Opinion
Case No. 4:20-CV-1816 SRC
03-11-2021
JOSEPH MICHAEL DEVON ENGEL, Plaintiff, v. CORIZON, et al., Defendants.
Memorandum and Order
Self-represented plaintiff Joseph Michael Devon Engel (registration no. 1069055), an inmate at Missouri Eastern Correctional Center ("MECC"), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his civil rights. The matter is now before the Court upon the motion of Engel for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of the required filing fees and costs. Doc. 2. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined that Engel lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, after reviewing the complaint, the Court will dismiss this case without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and for being frivolous and malicious. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Initial Partial Filing Fee
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.
In his affidavit in support of his request to proceed in forma pauperis, Engel states that he receives "$7.50 monthly" but that he "only get[s] 5.00 dollars [a] month." Doc. 2 at 1. Engel has not submitted a certified prison account statement in this case. Based on the financial information Engel has submitted, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount "that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner's finances."). Any claim that Engel is unable to pay $1.00 must be supported by a certified copy of his inmate account statement that details his inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. When reviewing a complaint filed by a self-represented person under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court accepts the well-pleaded facts as true, White v. Clark, 750 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1984), and it liberally construes the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits the claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented plaintiffs are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (refusing to supply additional facts or to construct a legal theory for the self-represented plaintiff).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679.
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). While federal courts should not dismiss an action commenced in forma pauperis if the facts alleged are merely unlikely, the court can properly dismiss such an action as factually frivolous if the facts alleged are found to be "clearly baseless." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327). Allegations are "clearly baseless" if they are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Id. (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327, 328). "As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." Id. at 33.
An action is malicious when it is undertaken with the intent to harass or if it is part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits. See Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing that when determining whether an action is malicious, the Court need not consider only the complaint before it but may consider the plaintiff's other litigious conduct).
Background
Engel is a prisoner and a frequent filer in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri over the last few months, having initiated over 130 civil actions. As of December 21, 2020, at least three of Engel's civil actions were dismissed for one of the reasons enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Engel v. Governor of Missouri, No. 1:20-cv-217-HEA (E.D. Mo. dismissed Dec. 15, 2020); Engel v. United States of America, No. 4:20-cv-1742-MTS (E.D. Mo. dismissed Dec. 18, 2020); Engel v. Missouri Courts, No. 4:20-cv-1258-SPM (E.D. Mo. dismissed Dec. 21, 2020). Therefore, for cases filed December 22, 2020 and after, Engel is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which limits a prisoner's ability to proceed in forma pauperis, or without prepayment of fees and costs. However, this case was filed by Engel around December 17, 2020, before he received his third 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal.
The Complaint
Engel is currently incarcerated at Missouri Eastern Correctional Center ("MECC"); however, when he filed this suit, Engel was incarcerated at Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center ("ERDCC") in Bonne Terre, Missouri. Engel seeks relief in this matter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three defendants: (1) Corizon; (2) ERDCC; and (3) MODOC (Missouri Department of Corrections). Doc. 1 at 1. He sues these three defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id.
Engel, who describes himself as a sovereign citizen, prepared his pleading on a form § 1983 complaint from the Western District of Missouri Court. His "Statement of Claim" is as follows:
On 11-3-20 7HU ERDCC 1pm Corizon Medical is still refusing my snack bags and blood sugar checks [-] this has been going on since 8-13-20. I have been on snack bags [and] blood sugars since 2003 [-] now medical refuses.Id. at 3.
Where the form complaint asks plaintiff to briefly state his "legal theory or cite appropriate authority," plaintiff writes: "My Health, Mental Health, Freedom, Sourvin Citizn, mind raping, 1st Amendment." Id. For relief, plaintiff requests 250 trillion dollars. Id. at 1-2, 4.
Engel also included in the 'Relief' section of the complaint (after his 250 trillion-dollar request): "Bramlett Kennett 1287573 1 million dollars." Doc. 1 at 4. To the extent that Engel is attempting to assert a claim for another prisoner, such claims are not allowed. A non-attorney pro se litigant may not represent someone else in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (stating that in all United States courts, "the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel").
Discussion
Having carefully considered the instant complaint, as well as Engel's recent history of engaging in abusive litigation practices, the Court finds this case subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and for being frivolous and malicious.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Engel's alleged status as a sovereign citizen of Alaska does not excuse him from meeting basic pleading requirements or satisfying the standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Claims of a "sovereignty" nature completely lack merit and have been summarily rejected as frivolous by the Eighth Circuit and other federal courts. See United States v. Hart, 701 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1983) (characterizing as frivolous an appeal in tax case challenging government's jurisdiction over "sovereign citizen"); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases rejecting claims of individual sovereignty including claims of a "sovereign citizen" or a "secured-party creditor").
Based on a liberal reading of the complaint, the Court construes Engel's allegations as a claim of inadequate medical care. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners from deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge Cty., 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012). To survive initial review, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 175 (8th Cir. 1995). Allegations of mere negligence in giving or failing to supply medical treatment will not suffice. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Nor will a prisoner's "mere disagreement with treatment decisions" support a claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Jones v. Minnesota Dep't of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2008).
