Opinion
2:20-cv-01433-CMC-MGB
10-25-2021
Emerson Jimel Edwards, Plaintiff, v. Warden Stephan; Ms. Jackson; Bryan P. Stirling; and Ms. Labadore, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDAITON
MARY GORDEN BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Emerson Jimel Edwards (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the allegations in Plaintiff's handwritten Complaint are mostly illegible and, in any event, incoherent. As a result, the discussion here is based on a very liberal construction of Plaintiff's allegations and employs a certain level of guesswork. Based on the undersigned's best interpretation, however, the Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff is being “taken advantage of” and incarcerated beyond his “max-out” date-which he claims was sometime in February 2020-because of his purported mental illness. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-6.) Consequently, Plaintiff claims that he is the victim of “kidnapping” and “human trafficking, ” and that Defendants have violated his rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of his extended stay in prison, he has been exposed to the coronavirus (“COVID-19”). (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff seeks $100,000 for every day he has been-and continues to be-held past his purported max-out date, as well as immediate release from the South Carolina Department of Corrections' (“SCDC”) custody. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff seems to conflate these two statutes in his Complaint, asserting that Defendants have violated his “Section 504 ADA rights.” (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.) However, because the language of these two statutes is substantially the same, generally the same analysis is applied to both. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act may be combined for analytical purposes). Indeed, Title II of the ADA explicitly provides that “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights” provided under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “shall be the remedies, procedures and rights [that Title II of the ADA] provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12133. The undersigned therefore considers both statutes in construing Plaintiff's claims against Defendants.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After reviewing the Complaint, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his action was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 18.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff mistakenly filed a Motion to Amend/Correct his Complaint, indicating that he wanted to add a cause of action based on the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Dkt. No. 24.) The undersigned therefore issued another order, granting Plaintiff's request and giving him an additional twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 27.) The undersigned's order reiterated the pleading deficiencies previously identified in Plaintiff's original Complaint and highlighted several additional concerns with respect to a potential FTCA claim. The undersigned also reminded Plaintiff that if he failed to file an 2 amended complaint within the prescribed time period, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id.)
Plaintiff's case was not in proper form when he initially filed the Complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned issued instructions to remedy those proper form issues-which Plaintiff substantially did-prior to reviewing the substance of the claims here. (See Dkt. No. 6.)
Plaintiff later sought an extension to file his amended complaint based on certain COVID-related restrictions at his correctional institution. (Dkt. No. 29.) In response to Plaintiff's request, the undersigned issued a text order granting Plaintiff another twenty-one days to file his amended pleading and warning him that no further extensions would be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. (Dkt. No. 31). Oddly, the hardcopy of the undersigned's text order, which was mailed to Plaintiff that same day, was returned as “undeliverable” several weeks later. (Dkt. No. 35.) After confirming that Plaintiff's listed address was in fact correct, the Clerk of Court remailed the text order. (Dkt. No. 36.) To the undersigned's knowledge, there were no problems with this subsequent mailing. Nevertheless, the undersigned issued another order shortly thereafter granting Plaintiff one final extension to file an amended complaint in an abundance of caution. (Dkt. No. 39.) Despite these numerous extensions, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 3
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of 4 liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390- 91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the jumbled, indecipherable nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it very difficult for this Court to ascertain the scope of his claims against Defendants. While “a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (noting that federal courts cannot serve as “mind readers” or “advocates” for pro se litigants).
Thus, as the undersigned repeatedly warned Plaintiff, if a complaint's lack of clarity or legibility makes it unintelligible, as is the case here, dismissal under Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., is permitted. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 2; Dkt. No. 27 at 2.) See Green, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2; see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Kraim v. Columbia Police Dep't, No. 3:18-cv-1335-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 2058252, at *1 (D.S.C. May 7, 2019) (“Illegible words or allegations need not be considered by the court.”). Assuming, however, that the undersigned's liberal construction is correct, and Plaintiff is in fact challenging 5 his continued incarceration, this action is subject to summary dismissal for several additional reasons.
I. Plaintiff's Request for Damages Is Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that to recover damages for a conviction in violation of the Constitution, the conviction must first be successfully challenged:
to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Moreover, in addressing a damages claim,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. at 487. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). Notably, the Heck Court's preclusive holding likewise bars declaratory and injunctive relief if a judgment in the plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit . . . -if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”).
