This Court has recognized that a judge has authority to sign a final judgment based on a jury verdict even when that judge did not preside at trial because the judge did not have to determine any facts before entering judgment. See Hot-Hed, Inc. v. Safehouse Habitats (Scotland), Ltd., 333 S.W.3d 719, 734 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding that award of attorney's fees in final judgment was proper even though judge who signed final judgment did not preside at trial because trial was to jury, and trial court did not have to determine any facts before entering judgment); Enax v. Noack, 12 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2000, no pet.) (holding that district court to which case had been transferred could enter final judgment even though it did not hear any evidence because jury reached verdict in case before it was transferred); see also Shahin, 547 S.W.3d at 336 (recognizing that judge may make substantive legal decision despite not presiding over some or all of trial when decision does not require judge to find facts based on evidence she has not heard); Hull, 365 S.W.3d at 42-43 (concluding that, despite fact that visiting judge presided over trial, it was proper for district judge to rule on motion for new trial on issue about which she had heard argument and evidence and that pertained to enforcement of her prior order).

Many Texas courts, including this court, have held that constitutional county courts lack the authority to grant a constructive trust as part of their probate jurisdiction. See, e.g. , In re Burns , No. 12-09-00261-CV, 2010 WL 2982917, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; In re Estate of Alexander , 188 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) ; Enax v. Noack , 12 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). However, we note that the reasoning in those cases is based on the now repealed Texas Probate Code Section 5A.

Courts have upheld the authority of a judge to sign a judgment in accordance with a jury verdict even though the judge did not preside over the trial. SeeHot–Hed, Inc. v. Safehouse Habitats (Scotland), Ltd. , 333 S.W.3d 719, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) ; Walker v. Arlington Disposal Co. , No. 05-01-00283-CV, 2002 WL 84439, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 23, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Enax v. Noack , 12 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Similarly, a judge who did not preside over a bench trial may sign the final written judgment in the case so long as the written judgment merely memorializes an earlier final judgment rendered by the judge who heard the evidence.

But other cases from our court indicate that the exception to the free exchange of benches is a narrow one. See Hot-Hed, Inc. v. Safehouse Habitats (Scotland), Ltd., 333 S.W. 3d 719, 734 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. filed) (holding that award of attorney's fees in final judgment was proper even though judge who signed final judgment did not preside at trial because trial was to jury, and trial court did not have to determine any facts before entering judgment); Enax v. Noack, 12 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (holding that district court, to which case had been transferred, could enter final judgment even though it did not hear any evidence because jury reached verdict in case before it was transferred); Schneider v. Acousti Eng'g Co. of Fla., No. 01-92-00921-CV, 1993 WL 415481, at *2 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 14, 1993, no writ) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that it was proper for district judge to grant motion for new trial on attorney's fees even though visiting judge presided at trial because district judge had heard evidence on attorney's fees after trial and entered order granting them). 3) Analysis

However, neither the constitutional county court nor the county courts at law have jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust in a probate proceeding. See In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 639-40 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding); Schuele v. Schuele, 119 S.W.3d 822, 825 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.); Enax v. Noack, 12 S.W.3d 609, 611-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Ragland v. Ragland, 743 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex.App.-Waco 1987, no writ). This is so because the statute defining what matters are "appertaining to" or "incident to an estate" provides different definitions for probate proceedings in constitutional and statutory county courts than for probate proceedings in statutory probate courts and district courts.