Plaintiff E.L.A. commenced this action on March 4, 2016, alleging causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law against Abbott House, Inc. and its current and former employees Claude B. Meyers, Joyce Sayre-Kelly, Jermaine Armstead, Yusef Graves, Stacy Weshifesky, (the “Abbott House Defendants”); Roslyn Murov, M.D.; the City of New York and its current and former employees Eric Lipps, Vanessa Gaskin, William Bell, and John Mattingly (the “City Defendants”); and Arista Center for Psychotherapy, Inc. and Jacqui Israel and Richard Navon (the “Arista Defendants, ” and together with the Abbott House Defendants, Murov, and City Defendants, “Defendants”). For the reasons stated herein, I recommend that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. BACKGROUND

Although this case has not proceeded past discovery, it has a voluminous procedural history spanning more than four years, as discussed in detail below.

A. Plaintiff Commences This Lawsuit

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 4, 2016, asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), New York Social Services Law § 413, and New York State tort law for injuries arising from her time in foster care. Complaint, dated March 7, 2016, Dkt. No. 3. On April 11, 2016, the Court held an initial pretrial conference and subsequently approved a case management plan and the parties' proposed confidentiality agreement and order. Dkt. Nos. 24, 30. As part of this plan, the Court referred any discovery disputes to me. Id.

The first discovery dispute arose two months later, on June 16, 2016, when Plaintiff submitted a letter motion requesting that the Court direct defendants to produce certain initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including agency records that could help identify John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. Dkt. No. 31 at 1. A number of defendants named in the original complaint-Arista Center for Psychotherapy, Inc., Jacqui Israel, Vickie Friedman, and Rochelle Zimmerman; Abbott House and Claude B. Meyers; and City of New York, William Bell, and Eric Lipps-submitted letter responses arguing that Plaintiff's application was premature, and Plaintiff filed a reply letter in further support of her application. Dkt. Nos. 33-36. The Court held a telephonic conference on June 22, 2016 to discuss these discovery matters and subsequently issued a discovery and motion practice schedule. Dkt. No. 37. The Court modified this schedule twice in July 2016 by granting an extension of time for defendants to produce the initial disclosures at issue and an extension of time for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 38-39, 43-44. An amended schedule was then adopted by the Court with the consent of all parties. Dkt. Nos. 43-44. After the production of initial disclosures in August 2016 in accordance with that schedule, Dkt. Nos. 45, 47, the Court granted additional requests for extensions of time with respect to filing and responding to the amended complaint. Dkt. Nos. 47-50.

On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint and, in doing so, named all of the anonymous John and Jane Does in her initial complaint. Dkt. No. 52. Some of the defendants named in the amended complaint-including Arista Center for Psychotherapy, Inc., Jacqui Israel, Vickie Friedman, and Rochelle Zimmerman; Abbott House and Claude B. Meyers; City of New York, William Bell, Eric Lipps, and John Mattingly; and Richard Navon, M.D.-requested a pre-motion conference to discuss anticipated motions-including a motion to dismiss and a motion for a more definite statement, and the Court scheduled a hearing on October 5, 2016 to discuss defendants' requests. Dkt. Nos. 55-59, 61, 63-64. Before the hearing, Plaintiff submitted two letters characterizing the anticipated motions as premature and without merit. Dkt. Nos. 72-73. At the October 5 conference, the Court granted defendants permission to file a joint motion to dismiss, and set a schedule for the filing of Plaintiff's second amended complaint and motion practice. Dkt. Entry dated Oct. 5, 2016. However, due to a dispute about whether the second amended complaint complied with the parties' confidentiality order, the parties jointly requested an adjournment of the schedule on December 2, 2016. Dkt. No. 93. The Court held a hearing to address the confidentiality issues on December 7, 2016 and provided a short extension of time for Plaintiff to file a redacted second amended complaint. Dkt. Entry dated Dec. 7, 2016.

Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint on December 14, 2016. Dkt. No. 99. The following month, the Court directed Plaintiff to serve all Defendants by February 5, 2017, and referred the parties to the Court-annexed mediation program. Dkt. Entry dated January 19, 2017; Dkt. No. 115.

B. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

On February 23, 2017, while mediation efforts were still ongoing, defendant Roslyn Murov, M.D., requested a pre-motion conference to discuss an anticipated motion to dismiss and, on the same day, Plaintiff opposed that request as premature. Dkt. Nos. 125-26. The Court directed Plaintiff to provide an update regarding service of her second amended complaint and adjourned the March 8, 2017 status conference to April 5, 2017. Dkt. No. 128. Plaintiff's counsel confirmed service on all Defendants in a separate submission on March 30, 2017 and requested that the Clerk of Court enter default judgment against defendants who purportedly had not appeared yet, including Yusef Graves, John Mattingly, Vanessia Gaskin, Jermaine Armstead, and Stacy Weshifesky. Dkt. Nos. 131-36. Meanwhile, the represented defendants made a joint application to stay the mediation scheduled for April 4, 2017, to which Plaintiff objected. Dkt. Nos. 12930. The Court denied the request and directed the parties to participate in mediation, which proved unsuccessful. Dkt. Nos. 138, 168.

At some point in the proceedings, counsel for Abbott House began representing Yusef Graves, Vanessia Gaskin, Jermaine Armstead, and Stacy Weshifesky, and counsel for the City began representing John Mattingly. See Dkt. Nos. 137, 144.

At the April 5, 2017 status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule for a combined motion to dismiss to be submitted jointly by all moving defendants. Dkt. Entry dated April 5, 2017. The motion to dismiss, joined by Murov, Gaskin, the Abbott House Defendants, and the Arista Defendants, was filed on May 31, 2017. Dkt. Nos. 144, 146-47. The City Defendants (except for Gaskin, who had joined the motion to dismiss) filed their answer to the second amended complaint on June 26, 2017, and asserted cross-claims against Abbott House. Dkt. No. 155. Plaintiff filed her opposition papers to the joint motion to dismiss on June 28 and June 29, 2017, Dkt. Nos. 158-60, and the moving defendants filed their joint reply on July 21, 2017, Dkt. No. 166.

On March 27, 2018, the Court granted the motion to dismiss as to the Section 1983 claims against the Abbott House Defendants and the Arista Defendants, but denied the rest of the motion. Dkt. No. 176. Following this decision, Plaintiff requested permission to move for reargument or reconsideration of the Court's decision or, alternatively, to further amend her complaint on April 5, 2018, which the Court granted on June 27, 2018. Dkt. No. 181, 199. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on July 3, 2018, Dkt. Nos. 203-06, and Murov and the Abbott House Defendants filed a joint opposition on July 12, 2018, Dkt. No. 207. Plaintiff's motion was denied on July 19, 2018, Dkt. No. 209, and the remaining defendants who had not answered the second amended complaint submitted their respective answers in June, August and December 2018, Dkt. Nos. 196, 198, 210, 213.

C. Plaintiff Fails to Advance Her Case

It was at this point after the pleading stage that Plaintiff's efforts to advance her lawsuit began to deteriorate. Plaintiff first failed to respond to Murov's November 14, 2018 demand for authorizations “to obtain the plaintiff's records from various healthcare providers” and then neglected her follow-up requests in June and July of 2019, after which Murov sought the Court's assistance on July 11, 2019. Dkt. No. 217. Specifically, Murov requested that the Court schedule a conference to establish a discovery schedule or otherwise permit her to move to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Id. at 2. The Court granted Murov's request and scheduled a conference for July 17, 2019. Dkt. No. 218. One day prior to the conference, however, Plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that the parties had met and conferred and agreed that Plaintiff would produce the requested authorizations within 30 days. Dkt. No. 220. The conference proceeded as scheduled on July 17 and the parties were directed to complete all discovery by January 15, 2020 (again with all discovery issues referred to me). Dkt. Entry July 17, 2019; see also Dkt. No. 221 (Case Management Plan).

