclusive bargaining agent for his field workers. Each of the 27 Growers herein signed such an agreement on a form provided in advance by the Teamsters.
On July 25, 1970, negotiations for formal contracts commenced between the Teamsters and the Growers who had signed recognition agreements. The [101 Cal.Rptr. 58] Teamsters did not assert that they were authorized to represent the field workers, but indicated that they would assume responsibility for signing up the field workers as Teamster members. As at this time the field workers had not yet been approached by any union, their wishes and the authority of the Teamsters to represent them was no discussed. By the end of July, five-year exclusive 'union shop' contracts concerning the wages, hours and working conditions of the field workers were signed by each of the 27 Growers.
Prior to the signing, none of the field workers had signed cards seeking or authorizing representation by the Teamsters. In many instances, the field workers were neither notified of the existence nor the provisions of the Teamster contract, nor given an opportunity to ratify it. Affidavits of field workers alleged that some of the Growers or their foremen indicated a preference for the Teamsters, and told the field workers that they would lose their jobs if they refused to sign. These allegations were controverted by the counteraffidavits of some of the Growers.
In actions Nos. 29102, 29103, 29104, 29144 and 29186, the affidavits of the field workers alleging Grower preference for the Teamsters and threats of firing were controverted by counteraffidavits. In No. 29145, there were neither affidavits nor counteraffidavits filed. In No. 29185, the UFWOC affidavits were controverted only as to the number of signatures obtained.
Subsequently, the field workers, most of whom wanted to be represented by the UFWOC, refused to sign or ratify the agreements between the Teamsters and Growers. After UFWOC made repeated demands on the Growers to recognize the UFWOC as the freely designated representative of the field workers, the field workers commenced a recognition strike against the Growers. The Growers commenced the instant proceedings on August 24, 25 and 26, 1970. The matters were submitted on the verified pleadings and declarations of the parties and documents filed. The court found that each Grower had established the existence of a jurisdictional strike within the meaning of Labor Code section 1115 et seq., and entered substantially identical preliminary injunctions.
Some of the uncontroverted UFWOC affidavits indicate that a number of field workers did not bear about the Teamster agreement until after they had joined UFWOC in mid-August, although the Teamster-Grower agreements had been completed by the end of July.
The California Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1122) provides that 'A jurisdictional strike as herein defined' is against public policy and unlawful (Lab. Code, § 1115).
Labor Code section 1116 provides: 'Any person injured or threatened with injury by violation of any of the provisions here-of shall be entitled to injunctive relief therefrom in a proper case, and to recover any damages resulting therefrom in any court of competent jurisdiction' (emphasis supplied).
Labor Code section 1117 provides, so far as pertinent: 'As used herein, 'labor organization' means any organization or any agency or employee representation committee or any local unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work, which labor organization is not found to be or to have been financed in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer or any employer association within one year of the commencement of any proceeding brought under this chapter. The plaintiff shall have the affirmative of the issue with respect to establishing the existence of a 'labor organization' as defined herein.' (Emphasis supplied.)
Labor Code section 1118, so far as here pertinent, defines a jurisdictional strike as 'a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer or any other concerted interference [101 Cal.Rptr. 59] with an employer's operation or business, arising out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them. . . .' (emphasis supplied).
Labor Code section 1119 provides: 'Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to interfere with collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any other individual to join a labor organization.'
The remaining sections of the statute, section 1120, the separability provision, and section 1122, providing for damages to any party injured by an employee group organized, financed, interfered with, controlled or dominated by an employer, are not involved here.
The questions here presented ar whether, under the circumstances: 1) the Teamster contract was that of a 'labor organization' interfered with, dominated or controlled by the Growers or Vegetable Association, and whether the Growers had met their burden or proof (Lab.Code, § 1117); 2) the controversy arose 'between two or more labor organizations' (Lab.Code, § 1118); 3) if so, whether this was a 'proper case' for injunctive relief under the statute (Lab.Code, § 1116); and 4) whether the relief granted was unconstitutionally broad (United Farm Workers Organizing Committee A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Superior Court, supra).
