Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. International Profit Associates, Inc.

6 Citing cases

  1. Brownlee v. Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Chi.

    16-cv-00665 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2022)

    Catholic Charities next argues that “allegations of comments ‘of a sexual nature' are, standing alone, too vague to support a hostile work environment claim.” Def.'s Memo. Reconsider at 12-13 (citing EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., 647 F.Supp.2d 951, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2009)). However, in Int'l Profit Assocs., the claimant at issue could not “remember a single comment with enough specificity to determine whether any or all of the comments were more like ‘occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,' which is generally non-actionable, or more like ‘uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; or obscene language or gestures,' which are generally actionable.”

  2. Brownlee v. Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Chi.

    16-cv-00665 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2022)

    Id. at 6 (citing Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that even intimate or more crude physical acts-a hand on the thigh, a kiss on the lips, a pinch of the behind- “may be considered insufficiently abusive to be described as ‘severe' when they occur in isolation”); EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., 647 F.Supp.2d 951, 982-85 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of the employer after finding allegations of a male co-worker asking the plaintiff out, rubbing her shoulders and back, and telling her that he was a good kisser were insufficiently abusive to be described as severe)).

  3. Brownlee v. Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Chi.

    No. 16-cv-00665 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2021)

    Catholic Charities cites cases in the Seventh Circuit that stand for the proposition that "fleeting, boorish behavior, particularly from someone not in a position of authority over the plaintiff (an important consideration), is not severe enough to rise to the level of a hostile working environment." Id. at 6 (citing Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 808 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that even intimate or more crude physical acts—a hand on the thigh, a kiss on the lips, a pinch of the behind—"may be considered insufficiently abusive to be described as 'severe' when they occur in isolation"); EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 2d 951, 982-85 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of the employer after finding allegations of a male co-worker asking the plaintiff out, rubbing her shoulders and back, and telling her that he was a good kisser were insufficiently abusive to be described as severe)). Brownlee, in response, argues that even one instance of contact with an intimate body part in isolation can satisfy the severity requirement (citing Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 455 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2006)), and here, Washington's conduct did not occur in isolation.

  4. Boustany v. Xylem Inc.

    235 F. Supp. 3d 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)   Cited 12 times
    Dismissing Title VII claim brought by non-U.S. citizen who was employed outside of the United States because the plaintiff was outside the reach of Title VII, even though plaintiff had received a right-to-sue letter

    On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's conclusion. Shekoyan , 409 F.3d at 422.A number of other courts have applied the primary work station test or a close cognate of it. See, e.g.,Herrera v. NBS, Inc. , 759 F.Supp.2d 858, 866 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that individual who was hired in, supervised from, provided a furnished office in, given business cards with a local phone number from, attended weekly meetings in, and spent half of his work week in El Paso, Texas had a "primary workstation" in Texas); E.E.O.C. v. Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc. , 647 F.Supp.2d 951, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ; Denty v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 907 F.Supp. 879, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd , 109 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee was not covered by the ADEA because his "work station was outside the United States"); Gantchar v. United Airlines, Inc. , No. 93 C 1457, 1995 WL 137053, at *10 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 1995) (holding that foreign flight attendant, who spent approximately 20% of her time working in the United States, was not employed in the United States). Some commentators present the "primary workstation" test as the only relevant test. See, e.g. , 6 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 41:285 ("A determination of a plaintiff's location of employment for Title VII purposes focuses on the location of the employee's primary workstation."); 1 Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Federal Law § 18:26 ("A determination of a plaintiff's location of employment for Title VII purposes focuses on the location of the employee's primary workstation.").

  5. EEOC v. International Profit Associates, Inc.

    Case No. 01 C 4427 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2010)

    The court then addressed IPA's motions on the individual claims in three opinions over two years. See EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc. (IPA III), No. 01 C 4427, 2008 WL 4876860 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2008); see also EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 2009); EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assocs., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Ill. 2009). IPA did not indicate that it would seek summary judgment on the EEOC's pattern or practice claim until a September 2009 status hearing, when it requested leave to file the instant motion.

  6. Christmas v. City of Chicago

    691 F. Supp. 2d 811 (N.D. Ill. 2010)   Cited 41 times
    Finding that lay witnesses were "entitled to testify about their own perceptions, including the physical and emotional effects of the defendants' alleged conduct"

    First, arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. See EEOC v. Int'l Profit Assoc., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 951, 990 n. 41 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Second, the letter from the defendants' counsel does not outright refuse to produce Phillips for her deposition. The court also notes that the September 24, 2009, letter the plaintiffs cite as evidence that they were attempting to depose Phillips belies their assertion that the defendants first disclosed Phillips as a potential witness on October 1, 2009.