Opinion
No. CV-08-4040074
February 23, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Robin Elliott, an inmate incarcerated at the Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut, has brought this action as an administrative appeal pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 4-183. The defendant, Theresa Lantz, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, has moved to dismiss on the grounds that the decision to place the plaintiff on high security status while in prison is not a contested case, and, therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). The grounds which may be asserted in a motion to dismiss are: 1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; 3) improper venue; 4) insufficiency of process; and 5) insufficiency of service of process. Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985), citing Practice Book § 10-31.
The Complaint alleges that the plaintiff was placed on high security status by Department of Corrections personnel and that while on this status, his incoming and outgoing mail was reviewed. He seeks to challenge the decision to place him on high security status under Connecticut General Statutes § 4-183.
In Francis v. Officer Chevair et al, 99 Conn.App. 789, 916 A.2d 86 (2007), the Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of an action by a prisoner on the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the UAPA because the plaintiff did not have a statutory right to a hearing before the classification committee that terminated his employment in the prison work program. The Court stated:
CT Page 3885
Subsection (b) of that statute [Connecticut General Statutes § 18-78a] provides that "[i]n cases involving disciplinary action, classifications and out-of-state transfers, the Department of Correction shall not be required to follow the procedures of sections 4-176e to 4-182, inclusive, provided all procedural safeguards are afforded at such hearings to insure due process of law." Sections 4-176e through 4-182 are the portions of the UAPA mandating the procedures to be followed by agencies in conducting hearings on contested cases. See Taylor v. Robinson, 171 Conn. 691, 695, 372 A.2d 102 (1976).
It is apparent from the foregoing that the plaintiff enjoyed no statutory right to a hearing before the classification committee. Such a hearing has not been explicitly provided for in the statutes governing the department of correction. Moreover, the clear import of § 18-78a(1) is that a prisoner, when subject to a particular disciplinary action, classification decision or out-of-state transfer, is entitled to whatever procedures are constitutionally required but, nevertheless, does not have the right to the type of legislatively mandated hearing contemplated by the UAPA. The plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the classification committee, therefore, is not from a "contested case" as defined by § 4-166(2). Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under § 4-183.
Francis v. Chevair, supra, at 794 (emphasis added).
Here the plaintiff challenges the decision to classify him as a high security status prisoner. Section 18-78a specifically provides that such a decision is not a "contested case" from which appeal lies under § 4-183. The court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal and the case is ordered dismissed.