Two months later, on September 16, 2019, Murov informed the Court that Plaintiff still had not provided the outstanding authorizations and noted that counsel for Plaintiff represented that he was “having trouble with his client.” Dkt. No. 223 at 2. Murov requested a conference to discuss how best to resolve this discovery issue or, alternatively, to seek permission to file a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Id. In response, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that he had had some difficulty contacting his client but requested another ten days to continue his efforts to communicate with her and obtain signed authorizations. Dkt. No. 224. In light of this update, the Court denied Murov's request without prejudice and directed Plaintiff to provide her authorizations no later than September 30. Dkt. No. 225.

After Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court's deadline, Defendants requested a conference on October 2, 2019 to discuss the outstanding authorizations and an anticipated motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Dkt. Nos. 226-29. The Court directed Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' letter requests on or before October 11, 2019 and scheduled a conference for October 16, 2019. Dkt. No. 230. Plaintiff again failed to respond by the deadline. Instead, on the day of the conference, Plaintiff's counsel submitted a letter updating the Court that he was able to get in contact with his client-who had allegedly fallen into a coma after suffering a concussion-and that all the requested authorizations were now finalized and sent to Defendants. Dkt. No. 232 at 1. Plaintiff's counsel also stated his intent to have a forensic psychiatrist “evaluate [his client's] capacity to work diligently to the conclusion of this case.” Id. at 2. The Court cancelled the conference scheduled for that day, as it appeared that the discovery issue had been resolved. Dkt. No. 233.

However, on October 29, 2019, Murov made a fourth request for a court conference because Plaintiff's authorizations were deficient and, despite counsel for Plaintiff's reassurances to remedy the defect by October 28, he had failed to do so. Dkt. No. 234 at 1. On November 1, 2019, Plaintiff's counsel requested that the Court allow the parties to confer about the discovery and deposition schedule before holding a conference and reported that he was “gaining more cooperation from [his] client” and was processing “a multitude of authorizations.” Dkt. No. 235. The Court scheduled a telephone conference for November 12, 2019 and ordered the parties to meet and confer to resolve any outstanding discovery issues. Dkt. No. 236. Plaintiff's counsel provided an update about the state of discovery and the parties' disputes prior to the conference. Dkt. No. 237. After further discussion with the parties during the conference, the Court directed Plaintiff to provide outstanding records and authorizations by November 15, 2019 and extended the fact discovery deadline to February 14, 2020. Dkt. No. 238. Given that the parties did not raise any further issues regarding the authorizations, Plaintiff apparently made a complete production of authorizations to Defendants at some point after the November 12 conference.

By December 2019, a separate dispute between the parties arose that concerned depositions. In a letter dated December 17, 2019, Plaintiff advised the Court that the parties disagreed about the order of depositions and moved to compel certain defendants' depositions, Dkt. No. 244, and the Arista Defendants and Murov submitted letters in opposition of Plaintiff's requested relief, Dkt. No. 245, 247-48. By Order dated December 18, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's letter motion and directed that “plaintiff's deposition precede the defendants' deposition on a schedule to be worked out among counsel” in light of “the delays caused by plaintiff in her discovery production.” Dkt. No. 246 at 2.

