Opinion
2023-L-068
12-29-2023
ENERGY HARBOR GENERATION, LLC, f.k.a. FIRSTENERGY GENERATION CORP., Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER A. GALLOWAY, LAKE COUNTY AUDITOR, et al., Appellees.
Steven A. Dimengo, Richard B. Fry, III, Joshua E. O'Farrell, and Nathan M. Fulmer, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLC, (For Appellant). David C. Dimuzio and Matthew C. Dimuzio, David C. Dimuzio, Inc., (For Appellee, Christopher A. Galloway, Lake County Auditor). Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, (For Appellee, Lake County Board of Commissioners). Karrie M. Kalail, Jennifer A. Antoon, and Daniel R. Shisler, Peters, Kalail & Markakis Co., LPA, (For Appellee, Willoughby-Eastlake Board of Education).
Administrative Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2022 CV 001260
Steven A. Dimengo, Richard B. Fry, III, Joshua E. O'Farrell, and Nathan M. Fulmer, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLC, (For Appellant).
David C. Dimuzio and Matthew C. Dimuzio, David C. Dimuzio, Inc., (For Appellee, Christopher A. Galloway, Lake County Auditor).
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, (For Appellee, Lake County Board of Commissioners).
Karrie M. Kalail, Jennifer A. Antoon, and Daniel R. Shisler, Peters, Kalail & Markakis Co., LPA, (For Appellee, Willoughby-Eastlake Board of Education).
OPINION
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Energy Harbor Generation, LLC, f.k.a. Firstenergy Generation Corp., ("Energy Harbor") appeals the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, affirming the valuation of certain special real property, a synchronous condenser facility located in Eastlake Ohio, advanced by appellee, Christopher A. Galloway, Lake County Auditor ("Auditor"). At issue is whether the trial court erred in accepting the Auditor's valuation of the subject property over that of Energy Harbor's. We affirm.
{¶2} This matter involves an administrative appeal from a decision of the Lake County Board of Revision ("BOR"). The property at issue, located in Eastlake, Ohio, was previously operated as a coal-fired electricity generation plant. The Eastlake property was originally placed in service in the early 1950s. By the early 1970s, it had five generator units. As a result of changing environmental regulations, in 2012, the plant was decommissioned and the coal-fired generators were retired.
{¶3} In evaluating the closure of Eastlake as an electric generation facility, the area's regional transmission organization, PJM Interconnection ("PJM"), which manages the electrical grid, identified reliability issues if the generators were retired and taken offline. According to a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") order, American Transmission Systems, Inc. ("ATSI"), a transmission-only public utility, acquired the generators, in addition to other property at Eastlake to convert the plant to synchronous condensers. A synchronous condenser is a device that functions as a storage unit in an electric system and, among other things, serves to buffer for changing conditions on a power transmission grid. Synchronous condensers support the instantaneous and peak loads and load losses of a system. They are controlled by a voltage regulator to either absorb or generate reactive power to stabilize a grid's voltage or to improve power.
{¶4} The service offered by synchronous condensers to a grid is to produce VARs (volt amp reactance) and to sell those VARs as necessary and essential products of electric transmission systems for load serving entities in the region. Energy Harbor owns the property, while ATSI, a non-party, owns and operates the synchronous condensers.
{¶5} For the tax year of 2018, the Auditor valued the property at $59,300,000. The Auditor revalued the property in 2021 at approximately $61,000,000, but settled on the 2018 valuation because there was no significant difference in value. Energy Harbor subsequently filed a complaint against the Auditor based upon the 2021 valuation. After having the property independently appraised, Energy Harbor sought a reduction in valuation to $7,200,000 (approximately $52,000,000 disparity from the appraisal of the Auditor). The Auditor as well as the Willoughby-Eastlake City School District filed a countercomplaint seeking to retain the Auditor's value.
{¶6} It bears noting that the parties premised their appraisals upon the same, "highest-and-best-use" standard; to wit, the most probable and legal use of the property which is physically possible, appropriately supported, and financially feasible and which eventuates in the highest value of the property. (Energy Harbor's expert report, p. 12; Auditor's expert report, p. 7). The parties agreed that the "highest and best use" of the subject property is as a synchronous condenser facility providing voltage support to the affected electric grid(s). Id.
