Opinion
24-1755
09-23-2024
DEMAJIO J. ELLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LINDA CARPER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted September 20, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:21-cv-02383-JMS-CSW Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge.
ORDER
Demajio Ellis, an Indiana prisoner, sued more than two dozen healthcare providers and correctional officers at pendleton Correctional Facility. He claimed that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and that one correctional officer used excessive force, all in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Ellis lacked evidence that he suffered from a serious medical condition and that, even if he had one, the defendants did not consciously disregard a need for treatment. The court also ruled that the correctional officer did not use excessive force. We affirm.
Because this is an appeal from a summary-judgment decision, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to Ellis and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. See Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2020). Sometime before September 2019, Ellis was diagnosed with asthma, for which he had regular "chronic care" appointments and was prescribed an inhaler. Ellis had one bout of bronchitis during the relevant time period, but medical records show that his doctor believed that his asthma was well controlled. Ellis also believed that he had a heart condition that necessitated testing and treatment.
On 20 occasions between September 2019 and May 2020, Ellis sought treatment (at sick call, through health-services requests, or during the nurses' medication rounds) for symptoms including chest pain, shortness of breath, irregular heartbeat, wheezing, lightheadedness, and dizziness; he also asserted several times that he had passed out in his cell. No one ever witnessed Ellis's reported episodes of respiratory or cardiac distress, or any loss of consciousness. Ellis was never in medical distress when a nurse or doctor assessed him, and his vital signs were always within normal range, apart from a slightly elevated heart rate on one occasion. He received numerous physical examinations and diagnostic tests including electrocardiograms and chest x-rays. None revealed any cardiac or respiratory abnormality, other than the asthma. Still, Ellis wished to be admitted to the prison infirmary or hospitalized, and he lived in constant fear of dying. At one point, a nurse referred Ellis for a mental-health evaluation, suspecting that obsessive thoughts were responsible for his repeated medical complaints. Records show that Ellis experienced delusional thinking.
In April 2020, a correctional officer, Joshua Creel, handcuffed Ellis while escorting him to the medical unit. After Ellis stated that the handcuffs were too tight, Creel responded that Ellis could not go to the medical unit without restraints and did not adjust the handcuffs. Ellis remained handcuffed for approximately 40 minutes during his medical appointment. Afterward, he submitted an emergency healthcare request, stating that the handcuffs had caused blackish rashes on his wrists. In response, a member of the medical staff advised Ellis to apply lotion to the affected area.
In a series of federal complaints filed in late 2021, Ellis sued a total of 28 correctional officers (state employees) and healthcare providers (employees of Wexford of Indiana, LLC); the district court later consolidated these suits into a single case. Ellis alleged that the defendants ignored his need for treatment or provided inadequate care for his serious medical conditions, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also alleged that Creel had used excessive force by handcuffing him too tightly.
The defendants, in two groups, eventually moved for summary judgment. With respect to the deliberate-indifference claims, the district court first ruled that Ellis lacked evidence of any objectively serious medical condition. Regardless, the court added, no reasonable factfinder could infer deliberate indifference because the medical staff had responded attentively to his complaints. And Ellis's excessive-force claim failed because Creel had a security rationale for handcuffing Ellis, whose injury was minor at most. Finally, the court ordered Ellis to show cause why it should not also enter judgment in favor of two nurses who had not appeared: Kristin White (who never answered the complaint) and Jamie Bailey (who was never served with process). Ellis failed to do so-instead asking for a hearing on his requests for default judgments against the nurses-and the district court later entered judgment in their favor.
On appeal, Ellis first challenges the decision on his deliberate-indifference claim. He maintains that the medical staff provided ineffective treatment for his chest pain and breathing problems. But we agree with the district court that Ellis's claim does not withstand summary judgment.
First, Ellis lacks evidence that his medical condition is objectively "sufficiently serious," Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); in other words, that his condition "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Asthma can be a serious medical condition depending on the severity of the attacks. Id. (quoting Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 484 (7th Cir. 2005)). But here there is no medical evidence that severe asthma attacks caused Ellis's reported symptoms. Ellis used a preventative inhaler, his doctor concluded that his asthma was well-controlled, and his blood oxygen and lung function were consistently normal. And for his complaints of chest pain and related symptoms, Ellis underwent numerous physical examinations and diagnostic testing; none revealed signs of serious medical problems. Ellis's subjective belief as a layperson that he has underlying conditions cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Williams, 509 F.3d at 402.
Even if Ellis had an objectively serious medical condition requiring treatment, he did not present evidence that any medical staffer acted with deliberate indifference to his reported symptoms. When medical professionals provide some level of care to a prisoner, we defer to their medical judgment "unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances." Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Here, nothing in the record suggests that the medical staff failed to exercise medical judgment in responding to Ellis's complaints. To the contrary, Ellis received continuous medical care in the form of physical examinations, diagnostic testing, and prescription medication. See id. at 1025. Ellis believes that he required treatment at a hospital or a prescription for nitroglycerine, but prisoners do not have a constitutional right to specific medical treatment. See Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).
As for Ellis's claim about painful handcuffing, no reasonable factfinder could find that Creel used excessive force against Ellis. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" on prisoners. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). For excessive-force claims under the Eighth Amendment, we ask whether the "force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. at 7. Here, there is no evidence that the handcuffing was anything more than a good-faith application of force for the purpose of maintaining order and complying with the prison's policies. And even in the Fourth Amendment context (with its lower reasonableness standard), we have required a plaintiff claiming excessive force based on handcuffing to have put the officer on notice of the degree of pain or injury being inflicted by the handcuffs, not simply to mention their tightness. See Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2014) (collecting examples). Here, Ellis lodged a general complaint; there is no evidence about pain, just superficial marks on the wrist. Therefore, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Creel tightly handcuffed him maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. See Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2001).
Finally, Ellis argues that the district court erred by entering judgment for the nurses who did not appear. But its decision was proper-or, at least not prejudicial to Ellis in the case of Bailey, who was never served and need not have been included in the judgment. (Leaving her out would not have affected finality because it was too late to serve her, and a new claim against her would be untimely. See Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2001).) After the clerk's entry of default against White, Ellis missed the court's deadline for proving damages and obtaining a judgment under Rule 55(b)(2). Thus he did not "establish his entitlement to the relief he seeks." VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Because he never proved the substantial damages requested, the district court properly entered judgment for White-even though her default meant that the factual allegations against her were deemed admitted, see Barwin v. Vill. of Oak Park, 54 F.4th 443, 450 n.6 (7th Cir. 2022), which in this case would preclude a judgment for her on the merits.
AFFIRMED.
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).