On January 23, 2020, Murov moved to compel Plaintiff's counsel to produce certain documents that purportedly put Murov on notice of the abuse Plaintiff alleged to have suffered. Dkt. No. 251 at 1. Murov initially requested these records on December 9, 2019 and had made numerous follow-up attempts to secure them, but, despite assurances by Plaintiff's counsel, they were never produced. Id. at 2. The Court ordered Plaintiff's counsel to respond to Murov's letter motion by January 27, 2020, Dkt. No. 252. On January 29, 2020, having received no response, Murov submitted a letter advising the Court of counsel's failure to respond, Dkt. No. 253, and, on January 30, the Court granted defendant Murov's motion. Dkt. No. 254. The Court specifically warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order by February 6 could result in sanctions, including dismissal of her claims against Murov. Dkt. No. 254. Notwithstanding this admonition, Plaintiff did not comply. Dkt. No. 256 at 1. On February 12, 2020, Murov moved for sanctions, Plaintiff's counsel opposed the motion on February 21, 2020, and Murov filed a reply on February 24, 2020. Dkt. Nos. 256, 259-61, 267, 268.

By Opinion and Order dated September 24, 2020, the Court granted Murov's motion in part and denied it in part.

During this time, the Abbott House and City Defendants separately filed a letter motion, dated February 7, 2020, to compel Plaintiff's counsel to produce Plaintiff for a deposition (because she had not attended her scheduled deposition) or to dismiss the claims against them, in the event that she was not produced. Dkt. No. 258 at 1. According to the Abbott House and City Defendants, Plaintiff's counsel “had difficulty getting in touch with the plaintiff and was unable to provide a[n alternative] date for her deposition.” Id. Plaintiff's counsel did not respond to the letter motion. By Order dated February 12, the Court scheduled a telephone conference to discuss the issues raised in the letter motion, but denied the request for an order dismissing the complaint as premature. Dkt. No. 263.

Based on the discussions with Plaintiff's counsel during the conference, in which he further illuminated the problems he alleged he was having with his client, the Court directed counsel to file either a motion to withdraw as counsel, a motion for a competency evaluation of Plaintiff, or a letter advising the Court that his client wished to dismiss the case. Dkt. No. 264. The Court also held in abeyance the Abbott House Defendants and City Defendants' application for an order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint until the record was more fully developed. Id. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for a competency hearing and appointment of a guardian on February 28, 2020, explaining that:

To date, very [sic] time over the years I have inquired of [Plaintiff's] capacity and willingness to go forward; I have worked with my client, she has always expressed a willingness to proceed. IN [sic] recent months however, despite continuing to express her willingness she has taken actions that are adverse to going forward and harmful to her case. It is my [sic] not within my capacity as her attorney to make the judgment; but in my experience of working with her for 4 plus years it is my estimation she is not making a knowing intelligent choice

by not responding, but is under some form of diminished capacity, whether by PTSD or some other debilitating factor. Memory loss after concussion, etc.

Dkt. No. 269 at 7. Plaintiff's counsel also contended that it would be premature to move to withdraw from this case until after the other aspects of his motion were decided. Id. at 8.

The Abbott House and City Defendants opposed Plaintiff's motion for a competency hearing and appointment of a guardian. They contended that there was no evidence that Plaintiff was incapable of prosecuting her case. They pointed out that the forensic psychiatric report relied upon by Plaintiff's counsel was more than three years old and did not raise any issues regarding Plaintiff's competency. Dkt. No. 272, at 1.

In an Order dated March 3, 2020, the Court scheduled a conference for March 13, 2020 (and then rescheduled for April 22, 2020 and finally for June 24, 2020 due to the pandemic) to discuss these matters and directed Plaintiff's counsel to have his client attend the scheduled conference, warning that his client's “failure to attend the conference may be grounds for sanctions, including dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to prosecute.” Dkt. No. 274; see also Dkt. No. 275 (rescheduling conference and emphasizing that Plaintiff must attend, otherwise case may be dismissed); Dkt. No. 281 (“If plaintiff fails to appear, the Court will recommend . . . that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute.”). Plaintiff did not attend the conference.