Our analysis and answers to these questions must be based on the Jurisdictional Strike Act. In order to justify the preliminary injunctions here granted, the existence of a jurisdictional strike must be tentatively established by the complaint and affidavits (Surrey Restaurants v. Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union, 54 Cal.2d 461, 6 Cal.Rptr. 18, 353 P.2d 730).
In its most recent opinion construing the statute, Smyrniotis v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 64 Cal.2d 30, at pages 35-36, 48 Cal.Rptr. 725, at page 729, 409 P.2d 949, at page 953, our Supreme Court noted: 'The structure of the California [Jurisdictional Strike] Act is both deceptive and simple. It incorporates two different parts of the Taft-Hartley Act and joins them in an 'incongruous whole'. [Citation.] It seeks to accommodate two purposes that often may conflict: the protection of the union in its traditional use of concerted activity to improve wages and working conditions and the protection of the public by the restriction of that activity in case of the involvement of competing unions. In regard to protected union activity, Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employee, etc., Local No. 88 (1960) 53 Cal.2d 455, 471-472, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 480, 349 P.2d 76, 86, recognizes that the Act 'was designed, not to diminish free competition between labor and industry, but to release an innocent employer caught between the rival claims of two or more labor organizations.'' However, in regard to competition between two unions, 'the Act fails to resolve the basic issue which engenders such a dispute if it is a bona fide one. The Act provides no machinery whatsoever for informing the employer as to which of the truly competing unions he should recognize as the bargaining representative of his employees.'
In Smyrniotis, the court focused on section 1118. The employer terminated his new collective bargaining agreement with one union and refused to sign another because of a dispute concerning the contributions to the union welfare fund. After the original union went on strike, the employer formed a union that claimed to represent the majority of those then employed, and agreed to sign an exclusive collective bargaining agreement with the new union. The court held at pages 36 and 37, 48 Cal.Rptr. at page 729, 409 P.2d at page 953 that the key language that determined the applicability of the statute was the section 1118 requirement that the [101 Cal.Rptr. 60] 'concerted interference' with the employer's business must arise out of a 'controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them' has or should have the right to bargain collectively with the employer. The words 'arising out of a controversy' mean that the nterference originated in a jurisdictional dispute. The interference must issue from the dispute between the two unions as to which should represent the employee and emanates from 'pre-existing multi-union quarrels for power'. The court noted, at page 40, 48 Cal.Rptr. at page 732, 409 P.2d at page 956, that the time factor was relevant, but not controllong, but held that the 'Test must turn upon the nature of the dispute: whether or not the [striking] union's action arose out of a jurisdictional dispute.' The court concluded that since the dispute between the employer and the original union had not been concluded, the strike arose out of the original dispute and not a jurisdictional dispute between the two unions, and reversed the order granting the preliminary injunction.
Smyrniotis also points out, at page 35, 48 Cal.Rptr. 725, 409 P.2d 949, that while the statute seeks to avoid the undesirable effects of jurisdictional strikes, it specifically affirms the right of employees to participate in concerted activity (Lab.Code, § 1119) and at the same time attempts to prevent employers from misusing the statute to abridge those rights or from utilizing a completely dominated union to create a jurisdictional strike (Lab.Code, § 1117).
