Opinion
5:23-CV-499-M
09-15-2023
RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff, v. THE GRAMMY AWARDS on CBS, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on pro se Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). [DE-1, -2]. Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim and improper venue.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40F.3d72,74(4thCir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition.... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff, Ronald Satish Emrit, a resident of Florida and Maryland, alleges Defendant, The Grammy Awards on CBS, violated his civil rights and discriminated against him on the basis of race, ethnicity, and disability. Compl. [DE-1 ] at 1-6. Plaintiff contends his membership in the Grammys was ended by the Los Angeles chapter in 2010. Plaintiff believes he was discriminated against by the Grammys on the basis of his race, ethnicity, and disability. Plaintiff seeks $45,000,000 in damages and an injunction reinstating his Grammys membership. Id. at 7.
Having reviewed and liberally construed the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim and has filed this case in the wrong venue. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff's case be dismissed.
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discimin[ating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ....” 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a). It is not alleged that Defendant was Plaintiff's employer. See Barnwell v. Foot Locker, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-694-BO, 2018 WL 2422316, at *2 (E.D. N.C. May 29, 2018) (“Parties may pursue claims of discrimination under Title VII against their employers alone . . . .”). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a Title VII claim.
Plaintiff's claim that he was discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution are not actionable against Defendant because it is not a state actor. “A court may only apply equal protection scrutiny to state action.” B.P.J. v. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ., No. 2:21-CV-00316, 2023 WL 111875, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 5, 2023) (citing U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.; Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 923-24 (1982)); see also Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S.Ct. 2141, 2220, 216 L.Ed.2d 857 (2023) (“The Equal Protection Clause operates on States. It does not purport to regulate the conduct of private parties.”) (Gorsuch, J. concurring). Likewise, “the Due Process Clause protects individuals only from governmental and not from private action.” Illsley v. Truist Bank, No. 5-.23-CV-97-BO-RJ, 2023 WL 3690094, at *3 (E.D. N.C. May 26,2023) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982)). “[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Purely private conduct, “no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,” is not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001). State action requires proof that the alleged constitutional deprivation was (1) “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State” and (2) that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. Plaintiff's complaint alleges no facts from which the court could conclude that Defendant was acting under the color of state law, and therefore, his Constitutional claims fail as a matter of law.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause states, “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. Const, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. That clause prohibits discrimination against citizens of other states simply because they are citizens 4 of other states. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999). Plaintiff has alleged no facts that would support a claim based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Plaintiff also alleges disability discrimination. It is unclear under what section of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Plaintiff attempts to proceed. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiff's complaint contains no facts in support of an ADA claim and thus, fails to meet the basic pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) and Iqbal and Twombly. Id. (a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations but that the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusion). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an ADA claim.
Finally, venue is not proper in this court.
A civil action may be brought in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff's complaint does not establish that venue is proper in this district where defendant is not alleged to reside in North Carolina and none of the events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have occurred in North Carolina. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” Given that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim, the interest of justice is not served by transfer and the court should dismiss the complaint. See LoRusso v. Duke Energy Co.,No. 3.22-CV-598-FDW-DSC, 2023 WL 2334371, at *2 n.6 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 2, 2023) (concluding transfer to proper venue not warranted where the complaint was subject to dismissal as frivolous and for failure to state a claim). Accordingly, it is recommended that the case be dismissed as filed in the wrong venue.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until September 29, 2023 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
So ordered.