Thereafter, this case was referred to me to prepare a report and recommendation as to whether it should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, relief, as noted, that several defendants had repeatedly sought due to Plaintiff's various delinquencies and failures to comply with court orders. Dkt. No. 285.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A plaintiff has a duty to diligently advance her case, and if she fails to do so, a court may dismiss the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. See, e.g., Hardaway v. Agyemong, 572 Fed.Appx. 11, 12 (2d Cir. 2014); United States ex rel. Pervez v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 415 Fed.Appx. 316, 317 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Lyell Theater Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1982)). Pursuant to Rule 41(b), a court may dismiss an action where the plaintiff “fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order.” While the text of the Rule only addresses cases in which a defendant moves for dismissal of an action, “it is unquestioned that Rule 41(b) also gives the district court authority to dismiss a plaintiff's case sua sponte for failure to prosecute.” La Sane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). Indeed, “[a] plaintiff's lack of diligence alone is enough for dismissal.” Zapata v. Isabella Geriatric Ctr., No. 12-CV-738 (ALC) (DF), 2013 WL 1762900, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2013) (quoting West v. City of New York, 130 F.R.D. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)), adopted by 2013 WL 1762168 (Apr. 24, 2013).

Here, several defendants have sought dismissal for failure to prosecute, but even if they had not, the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute on its own motion.

When considering whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), a court must weigh the following five factors:

(1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.

Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996)). No factor is dispositive, and the Court should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 216; accord U.S. ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004). Each factor is addressed in turn below and, taken together, these factors weigh in favor of dismissal with prejudice.

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Prosecute Her Case and All Five Factors Weigh In Favor of Dismissal.

1. Plaintiff Violated Numerous Court Orders Causing Substantial Delays

First, Plaintiff has failed to comply with numerous court orders and has repeatedly engaged in dilatory behavior during the discovery phase of this case. Starting with Murov's November 2018 demand for authorizations, Plaintiff neglected to provide the requested documents despite Murov's many attempts to obtain them. See Dkt. No. 223 (follow-up requests for authorizations on June 26, July 17, August 16, and September 9, 2019). Indeed, Defendants wrote to the Court on at least four separate occasions to seek assistance with Plaintiff's delinquency. Dkt. Nos. 217 (July 11, 2019 letter); 223 (September 16, 2019 letter), 226-29 (October 2, 2019 letters), and 234 (October 29, 2019 letter). During this time, Plaintiff violated at least two court orders: the Court's September 17 Order, directing her to provide the requested authorizations by September 30, see Dkt. No. 225, 226 at 2, and the Court's October 3 Order, directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' request for a conference concerning this discovery issue by October 11, 2019, see Dkt. No. 230 at 2. It was not until October 16, 2019-the day the Court scheduled a conference to discuss the matter of her delinquency-that Plaintiff submitted a letter representing that the authorizations at issue were being processed and mailed to Defendants. Dkt. No. 231. However, Plaintiff's production turned out to be deficient and the complete production of authorizations was not provided until sometime after the Court's Order, dated November 12, 2019. Dkt. No. 238. In sum, Plaintiff's response to the demand for authorizations came after a year-long delay, a multitude of requests from Defendants for the Court's assistance, and two direct violations of the Court's orders.

Plaintiff also neglected to respond to Murov's December 9, 2019 request for certain documents pertaining to her alleged liability and two subsequent court orders directing her to respond to Murov's letter and produce the records at issue. See Dkt. No. 251-1, 252, 254. Without any explanation for her violations, and only after Murov moved for sanctions as a result of her delay, Plaintiff notified the Court on February 21, 2020 that she had provided Defendants with the documents at issue on that same day. Dkt. No. 267.