UFWOC argues that section 1119 was intended to reflect the basic public policy of this state with respect to labor organizations and protect the employees' right to collective bargaining. However, our Supreme Court concluded in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, etc., Local No. 88, 53 Cal.2d 455, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76, that in the absence of any specific statute or statutory machinery for determining the appropriateness of bargaining units, conducting elections, etc., the employer had neither an affirmative duty to bargain with the majority union nor a duty not to bargain with any other union. The court held at page 469, 2 Cal.Rptr. at page 479, 349 P.2d at page 85 that section 923 of the Labor Code did not place on the employer an affirmative duty to bargain and stated that 'An employer's decision whether or not to bargain with a labor organization has long been determined in this state by the free interaction of economic forces.' (Emphasis supplied.) Then, in commenting on the nonexistence of a duty not to bargain with nonrepresentative unions, the court held at page 474, 2 Cal.Rptr. at page 482, 349 P.2d at page 88: 'We conclude that employers are not required by law to engage in collective bargaining and that closed or union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve them are lawful in this state whether or not a majority of the employees directly involved wish such agreements.' [101 Cal.Rptr. 61] .' (Emphasis added.) Petri, like most of the other cases to date, arose out of entirely different fact situations than that here presented, namely the formation of an 'inside' union formed by or with the approval of the employer.
Set forth as follows in Labor Code section 923: 'In the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of this State is declared as follows:
As indicated in Petri, the federal statutes provide for machinery for the recognition and determination of the collective bargaining agent in accordance with the wishes of a majority of the employees. This significant omission in the California statute has been the subject of comment since its enactment in 1947 (see Aaron, The California Jurisdictional Strike Act, 27 So.Cal.L.R. 237, 242-264) but apparently no legislative attempts have been made to cure the omission in the intervening years or the 12 years that have elapsed since the Petri case was decided.
We can only conclude from the unequivocal language of Petri that in this state, an employer can sign an exclusive collective bargaining agreement with a union to cover all of his employee even when there is no indication that these employees want to be represented by the union or have authorized the union to represent them, or have been given an opportunity to accept or reject the agreement.
UFWOC decries the tactics of the Growers here in encouraging their field workers to join the Teamsters and in threatening to fire them if they did not. These allegations were denied in the counter-affidavits of a number of Growers. In those instances, this court is required to follow the trial court's resolution of the conflicting affidavits. However, even where such conduct on the part of some of the Growers is uncontroverted we are constrained to conclude that, under the guidelines of Petri approving closed or union shop agreements without the employees' prior approval, there may nevertheless be a jurisdictional dispute between two independent unions and a proper case for the application of the Jurisdictional Strike Act. The Growers had entered into a legal and binding collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters and the subsequent action by UFWOC clearly created a jurisdictional dispute between these two giant unions. Furthermore, the preliminary injunction here expressly reserved to all of the field workers the rights guarantedd by Labor Code section 1119, including the right of the individual employee to retain or change his union affiliation as he desires.
The first question presented is whether or not the Growers have met their burden of proof that the Teamsters were a 'labor organization' which was not 'interfered' with by the Growers or the Vegetable Association. There is no question that the Teamsters are an independent 'labor organization' certified by the NLRB as a bargaining unit. The July 1970 strike against the Growers further demonstrates their independence.
As the uncontroverted affidavits of the Growers and the Teamster representatives indicated that at no time were the Teamsters financed or dominated by the Growers or the Vegetable Association, we need not discuss these two issues.
UFWOC, however, argues: 1) that if there has been any 'interference' by the employer with the employees' right to determine who should represent them at the bargaining table, the requirements of section 1117 have not been met; 2) that domination is clearly not the only criteria as section 1117 also indicates that 'interference,' 'in whole or in part,' by the employer is sufficient to take the dispute out of the operation of the statute; and 3) that active interference can take many forms, such as: premature recognition of the Teamsters here as exclusive bargaining agents without determining if the union represented a majority or a substantial number of the field workers; active solicitation of the field workers to join the Teamsters by Grower foreman or conduct indicating that the Growers favored the Teamsters over UFWOC.
But here, there was no evidence that prior to the signing of the Teamster contract, the field workers had indicated that they wanted to be represented by UFWOC. The uncontroverted affidavits [101 Cal.Rptr. 62] indicate that not until after the signing of the Growers' agreement with the Teamsters was there any attempt made by WFWOC to organize the field workers. Under these circumstances, the Growers' recognition of the Teamsters, the signing of the collective bargaining agreement, and other acts, did not constitute 'interference.' We reiterate that under the express holding of Petri, agreements such as that between the Growers and the Teamsters are lawful 'whether or not a majority of the employees directly involved wish such agreements' (Petri, supra, at pp. 474-475, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76). We hold, therefore, that the Growers have met their burden of proof under section 1117 that they had entered into a valid agreement with the Teamsters, an independent labor organization.
