Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Services, Inc.

19 Citing cases

  1. Aba Sheikh v. Choe

    156 Wn. 2d 441 (Wash. 2006)   Cited 140 times

    Evangelical United Brethren Church, 67 Wn.2d at 259-60. See also Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 408, 583 P.2d 626 (1978) ("As the court's agent, the standard of care imposed upon Kamp is that of a parent."). And see, e.g., Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995); P.G. v. Dep't of Health Human Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 4 P.3d 326, 332 (Alaska 2000); E.P. v. Riley, 1999 SD 163, 604 N.W.2d 7, 12; Calabria v. State, 289 N.Y. 613, 43 N.E.2d 836 (1942).

  2. Paulson v. Huang

    146 Wn. App. 1036 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)

    A plaintiff must present evidence that the "(1) the child has a dangerous proclivity; (2) the parents know [or should have known] of the child's dangerous proclivity; and (3) they fail to exercise reasonable care in controlling that proclivity." Barrett v. Pacheco, 62 Wn. App. 717, 722, 815 P.2d 834 (1991); accord Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs. Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); 16 David K. DeWolf Keller W. Allen, Washington Practice: Tort Law and Practice § 3.21 at 137 (3d ed. 2007). Paulson contends the trial court erred in giving the instruction because the case law it relied on only applies to claims involving intentional torts.

  3. Sun Mountain Prods., Inc. v. Pierre

    84 Wn. App. 608 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    Adopting objective standard of care for negligent supervision

    For example, in two cases, knowledge was proven. See Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 404, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wn. 241, 245, 281 P. 991 (1929). The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS favors the objective standard, providing that a parent is liable for the torts of his or her child when the parent "(a) knows or has reason to know that he [or she] has the ability to control [the] child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."

  4. Barrett v. Pacheco

    62 Wn. App. 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 8 times

    [3] Under the doctrine of negligent supervision, parents are liable for the intentional torts of their minor children when: (1) the child has a dangerous proclivity; (2) the parents know of the child's dangerous proclivity; and (3) they fail to exercise reasonable care in controlling that proclivity. Norton v. Payne, 154 Wn. 241, 244-45, 281 P. 991 (1929); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 408, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Carey v. Reeve, 56 Wn. App. 18, 22, 781 P.2d 904 (1989). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1965) provides that a parent is liable for the torts of his or her child when the parent "(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."

  5. Dinsmore-Poff, v. Alvord

    972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that a parent's tort duty to restrain child exists only where "the parent ha reason to know with some specificity of a present opportunity and need to restrain the child to prevent some imminently foreseeable harm"

    See Costello v. Hart, 23 Cal.App.3d 898, 100 Cal.Rptr. 554 (1972); Duncan v. Rzonca, 133 Ill. App.3d 184, 88 Ill.Dec. 288, 478 N.E.2d 603 (1985).See Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626, 630 (1978) (en banc) (affirming verdict against program for troubled youth from which three boys ran away, stealing and damaging a car, and which, when the boys were returned after ten days, reassigned them to the same unguarded facility, whence they again escaped three days later, stealing and damaging another car, because record was "devoid of evidence indicating [any] increased supervision of the boys during the 3 days" after their return); Norton v. Payne, 154 Wn. 241, 281 P. 991, 992-93 (1929) (reversing nonsuit taken after evidence because mother had testified that father not only had not tried to restrain daughter, but had actually encouraged her in habit of hitting other children with sticks). The few opinions besides Marx in group (c), evaluating whether parental efforts were reasonable, suggest that a good-faith attempt to correct misconduct as it occurs is enough.

  6. Popple v. Rose

    254 Neb. 1 (Neb. 1998)   Cited 35 times

    However, those courts specifically adopting a parental duty to warn of children's dangerous propensities have narrowed the duty even further and limited the application thereof to only situations where the parents are aware of the child's known, habitual, dangerous propensity. Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess, 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Cooper v. Meyer, 50 Ill. App.3d 69, 365 N.E.2d 201 (1977); Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973); Caldwell v. Zaher, 344 Mass. 590, 183 N.E.2d 706 (1962); Preston v. Duncan, 55 Wn.2d 678, 349 P.2d 605 (1960); Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955); Martin v. Barrett, 120 Cal.App.2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953); Zuckerberg v. Munzer, 277 A.D. 1061, 100 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1950); Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944); Johnson v. Butterworth, 180 La. 586, 157 So. 121 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Turner v. Bucher, 308 So.2d 270 (La. 1975); Norton v. Payne, 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929). Compare Hackett v. Schmidt, 630 So.2d 1324 (La. App. 1993).

  7. Fuller v. Studer

    122 Idaho 251 (Idaho 1992)   Cited 4 times
    In Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho 251, 833 P.2d 109 (1992), the Court extended the Sterling rationale to the parent-child context.

    Other jurisdictions have held similarly. See Alioto v. Marnell, 402 Mass. 36, 520 N.E.2d 1284 (1988); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Services, Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Cooper v. Meyer, 50 Ill.App.3d 69, 7 Ill.Dec. 916, 365 N.E.2d 201 (1977); Parsons v. Smithey, 109 Ariz. 49, 504 P.2d 1272 (1973); Linder v. Bidner, 50 Misc.2d 320, 270 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1966); Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953). In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants filed the affidavit of Mr. Studer and Mr. Seager.

  8. State v. Harrell

    105 Wn. 2d 840 (Wash. 1986)   Cited 3 times

    DSHS by court order had legal custody of Harrell and retained ultimate custodial responsibility. The County contends that Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978) supports its position that Group Homes had "custody" of Harrell sufficient to assess detention fees against it pursuant to RCW 13.16.085. Kamp operated a group child care facility. As part of its operations Kamp contracted with DSHS to provide care for children referred either from juvenile court or DSHS. Two children escaped from Kamp and caused damage to property of a third party.

  9. Irwin v. Ware

    392 Mass. 745 (Mass. 1984)   Cited 185 times
    Holding that police officer was not performing discretionary function in releasing known drunk driver because he acted contrary to established policy

    mon carrier has duty to protect passengers); Rawson v. Massachusetts Operating Co., 328 Mass. 558, 560 (1952) (theater owner has duty to protect patrons). See also International Distrib. Corp. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 569 F.2d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer's duty to foreseeable plaintiff for failure to supervise employees); Keating v. Jones Dev. of Mo., Inc., 398 F.2d 1011, 1014-1015 (5th Cir. 1968) (motel owner's duty to prevent harm to guest by third party in swimming pool on premises); Wanca v. Penn Indus., Inc., 260 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1958) (employer's duty to protect bystander from dangerous employee); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201-202 (1982) (private mental hospital's duty to protect foreseeable plaintiff from patient); Stalzer v. European Am. Bank, 113 Misc.2d 77, 81-83 (N Y Civ. Ct. 1982) (bank's duty to protect patrons); Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 340 (1978) (parent's duty to protect third parties from child's use of dangerous instrument); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Serv., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 408 (1978) (group child care facility's duty to control acts of delinquent children). Such a duty to prevent harm to another caused by a third person has been recognized for public employees as well as private individuals.

  10. Bradbury v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

    91 Wn. 2d 504 (Wash. 1979)   Cited 17 times
    Recognizing retroactive application as the general rule, but noting that this court has on occasion applied a new rule of law "either prospectively or with only limited retroactive effect"

    We will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Serv., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Martin v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 39, 42, 578 P.2d 525 (1978). Whether arbitration is the proper procedure by which to determine damages is a matter that initially must be resolved by the trial court.