{¶7} The BOR conducted a hearing where Energy Harbor offered testimony from Kevin Reilly, a certified appraiser; Jess Yenter, a project manager with Eaton Corporation, a company which, inter alia, estimates costs of engineering facilities such as the configuration/facility at issue; and Robert Dicola, First Energy Service Company's manager who oversees operations at the condenser plant. The Auditor presented testimony from George Sansoucy, a certified appraiser. After hearing the testimony and assessing the respective reports from each party's appraiser, the BOR upheld the Auditor's valuation. Energy Harbor appealed to the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to R.C. 5717.05.
{¶8} The trial court denied Energy Harbor's request to present additional testimony and evidence. And, after considering the evidence adduced at the BOR hearing, the trial court issued a judgment affirming the BOR's decision. This appeal follows.
{¶9} Energy Harbor's first assignment of error provides:
The trial court erred by failing to accept Energy Harbor's $7,200,00 valuation, which was supported by competent and probative evidence of the real property's true value, thereby shifting the burden to appellees to rebut this value. Energy Harbor presented Mr. Reilly, an expert appraiser, who used reasonable and lawful methods to determine the value of Eastlake's real property.
{¶10} Under this assignment of error, Energy Harbor claims that Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's valuation, based upon the replacement-cost-new method, which allegedly accounts for technology advancements in constructing a substitute property, accurately determined the fair-market value of the converted synchronous condenser facility. Energy Harbor maintains its appraisal was premised upon, inter alia, the principle that a knowledgeable buyer would pay no more for property than the cost of producing a substitute. Here, Energy Harbor asserts its valuation is more sound and/or appropriate because the replacement facility it envisions would not implement the use of or value extraneous property and buildings (unlike the underlying facility), but streamline the facility into a smaller configuration. In light of these points, Energy Harbor maintains the trial court erred in accepting the Auditor's valuation in lieu of its modernized replacement facility.
{¶11} R.C. 5717.05 provides for an appeal of a decision of a board of revision directly to the court of common pleas. The standard of review is substantially different than in most administrative appeals. Concord Plaza General Partnership v. Lake Cty. Auditor, 11th Dist. Lake No. 90-L-15-113, 1991 WL 268823, *5-6 (Dec. 13, 1991). In determining an appeal from a county board of revision, a common pleas court does not merely review the judgment and decide whether it is supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. Instead, the trial court must render its own decision on the merits. Id.
{¶12} In Black v. Board of Revision, 16 Ohio St.3d 11, 475 N.E.2d 1264 (1985), the Supreme Court of Ohio explained the trial court's standard of review on an appeal pursuant to R.C. 5717.05, as follows:
While R.C. 5717.05 requires more than a mere review of the decisions of the board of revision by the trial court, that review may be properly limited to a comprehensive consideration of existing evidence and, in the court's discretion, to an examination of additional evidence. The court should consider all such evidence and determine the taxable value through its independent judgment. In effect, R.C. 5717.05 contemplates a decision de novo. * * * Selig v. Bd. of Revision (1967), 12 Ohio App.2d 157, 165 .Black at 14.
{¶13} Accordingly, a trial court's analysis of the evidence should be thorough and comprehensive. This review ensures that a court's final determination is not a mere rubber stamping of the board of revision's determination, but rather an independent investigation and complete revaluation of a board of revision's value determination. Park Ridge Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 29 Ohio St.3d 12, 504 N.E.2d 1116 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus. A de novo review is required, and the trial court is required to reach its decision without any deference to the administrative ruling of the board of revision. Teamster Hous., Inc. v. McCormack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 69583, 1996 WL 239998, *3 (May 9, 1996).
{¶14} On appeal from the court of common pleas to the appellate court, "[t]he judgment of the trial court shall not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Black at paragraph one of the syllabus. The phrase "abuse of discretion" is one of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court, which does not comport with reason or the record. Gaul v. Gaul, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2009-A-0011, 2010-Ohio-2156, ¶ 24, citing State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362 (1925).
{¶15} In its judgment entry, the trial court expressly acknowledged that Kevin Reilly was qualified to perform an appraisal and that Jess Yenter was qualified to provide a cost estimate for constructing a new synchronous condenser system. Mr. Reilly relied upon Mr. Yenter's estimate in drawing his final conclusion on the appraisal.
{¶16} Energy Harbor contends that the replacement value, which is a valid means of arriving at a property's value, see Ohio Adm. Code 5703-25-05(D), provided a credible basis for its appraisal because it took into the consideration the age of the buildings, depreciation, the "superadequacy" of the buildings (i.e., that the buildings were overbuilt for their current purpose) and the obsolescence of the buildings (i.e., the reduction in the buildings' usefulness due to an outdated or different design). Mr. Yenter created a cost estimate for a replacement configuration that would use smaller condensers (in both size and capacity) that would be housed outdoors and air-cooled, rather than water-cooled, like the current condensers. The replacement facility would not require a wall-mounted crane for servicing the condensers and the replacement configuration could be built on the existing property.
{¶17} Mr. Reilly incorporated Mr. Yenter's estimate into his appraisal, subtracted depreciation, added an agreed value of the land, and concluded $3.6 million (rounded down) is the replacement value of the land. Mr. Reilly then concluded that the regulated value of the land was $7.2 million.
{¶18} In its judgment, the trial court accepted Energy Harbor's appraiser and cost-estimator as experts. It emphasized, however, that federal and state regulators would have to approve the replacement configuration-a matter not touched upon by Energy Harbor's experts. To this point, the court observed that none of Energy Harbor's witnesses could verify that regulators would approve the design or issue permits should they be necessary. And Mr. Yenter could not point to any other approved installations of sites similar to that described in his report. The trial court concluded that "[w]ithout regulatory approval, the Replacement Configuration is just a hypothetical, and not a substitute with equal utility to the Present Configuration (which does have regulatory approval)." The trial court determined that Energy Harbor consequently failed to meet its burden of establishing replacement value of the property.
{¶19} With respect to the Auditor's valuation, the trial court stated that the parties stipulated to the qualifications of Mr. Sansoucy, the Auditor's appraiser. The trial court noted that Mr. Sansoucy's appraisal used a modified version of the reproduction-cost method. The court identified Mr. Sansoucy's calculations: He determined the percentage of the current configuration being used at the site, which is 25% of the entire property; he then calculated the reproduction cost of the entire present configuration ($648,000,000), less depreciation (roughly 65-70%, based upon the site's age), then subtracted the reproduction cost of the unused portion (75%). In doing so, Mr. Sansoucy noted that 30-35% (undepreciated value) divided by $648,000,000 is approximately $216,000,000. That figure divided by 25% (the utilized portion of the site) is $54,000,000. Mr. Sansoucy then added $4,500,000 as the value of the salvageable aspects of the site, along with the value of the land ($2,950,000) and testified the value equates to approximately $61,000,000. Mr. Sansoucy then determined that, because his appraisal (in 2021) was not significantly different from the previous Auditor's appraisal in 2018, he would not upwardly deviate from the previous appraisal. He therefore concluded the 2018 appraisal, $59,300,000 was a valid measurement of the site's value.
{¶20} The court identified various objections Energy Harbor had to Mr. Sansoucy's method(s) and conclusion(s); namely, (1) that he merely reproduced a coal-fired electric generation plant rather than a synchronous condenser facility and hence, his appraisal includes "obsolescences and superadequacies"; and (2) that Mr. Sansoucy's method should be discounted because his approach should not be applied to properties over 10-years old due to improvements in technology and lower material costs.
{¶21} Regarding the first point, the trial court determined that there was no evidence that the improvements relating to the site's conversion to a synchronous condenser facility were unnecessary or superadequate. That is, there was nothing in the record to indicate the condensers, given their size and output, could be housed or serviced without the existing buildings; namely, those considered in Mr. Sansoucy's appraisal. Moreover, the court underscored that "without evidence that the Replacement Configuration [advanced by Mr. Reilly and Mr. Yenter,] would be approved [by regulating authorities], it is a mere hypothetical and cannot be used to value the property."