Instead, a prisoner must allege that he suffered objectively serious medical needs and that defendants actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded those needs. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). A "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011).
Here, Engel alleges that "Corizon Medical" denied him snack bags and blood-sugar checks over an approximate three-month period. Although Engel asserts that he had been provided snack bags and blood checks for many years prior, he does not name a serious medical need from which he suffers that requires these treatments. He also does not allege that any defendant is aware that he has a serious medical need requiring such treatments. In addition, Engel does not specify any injury from which he has suffered as a result of this denial. An action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a tort claim, and a plaintiff must suffer some actual injury before he can receive compensation. Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2008). For all of these reasons, the allegations of the complaint fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
As to defendant Corizon, "[a] corporation acting under color of state law . . . will not be liable on a respondeat superior theory." Smith v. Insley's Inc., 499 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir. 1993)). Rather, to support a claim against a corporation like Corizon, the plaintiff "must show that there was a policy, custom, or official action that inflicted an actionable injury." Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006); Sanders, 984 F.2d at 975-76 (stating that a corporation acting under color of state law will only be held liable where "there is a policy, custom or action by those who represent official policy that inflicts an injury actionable under § 1983"). The complaint does not contain any allegations that a Corizon policy or custom was responsible for the alleged violations of Engel's constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to defendant Corizon.
As to defendants ERDCC and MODOC, plaintiff does not mention either of these defendants by name in his allegations. "Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (to be cognizable under § 1983, a claim must allege that the defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for the incidents that deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights). Plaintiff does not allege, with any specificity, that either of these defendants did anything to violate his rights. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed, even under the liberal construction to be given pro se complaints"); see also Krych v. Hvass, 83 F. App'x 854, 855 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint against defendants who were merely listed as defendants in the complaint and there were no allegations of constitutional harm against them).
Also, MODOC is not a suable defendant under § 1983. "Section 1983 provides for an action against a 'person' for a violation, under color of law, of another's civil rights." McLean v. Gordon, 548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Deretich v. Office of Admin. Hearings, 798 F.2d 1147, 1154 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "[§] 1983 provides a cause of action against persons only"). However, "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Furthermore, an agency exercising state power is also not a person subject to suit under § 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against a state or its agencies for any kind of relief, including monetary damages. Monroe v. Arkansas State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007).
Furthermore, this action is also subject to dismissal as factually frivolous because Engel's allegations lack an arguable basis in either law or in fact. In the complaint, Engel alleges he is entitled to recover hundreds of trillions of dollars in damages from three entities for a claim that entirely lacks factual support. Such demands and allegations rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible. The Court therefore concludes that Engel's allegations and requested relief are "clearly baseless" under the standard articulated in Denton. 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
Finally, the Court also dismisses this action because it appears to be malicious. See Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1987) (an action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the defendants rather than vindicating a cognizable right). Engel has filed over one hundred other complaints in this Court alleging that his civil rights have been violated by these defendants and other state and local entities and officials. Engel submits the pleadings in bulk, and he specifies that he intends each set of pleadings to be docketed as an individual civil action. The nature of those pleadings and Engel's claims for damages are roughly the same as those in the instant action. It therefore appears that this action is part of an attempt to harass these defendants and others by bringing repetitious lawsuits, rather than a legitimate attempt to vindicate a cognizable right. See Spencer, 656 F. Supp. at 461-63; see also In re Billy Roy Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that an action is malicious when it is a part of a longstanding pattern of abusive and repetitious lawsuits). This action is subject to dismissal for this reason, as well.
Having considered the instant complaint and supplemental document, as well as Engel's recent history of engaging in abusive litigation practices, the Court concludes that it would be futile to permit Engel leave to file an amended complaint in this action. The Court will therefore dismiss this action at this time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Engel is cautioned to avoid the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits. First, a prisoner who has filed three or more actions or appeals that were dismissed for one of the reasons stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which limits his future ability to proceed in forma pauperis. Second, the practice of repeatedly filing meritless lawsuits can be interpreted as an abuse of the judicial process, which can result in court-imposed limitations on the ability to bring future lawsuits. This Court is "vested with the discretion to impose sanctions upon a party under its inherent disciplinary power." Bass v. General Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842, 851 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). This includes the discretion to craft and impose sanctions to deter litigants from engaging in "conduct which abuses the judicial process." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-45 (1991); see also Tyler, 839 F.2d at 1292 (affirming the district court's sua sponte determination that a litigant should be limited to filing one lawsuit per month pursuant to certain conditions precedent as a sanction for the litigant's repeated abuse of the judicial process). These powers stem from "the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
Accordingly, the Court grants [2] Engel's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court further orders that Engel shall pay an initial filing fee of $1.00 within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order. Engel is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.
The Court dismisses this action without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for being frivolous and malicious. The Court certifies that that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith. An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 11th day of March, 2021.
/s/ _________
STEPHEN R. CLARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE