Opinion
December 17, 1984
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Young, J.).
Order reversed, with costs, and motion denied.
Under the rules for calendar practice of the Chief Administrator of the courts (22 NYCRR 103.4) and this department (22 NYCRR 675.7), a motion for further pretrial proceedings after a note of issue and statement of readiness have been filed should only be granted upon a showing of the presence of "unusual and unanticipated conditions" subsequent to the filing of the statement of readiness (22 NYCRR 675.7; Perricone v. City of New York, 96 A.D.2d 531, affd 62 N.Y.2d 661; Huttner v. Mayberry, 96 A.D.2d 527). The substitution of new counsel and/or the inexperience or inadvertence of predecessor counsel alone is not sufficient to depart from the provisions of the these rules ( Shore v. Lubov, 46 A.D.2d 668). Additionally, where the movant clearly has long known, or should have known, prior to the filing of the statement of readiness, the identity of the individuals sought to be deposed and the significance of their testimony, a motion for their pretrial examination, made subsequent to the filing of the statement of readiness, should be denied ( Holbin v Port Auth., 88 A.D.2d 990). The fact that the movant here is plaintiff's substituted counsel and such knowledge cannot be attributed to him personally should not, in and of itself, alter the result herein ( Shore v. Lubov, supra). Lazer, J.P., Mangano, Bracken and Niehoff, JJ., concur.