Finally, and most notably, Plaintiff failed to attend the June 24, 2020 conference despite multiple Court orders emphasizing that Plaintiff herself must attend, which were served on her by her counsel. See Dkt. No. 274 (March 3 order scheduling conference and directing Plaintiff attendance is required); Dkt. No. 275 (March 12 order rescheduling conference and reemphasizing Plaintiff must attend); Dkt. No. 276 (counsel confirming service of the Court's March 3 and 12 orders on Plaintiff); Dkt. No. 281 (June 10 order confirming telephonic conference details and reaffirming requirement that Plaintiff be in attendance); Dkt. No. 282 (confirming service of June 10 order on Plaintiff). Since the June 24 conference, the Court has not received any further communication about this violation or Plaintiff's desire to continue prosecuting this case - and she has now had several months to indicate her interest in proceeding with her case. Indeed, the last reported contact between Plaintiff and her counsel was on June 6, 2020, when she told him that “she has ‘been trying to mentally be well.'” Dkt. No. 282. Prior to this communication, her counsel contended that he had experienced difficulties obtaining Plaintiff's cooperation as far back as September 2019, see Dkt. No. 223 (defendant Murov's September 16, 2019 letter explaining that Plaintiff's counsel indicated “having trouble with his client”), and he has continued to express his inability to work with his client until as recently as February 21, 2020, Dkt. No. 269 at 7 (“I[n] recent months however, despite continuing to express her willingness she has taken actions that are adverse to going forward and harmful to her case.”). Effectively, Plaintiff's failure to abide by the numerous court orders requiring her appearance has brought this case to a standstill.

Given Plaintiff's repeated violations of the Court's orders and unresponsiveness to her adversaries' requests-problems that have plagued this case since November 2018-factor one weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. See, e.g., Moton v. Williams, No. 15-CV-6485 (GBD) (JLC), 2018 WL 2229126, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2018) (“While courts have observed that there is no ‘magic number' for the length of noncompliance, courts have deemed delays of three months and less sufficient to warrant dismissal.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)), adopted by 2018 WL 3384433 (July 11, 2018).

2. The Court Gave Notice to Plaintiff that Failure to Comply with Court Orders May Result in Dismissal

Second, Plaintiff received multiple notices between January and June 2020 that failure to comply with the Court's orders could result in dismissal of her case. Dkt. No. 254 (January 30 Order explaining that failure to produce discovery by deadline may result in dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Murov); Dkt. No. 574 (March 3 Order warning that “Plaintiff and her counsel are hereby put on notice that a failure to attend the conference may be grounds for sanctions, including dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to prosecute”); Dkt. No. 275 (March 12 order rescheduling the conference making clear that “plaintiff herself must attend the . . . conference with the Court in person and failure to do so could result in sanctions, including dismissal”); Dkt. No. 281 (June 10 Order advising that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear, the Court will recommend . . . that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute”); see also Dkt. Nos. 276, 282 (notices indicating service on plaintiff). As a result, this factor also weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. See, e.g., Brow v. City of New York, 391 Fed.Appx. 935, 937 (2d Cir. 2010) (dismissal affirmed where court order put plaintiff on “notice that failure to attend his deposition would result in dismissal”); Peters v. Dep't of Corr. of New York City, 306 F.R.D. 147, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (case dismissed where plaintiff received “two notices of possible dismissal for failure to prosecute”).