{¶22} Similarly, even if improvements in technology and building material costs are considered, the trial court determined Energy Harbor's challenge suffers from the same flaw, i.e., its appraisal of a hypothetical replacement configuration does not account for regulatory approval. This omission, along with Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's proposal to replace the existing facility with a hypothetical facility that is much smaller (the generators in the replacement support less voltage) and with different technologies (e.g., outdoor cooling of the generators rather than indoor installed, water cooled generators), suggest Energy Harbor's appraisal was of an entirely different property than that which required appraisal. These points are supported by the record.
{¶23} During Mr. Sansoucy's testimony, he stated Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's determinations only place a replacement value on "control buildings," not the buildings required to house the extremely large condenser(s). In this regard, the hypothetical replacement facility, advanced by Energy Harbor, is not an accurate comparison to the existing facility.
{¶24} To this point, Mr. Sansoucy testified the hypothetical replacement does not have the same utility and attributes of the current facility. He testified Energy Harbor's replacement model is:
not an actual replacement of exactly what's there. And it may sound trivial and trite that you are undersizing the 345,000 volt line but PJM doesn't think so. Their calculations were very formal. There are summaries of them in our report, and
very precise because that's a lot of VARS that's not going into the large transmission line that has the most punch, yet you're overloading the lines that you don't need to.
{¶25} And, according to Mr. Sansoucy, the report submitted by Mr. Yenter assumes medium, rather than higher voltage, which the existing site can handle.
{¶26} Further, to his knowledge, Mr. Sansoucy testified that the largest of the condensers in the facility ("Eastlake Number 5") is the largest synchronous condenser operating in North America. He additionally testified that the larger condensers are water cooled, not air cooled (like the smaller versions in Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's replacement approach). In this respect, Mr. Sansoucy emphasized that one cannot simply replace function. He asserted, in light of the purpose of the condensers, they need to be larger and more powerful. Without the ability to handle large voltage, generators which depend upon condenser support are actually harmed.
{¶27} Mr. Sansoucy further clarified that Energy Harbor's replacement facility "doesn't pass the smell test." He opined:
[F]irst of all, it's taking just the smallest components of a hypothetical greenfield site that has no buildings, not even putting buildings over the synchronous condensers. You've got to have a crane come in, you know, in the elements to lift the top of these things off to work on them or come out the side or whatever. And [Energy Harbor's appraisal contemplates] smaller units.
In fact, the synchronous condensers that you're dealing with are in a building because they have to be maintained. They have the cranes. They have everything else.
Now, the total cost, which no one wants to tell you, of five synchronous condensers, PJ - - - FERC actually analyzed that and said it's going to be more expensive to buy new than it is to build, to convert the existing units. We find it more cost effective to do the conversion, and that hasn't changed. So you've got 4 million or 7.5 million dollars worth of buildings
and real estate * * * against something that's going to be 200, 300 million dollars.
Whereas, we had $59 million of building against a depreciated personal property, generators and everything that cost somewhere between 100 and 150 million at the end of the day to renovate, which back in the old days that was about 160 million dollars versus 180 million. So our number might seem like a lot but it's the personal property side that's depreciated and being reused and it cost a lot less to convert those than to buy new ones.
* * *
So it's, it is fundamentally a senseless proposal that is hypothetical, that is never going to actually work. And you just, appraisal theory, it has to be real. You can't do that. And I just want to point out. You may think the 60 million looks like a lot. It's very small when you consider the buildings but it's essential. And you're comparing it to no buildings.
{¶28} The court was entitled to accept Mr. Sansoucy's critique of Energy Harbor's appraisal and the logistics of its utility and feasibility.
{¶29} Under the circumstances, the trial court weighed the credibility of each of the expert's relative testimony and considered the details of their relative approaches. In light of the problems Mr. Sansoucy identified with Energy Harbor's appraisal, which were not specifically undermined, let alone refuted by Energy Harbor, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Mr. Sansoucy's appraisal. Any burden that Energy Harbor may have met by advancing its replacement-configuration appraisal was rebutted by the Auditor's appraisal, and the latter was supported by both reason and the record.