UFWOC contends that as stated in Petri, the federal decisions are persuasive in interpreting section 1117 as to the meaning of 'interference.' UFWOC urges that the Growers' signing of the contract with the Teamsters, and the threats of discharge and other acts constitute conduct condemned as 'interference' in Petri and, therefore, the Growers were not entitled to the affirmative relief under the statute. This argument might have some weight had there been anything in the record to indicate that UFWOC had attempted to organize the field workers prior to the signing of the Growers' agreement with the Teamsters and that the Growers had deliberately sought out the Teamsters and signed the agreement for the very purpose of creating a jurisdictional strike situation to thwart UFWOC's efforts. Under the facts presented here, however, the trial court was justified in concluding that both the Growers and the Teamsters acted in good faith and that there was nothing present in the picture with which the Growers could 'interfere' within the meaning of section 1117 prior to the execution of their binding contract with the Teamsters.
The next question is whether the controversy here arose 'between two or more labor organizations' so as to constitute a 'jurisdictional strike' as defined in section 1118. The 1968 and 1970 agreements between the Teamsters and UFWOC, whereby the parties agreed not to 'raid or participate in a raid upon any firm that is presently under an agreement with the other party,' support the trial court's implied conclusion that the instant controversy arose between two labor organizations. Furthermore, unlike Smyrniotis, supra (discussed above), here, there was no underlying dispute between the Growers and UFWOC. The Teamsters had signed up with the Growers before UFWOC arrived on the scene. In Smyrniotis an employer in the throws of a controversy with a union, actively participated in the formation of an 'inside union' to deliberately create what he subsequently claimed to be a jurisdictional dispute.
We hold that in the instant case, the 'controversy arose between two or more labor organization.' We conclude, therefore, that the existence of a jurisdictional strike as defined by section 1118, and made unlawful by section 1115, was tentatively established by the complaint and affidavits (Corrigan v. Barbers & Beauticians Union, 251 Cal.App.2d 490, 496, 59 Cal.Rptr. 533). It follows, therefore, that the instant controversy was a 'proper case' for the granting of the preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to section 1116.
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the preliminary injunctions here granted were so broad as to deprive UFWOC of its constitutionally protected First Amendment rights. The pertinent portions of two of the preliminary injunctions are set forth below: the injunctions in No. 29186 and [101 Cal.Rptr. 63] its companion cases, Nos. 29101, 29102, 29103, 29104, 29144 and 29145, prohibit all picketing; that in No. 29185 specifically permits a single peaceful informational picket at any entrance to a place of business of the Growers. All the injunctions preserve the rights of individual employees granted by section 1119.
UFWOC is prohibited from: '1. Picketing or striking the premises, ranches and places of business of Plaintiff of harassing or intimidating Plaintiff, Plaintiff's employees, and third persons contracting with Plaintiff.
'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that during the pendency of this action, Defendants above-named, and each of them, and their officers, agents, employees, representatives, and all persons acting in concert or participating with them, shall ne, and they are hereby restrained, and enjoined, from directly or indirectly causing or participating in a concerted refusal to perform work for Plaintiffs, and each of them, slow down, work stoppage, picketing of locations of any of Plaintiffs' operations or business, interfering with the sale or disposition of any of Plaintiffs' goods and merchandise, or other interference with any of Plaintiffs' operations or business including, but not limited to, wholesale and retail outlets for any of Plaintiffs' goods and merchandise, sheds, processing plants, properties, offices, camps and fields, including the specific locations described in Exhibit 'A' attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference.