Here, Plaintiff is specifically seeking damages for each day he is confined beyond the legal limit of his sentence. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) In other words, a judgment in Plaintiff's favor would 6 necessarily imply the invalidity of his current incarceration, such that Heck applies to the instant case. And because Plaintiff has neither alleged nor shown that the duration of his confinement has been invalidated in one of the manners prescribed in Heck, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claim for damages is subject to summary dismissal, at least for the time being. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 3, warning Plaintiff that his request for damages is precluded under Heck.) See Davis v. Stirling, No. 2:20-cv-097-RMG, 2020 WL 5887394, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2020) (finding that Heck barred § 1983 claim for damages where plaintiff alleged that he was being incarcerated beyond his max-out date).
II. Release from Custody Is Unavailable in a Civil Rights Act
Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff's request for immediate release, the undersigned reiterates that release from prison is not a proper remedy in a civil rights case. Rather, such relief may be sought only in a habeas corpus action. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481 (stating that a writ of habeas corpus is the “exclusive remedy” for a prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release from that confinement); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining that a challenge to the duration of confinement falls within “the core of habeas corpus”). Thus, as the undersigned previously explained, the Court cannot grant Plaintiff's request for immediate release from SCDC's custody in the instant case. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 3.)
III. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim to Relief Based on His Exposure to COVID-19
While Plaintiff's continued incarceration seems to be the gravamen of his Complaint, it appears he may be attempting to raise an additional claim under § 1983 based on his exposure to COVID-19. A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 7 Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law).
Although the Complaint does not expressly identify which of Plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated, the undersigned assumes that he intends to raise a claim under the Eighth Amendment, either contesting his conditions of confinement or alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“The [Eighth] Amendment . . . imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As explained in the undersigned's previous order (Dkt. No. 27 at 2), a plaintiff must demonstrate the following two factors to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). A culpable state of mind is “one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. A prison official demonstrates deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 8
While the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” it “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 at 678; see also Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017) (finding complaint's “vague references to [pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”); Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”).
Here, the undersigned explicitly warned Plaintiff that his case would be summarily dismissed if he did not provide some minimal level of coherent, factual support regarding his alleged exposure to COVID-19. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 3-4; Dkt. No. 27 at 2.) In particular, the undersigned notified Plaintiff that he needed to clarify the grounds for his claim and describe how each Defendant was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. (Dkt. No. 18 at 3-4.) See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that a person acting under color of state law can be liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights). Because Plaintiff did not amend his Complaint to include this most basic information, the undersigned finds that he has failed to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on his purported exposure to COVID-19. 9
The undersigned also reiterates that to the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody based on his exposure to COVID-19, his claim more likely constitutes an emergency motion for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, December 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5194. See McCarson v. Reherman, No. 2:20-cv-1386-HMH-MGB, 2020 WL 2110770 (D.S.C. May 4, 2020). Such motions are filed in the inmate's underlying criminal case. See Id. at *2 (explaining that if inmates wish to contest their confinement based on COVID-19, they may pursue release from custody in their underlying criminal matters by showing “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release pursuant to the First Step Act).
IV. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim to Relief Under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act
Finally, Plaintiff's Complaint vaguely references violations of his rights under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Both of these statutes prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities. More specifically, Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall by reason of such disability be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, to raise a claim under either of these statutes, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005).
Aside from the cursory references to Plaintiff's “mental illness” and “disabilities, ” the Complaint is totally devoid of any factual allegations in support of the requisite elements above. As the undersigned repeatedly warned Plaintiff, such bare allegations are once again insufficient, even for a pro se party like him, to state a claim for relief under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 2; Dkt. No. 27 at 2.) See, e.g., Leak v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. 5:19-CT-3012-M, 2020 WL 5822213, at *6 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (dismissing state prisoner's claims under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act where plaintiff failed to allege that he was excluded 10 from a benefit and provided little substantive information regarding his disabilities). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a cause of action pursuant to either of these statutes, his claims are likewise subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
Despite multiple opportunities to cure the deficiencies in his Complaint, Plaintiff did not file an amended pleading in the instant case. For that reason, and for those reasons discussed at length above, the undersigned is of the opinion that any further opportunities to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile at this time. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons forms or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process.
Because Plaintiff may refile his claims should his conviction and/or sentence ever be overturned or called into question by the appropriate court, it is recommended that this dismissal be without prejudice. See Bowman v. Mann, 683 Fed.Appx. 258, 259 (4th Cir. 2017).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiffs attention is directed to the important notice on the next page. 11