{¶30} Energy Harbor's first assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶31} Energy Harbor's second assignment of error provides:
The trial court erred by affirming the auditor's value which includes significant value attributable to personal property (i.e., synchronous condensers and their foundations) and the intrinsic value this personal property has to the electrical grid. The auditor's value is based upon unreliable evidence, including the Sansoucy appraisal.
{¶32} Initially, according to the trial court's judgment, both parties agreed that the condensers are personal property and not included in the valuation. Moreover, and more significant to our disposition of Energy Harbor's claim, nothing in the record, despite its protestations to the contrary, indicate it argued during the BOR hearing that Mr. Sansoucy's appraisal included "business fixtures" of any kind. Because this issue was neither raised during the BOR hearing and therefore not in the trial court, we need not address Energy Harbor's argument for the first time on appeal.
{¶33} Notwithstanding the foregoing point, we emphasize that Mr. Sansoucy's testimony did not express he valued the condensers or other equipment as aspects of the real property appraised. In the preface to his report, Mr. Sansoucy specifically notes that the values detailed represent real-property values only, which includes "buildings, the site improvements, the water intake systems, the site support systems such as parking, entry, grading, etc. and real property components of the condenser interconnection facilities." (Sansoucy Letter, p. 2, attached to report). Further, Mr. Sansoucy lists the specific aspects of the real property that he accounted for in his appraisal. (Sansoucy Report, pp. 18-22, 26). None of the items listed include the condensers. He then specifically states that equipment is valued by the state of Ohio, not Lake County and, as such, the personal property and/or equipment are not part of the appraisal.
{¶34} Moreover, during his testimony, Mr. Sansoucy specifically enumerated the features of the site that led to his valuation. He speaks specifically to the buildings on the real property and their utility (due to size) for housing the synchronous condensers, but does not state that the synchronous condensers (qua equipment) was used as part of the valuation. Mr. Sansoucy additionally qualified his appraisal by estimating how many of the various buildings on the site are still in use and he testified that his valuation only utilizes the percentage of the buildings still in use. The balance of the record, including Mr. Sansoucy's testimony and report, fails to indicate he treated the synchronous condensers as aspects of the real property appraised.
{¶35} We recognize that the nature of the synchronous condenser facility and its operation and utility were discussed in great detail by Mr. Sansoucy. Nevertheless, we fail to see how, at any point, he included the value of the condensers themselves into his appraisal.
{¶36} Next, Energy Harbor contends the Auditor's valuation of the site based upon the costs to construct a replica of the 70-year-old converted coal plant is not an accurate reflection of the site's fair market value. Specifically, Energy Harbor argues the Auditor's appraisal is disfavored due to the age of the facility that is at the base of the real-estate valuation in this case. It asserts that if replacement with a different substitute would be more economical (as it alleges its replacement model is), then the cost of reproducing an identically old asset has no bearing on value; that is, Energy Harbor argues that its appraisal model should have been given greater credence because it takes into consideration a more modern design that could still meet the owner's needs.
{¶37} As discussed above, the trial court considered this argument and disregarded it in light of Mr. Sansoucy's testimony. Mr. Sansoucy underscored that Energy Harbor's appraisal was based upon a model that is fundamentally dissimilar to the attributes and needs serviced by the current site. And, Energy Harbor's appraisal is inherently hypothetical because it does not take into consideration its conditional nature which would require not-yet-existing approval from regulatory authorities. We see no problem with the trial court's determination that Mr. Sansoucy's method(s) and appraisal were more credible than Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's submissions and testimony.
{¶38} Energy Harbor next asserts the trial court relied upon statements and testimony from Mr. Sansoucy that were not credible and beyond the scope of his expertise.
{¶39} At the BOR hearing, Energy Harbor's counsel stipulated to Mr. Sansoucy's expert status. Still, Energy Harbor cites to various aspects of Mr. Sansoucy's testimony, but does not explain how the testimony (all of which relates to whether Energy Harbor's appraisal and replacement method would provide equal or adequate utility as the current facility) is outside the expert's expertise. Mr. Sansoucy did speculate that Energy Harbor's appraisal would not likely, in his opinion, be accepted by regulators, but this does not necessarily transcend Mr. Sansoucy's expertise.