The applicable law was recently summarized by our Supreme Court in United Farm Workers Organizing Committee A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 556, at page 566, 94 Cal.Rptr. 263, at page 270, 483 P.2d 1215, at page 1222, wherein it was stated that: 'In 1953 the Jurisdictional Strike Act was held constitutional against a contention that the prohibition of peaceful picketing violated the constitutional righ of free speech. (Seven Up, etc., Co. of Los Angeles v. Grocery, etc., Union (1953) 40 Cal.2d 368, 254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327 (revd. on other grounds) (1959) 359 U.S. 434, 79 S.Ct. 939, 3 L.Ed.2d 931.)' The court continued to state that Seven Up and its two companion cases (Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union, 40 Cal.2d 382, 254 P.2d 553; Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal.2d 392, 254 P.2d 559) 'stand for the proposition . . . that peaceful picketing for purposes declared to be illegal or contrary to public policy of the state may be enjoined, under some circumstances . . .' (emphasis supplied).
United Farm Workers Organizing Committee A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Superior Court, supra, at page 572, 94 Cal.Rptr. at pages 274-275, 483 P.2d at pages 1226-1227 held: ' . . . that peaceful and truthful attempts to persuade the general public not to purchase a specific product or products, unaccompanied by picketing or coercive tacties, is not the 'other concerted activity' contemplated by the Jurisdictional Strike Act.' (Emphasis supplied.)
UFWOC contends that under the circumstances here presented, the local ban on all picketing in No. 29186 is an unwarranted infringement of its First Amendment rights. Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, supra, stated at page 401, 254 P.2d at page 565: 'The state policy of outlawing jurisdictional coercive activity in the maintenance of peaceful industrial relations justifies the injunctive as well as legal relief.' (Emphasis supplied.) The affidavits here clearly support the conclusion that the picketing enjoined was disruptive and not informational only. As the court was justified on the basis of the affidavits in finding that a jurisdictional strike had been established, injunctive relief pending the trial on the merits was proper.
As we have stated above, even peaceful picketing may be enjoined under some circumstances. However, we are not here called upon to determine the constitutional question of whether limited peaceful informational picketing was improperly enjoined in this case. At oral argument, the attorney for the Growers in No. 29186 and its companion cases indicated that there was no objection to a modification of those preliminary injunctions to conform to that issued in No. 29185 which permits such picketing. As so modified, the preliminary injunctions in Nos. 29186, 29101, 29102, 20103, 29104, 29144 and 29145, are hereby affirmed. The order in No. 29185 is likewise affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on appeal.
KANE and ROUSE, JJ., concur.
'Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental authority has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate and other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment. Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.'
'2. Any activity or conduct directly or indirectly preventing Plaintiff's employees or third persons from entering the premises, ranches and/or places of business of Plaintiff to perform work or any activity or conduct directly or indirectly encouraging said employees to strike or picket or from threatening said employees should they continue to perform work on the premises, ranches or places of business of Plaintiff.
'3. Inciting, advising, or encouraging any individual to engage in a strike, slowdown, or work stoppage; assisting in or engaging in any activity which would obstruct lawful ingress and egress from the premises, ranches and places of business of Plaintiff.
'In accordance with California Labor Code, Section 1119, nothing in this Order shall be construed to interfere with collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any other individual to join a labor organization.'
'Notwithstanding the above, Defendants are not prohibited from peaceful informative picketing limited to no more than one picket at any entrance or entrances to any place or places of business or operation of any of Plaintiffs, for purposes other than causing or participating in a concerted refusal to perform work for any of Plaintiffs, or in a concerted interference with Plaintiffs' operations or business, arising out of a controversy between the Western Conference of Teamsters and United Farm Worker's Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, as to which of them has, or should have, the exclusive right to bargain collectively with any of Plaintiffs on behalf of any of the Plaintiffs' employees, or as to which of said labor organizations has, or should have, the exclusive right to have its members perform work for any of Plaintiffs.
'In accordance wich California Labor Code, Section 1119, nothing in this Order shall be construed to interfere with collective bargaining subject to the probibitions herein set forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any other individual to join a labor organization.'