3. Defendants Would be Prejudiced by Further Delay

Third, further delay of the proceedings would prejudice Defendants. At the outset, “it is important to note that prejudice to the Defendants from unreasonable delay may be presumed.” Samman v. Conyers, 231 F.R.D. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Peart v. City of New York, 992 F.2d 458, 462 (2d Cir.1993)). Defendants have undoubtedly suffered from Plaintiff's substantial delay dating back to November 2018, when her ability (or willingness) to litigate this case in earnest began to fade and she failed to timely respond to multiple requests for discovery. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 217 at 2 (defendant Murov demands authorization on November 14, 2018 and June 26, 2019); Dkt. No. 226 at 2 (detailing Murov's subsequent demands for authorization on July 17, August 26, and September 9, 2019); Dkt. No. 227 (Abbott House and City Defendants noting plaintiff's failure to respond to their January 29, 2019 demands for authorizations); Dkt. No. 251 at 1-2 (Murov's letter noting Plaintiff subsequently neglected to produce requested records after being served with notice to produce on December 19, 2019 and following up on two separate occasions). In sum, Plaintiff's inability to fulfill her discovery obligations-even with Defendants' incessant prodding-and to attend Court conferences has continued with no sign of change. See, e.g., Samman, 231 F.R.D. at 166 (prejudice found where “[p]laintiff's delays have forced [d]efendants to incur the costs of attending multiple conferences and otherwise litigating a case that has failed to progress and has no end in sight”). The delays in this four-year-old lawsuit have been substantial as the parties have not conducted a single deposition and discovery disputes have only recently been resolved. Any further delay of these proceedings would greatly prejudice Defendants. See, e.g., St. Prix v. Sirus XM Satellite Radio, No. 11-Cv-1506 (CM) (KNF), 2014 WL 405812, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2014) (finding prejudice after two years of delay and acknowledging that “[defendant] will be prejudiced by further delay; the longer the litigation process continues, the less likely it is that critical witnesses will be available.”); Antonios A. Alevizopoulos & Assocs., Inc. v. Comcast Int'l Holdings, Inc., No. 99-CV-9311 (SAS), 2000 WL 1677984, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2000) (significant prejudice where plaintiff did not appear for deposition by court-ordered deadline). Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.

4. The Court's Interest in the Docket Outweighs Plaintiff's Interest in Being Heard

Fourth, “Plaintiff has been given multiple opportunities and ‘ample time to inform the Court that [s]he stood ready to press [her] claims' in an effort to strike a balance between the Court's docket and Plaintiff's right to be heard.” Portorreal v. City of New York, 306 F.R.D. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). At this juncture, the Court's interest in managing its docket outweighs Plaintiff's interest, if any, in being heard.

5. The Court Has Considered Lesser Sanctions.

Fifth, dismissal with prejudice is an appropriate remedy in these circumstances. The Court has considered lesser sanctions but “[t]here is no indication that a lesser sanction, such as a fine, would be effective, given the plaintiffs failure to take any action for several months to indicate an interest in pursuing this case.” Rogers v. Villafane, No. 12-CV-3042 (CBA) (MDG), 2013 WL 3863914, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013). Although dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a “harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations, ” U.S. ex rel. Drake, 375 F.3d at 254 (citations omitted), dismissal without prejudice would be futile in this case as Plaintiff's claims are time barred, see, e.g., Nzomo v. Wheeler, No. 10-CV-8530 (RA) (JLC), 2013 WL 4713911, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2013) (dismissing action with prejudice where Section 1983 claims were barred by statute of limitations), adopted by 2014 WL 92711 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2014). Plaintiff's causes of action under Section 1983, New York Social Services Law, and New York State tort law stem from Defendants' alleged misconduct from 1997 through 2010, see Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 22-25, 39, 259-498, and are all governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, as Plaintiff's second amended complaint naming the Defendants was filed in December 2016 (Dkt. No. 99), her claims for actions occurring at the latest in 2010 would necessarily be time barred in a newly-filed lawsuit (i.e., in or after 2020). Therefore, the fifth and final factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to New York's personal injury statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). See, e.g., Plumey v. New York State, 389 F.Supp.2d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims arising from personal injury in New York). Similarly, Plaintiff's claims under New York State tort law and statutory law are also subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Baker v. Stryker Corp., 770 Fed.Appx. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2019) (personal injury claims alleging negligence are governed by New York's three-year statute of limitations); Nichols v. Curtis, 104 A.D.3d 526, 528 (1st Dep't 2013) (a three-year statute of limitations for claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty).

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, because all five factors weigh in favor of dismissal, I recommend that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to such objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Richard Berman and the undersigned, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York, 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Berman.

FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

E.L.A. v. Abbott House, Inc.

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E.L.A. v. Abbott House, Inc.

E.L.A. v. Abbott House, Inc.

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E.L.A. v. Abbott House, Inc.

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