{¶40} Mr. Sansoucy testified: "I don't think, it's my own humble opinion, but I don't believe that PJM would approve outdoor units on Lake Erie that are critical to keeping the grid up if Perry [a nearby nuclear facility] goes down. I think they would require buildings." Mr. Sansoucy was not necessarily testifying to what PJM would do, but rather to the feasibility of the replacement plant (and the conditions necessary for its construction and operation). Such opinion testimony is within Mr. Sansoucy's expertise as an expert appraiser in power plants. Regardless of these points, Energy Harbor did not object to Mr. Sansoucy's testimony and thus we need not deeply explore its objection(s) for the first time on appeal.
{¶41} Further, Energy Harbor's cites to cases it did not bring to the BOR's attention as a means to attack Mr. Sansoucy's credibility. These cases were not used during Energy Harbor's cross-examination of Mr. Sascoucy and thus were not part of the record before the trial court. Similar to the previous point, we are not a trier of fact and therefore cannot consider Energy Harbor's credibility attacks based on matters submitted to us for the first time on appeal.
{¶42} Energy Harbor's second assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶43} Energy Harbor's third assignment of error provides:
The trial court erred by denying a hearing requested by both parties to present additional evidence on issues critical to its decision.
{¶44} Under this assigned error, Energy Harbor takes issue with the trial court's decision, wherein it declined to take additional evidence beyond that received at the BOR hearing. Energy Harbor claims it was prejudiced by its inability to present additional evidence regarding ATSI's operation of the synchronous condensers at the site and the regulatory possibilities of a replacement plant that is at the heart of its appraisal. Energy Harbor argues that the trial court's duty to independently and thoroughly weigh the evidence was undermined by denying its request.
{¶45} R.C. 5717.05 provides, in relevant part:
The court may hear the appeal on the record and the evidence thus submitted, or it may hear and consider
additional evidence. It shall determine the taxable value of the property whose valuation or assessment for taxation by the county board of revision is complained of, or if the complaint and appeal is against a discriminatory valuation, shall determine a valuation that shall correct the discrimination, and the court shall determine the liability of the property for assessment for taxation, if that question is in issue, and shall certify its judgment to the auditor, who shall correct the tax list and duplicate as required by the judgment.(Emphasis added.)
{¶46} This court has underscored that a trial court possesses the discretion to properly limit its review to "'a comprehensive consideration of existing evidence.'" Wetland Preservation Ltd. v. Corlett, 2012-Ohio-3884, 975 N.E.2d 1033, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.), quoting Black, 16 Ohio St.3d at 14. Both parties had equal opportunity to present their expert witnesses and submit their witnesses' relative reports at the BOR hearing. Similarly, both parties had an opportunity to cross-examine and object to the opposing parties' witness' testimony and conclusions. We fail to see how the trial court's decision to deny additional evidence, in light of the significant record before it from the BOR, amounts to an abuse of discretion.
{¶47} Energy Harbor's third assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶48} Energy Harbor's final assignment of error provides:
The trial court violated its duty to independently review the evidence and determine its own fair market value of the real property at Eastlake by merely affirming the Auditor's value.
{¶49} Under this assignment of error, Energy Harbor claims the trial court simply "rubber stamped" the Auditor's valuation. As discussed at greater length under Energy Harbor's first assignment of error, the trial court did not err in finding Mr. Sansoucy's appraisal more credible than that of Mr. Reilly's and Mr. Yenter's. There is nothing to suggest that the trial court's judgment entry is merely a "rubber-stamp" validation of Mr. Sansoucy's valuation. The trial court articulated each party's relative approach toward valuing the subject property and, after considering specific objections, concluded Mr. Sansoucy's was a more persuasive estimation of value in light of the unique features of the property and the particular needs the property serves. We discern no abuse of discretion.
{¶50} Energy Harbor's final assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶51} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, J., ROBERT J. PATTON, J., concur.