Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. # 304 Bd. of Educ.

7 Citing cases

  1. Spruill v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

    544 F. Supp. 3d 839 (N.D. Ill. 2021)   Cited 5 times

    Spruill's rejoinder relies entirely on Eilenfeldt ex rel. J.M. v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Board of Education , 84 F. Supp. 3d 834 (C.D. Ill. 2015). Doc. 20 at 4-5.

  2. Pinkston v. The Bd. of Educ.

    19 CV 6477 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2023)

    Even accepting as true that K.S. did not initiate the fight, it is not difficult to surmise legitimate reasons for requiring a student involved in a physical altercation to sit in the principal's office. See, e.g., Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F.Supp.3d 834, 846 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff's class-of-one equal protection claim where it was conceivable that defendants had legitimate pedagogical and disciplinary reasons for their response to alleged bullying).

  3. Doe v. Haverford Coll.

    Civil Action 23-299 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2023)

    A false accusation of sexual assault is simply not, by its nature, harassment based on sex, even though the underlying conduct alleged is obviously sexual in nature. See Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. # 304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F.Supp.3d 834, 839, 842 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (finding that allegations that a male student was called “a rapist, pedophile, and child molester” were insufficient to state a claim that the student was harassed because of his gender); Nungesser v. Columbia Univ., 169 F.Supp.3d 353, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting the assertion that calling someone a rapist is inherently gendered); Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 14-cv-30143, 2015 WL 4306521, at *9 (D. Mass. July 14, 2015) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to give any examples of conduct that targeted him based on gender rather than his status as a student accused of sexual assault). Indeed, “[p]ersons of any gender may be perpetrators, or victims, of sexual assault.”

  4. Philips v. Waukegan Hous. Auth.

    642 F. Supp. 3d 743 (N.D. Ill. 2022)

    Next, the plaintiffs cite Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Ed., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834 (C.D. Ill. 2015). In Eilenfeldt, the court denied a school district and certain school officials' motion to dismiss a state-created danger claim where the school and its administrators failed to respond to the student-victim's complaints about ongoing bullying, harassment, and threats of violence from other students.

  5. L.M. v. S. Ill. Univ. at Edwardsville

    Case No. 18-cv-1668-NJR-GCS (S.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2019)

    Whether certain conduct shocks the conscience is "a necessarily fact-bound inquiry," and not appropriately decided at the motion to dismiss stage. Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Board of Education, 84 F. Supp. 3d 834, 845 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (citing King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Fenner v. Freeburg Community High School District No. 77, No. 15-0729-DRH, 2016 WL 633898, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 17, 2016). Defendants have not cited to authority demonstrating why this particular allegation fails to state a substantive due process claim.

  6. Doe v. Univ. of Chi.

    No. 16 C 08298 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 20, 2017)   Cited 12 times

    As several courts have recently held, a false accusation of sexual assault is not, without more, harassment based on sex, notwithstanding the sexual content of the accusation. Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. # 304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F.Supp.3d 834, 839, 842 (C.D. Ill. 2015) (allegations that a male student was called "a rapist, pedophile, and child molester" were insufficient to state a claim that the student was harassed because of his gender); Nungesser v. Columbia Univ., 169 F.Supp.3d 353, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting the assertion that calling someone a rapist is inherently gendered); Doe v. Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *9 (D. Mass. July 14, 2015) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to give any examples of conduct that targeted him based on gender rather than his status as a student accused of sexual assault). When someone levels an accusation that another person, male or female, committed sexual assault, the accuser is not making the accusation because the alleged perpetrator is one gender or the other.

  7. T.B. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. Dist.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-606 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2016)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, "[c]ourts have repeatedly held that forms of abuse utilizing gendered or sexual language do not, by their use of such language alone, constitute discrimination on the basis of gender." Eilenfeldt v. United C.U.S.D. #304 Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 3d 834 (C.D. Ill. 2015). Defendant's tangential arguments may be summarily dismissed.