Opinion
No. 10-04-00195-CR
Opinion delivered and filed August 3, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 40th District Court, Ellis County, Texas, Trial Court No. 28048CR. Affirmed.
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and, Justice REYNA (Justice VANCE concurring with note)
"(Justice Vance concurs. The perfunctory manner in which this opinion disposes of the issues does not assist the litigants, the higher courts, the Bench and Bar, or the public. There is essentially no analysis of the sufficiency issues under the applicable standards — only conclusions. This opinion suggests either that counsel for the appellant did not brief issues worthy of our consideration or that we have not given the issues our careful attention. I believe we should provide more of the facts and our analysis, even in memorandum opinions. Thus, I cannot join this opinion.)"
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Edwards appeals his conviction for burglary of a habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). We affirm. Evidence. In Edwards's first issue, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence. Edwards fails to cite relevant authorities. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We overrule Edwards's first issue. Sufficiency of the Evidence. In Edwards's second issue, he contends that the evidence was insufficient. Edwards argues that there was no evidence that he was guilty as a party. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003). The State points primarily to eyewitness testimony identifying Edwards as the burglar. Legal Sufficiency. Considering the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we determine that a rational jury could have found Edwards guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Prible v. State, No. AP-74,487; 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 110, at *12-*13 (Tex.Crim.App. Jan. 26, 2005). Factual Sufficiency. Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we determine that the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, and that the contrary evidence is not so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Prible, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 110, at *16; Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We overrule Edwards's second issue. Brady Evidence. In Edwards's third issue, he contends that the State failed to produce Brady evidence. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Edwards fails to establish that the evidence was favorable or material. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999); Brady at 87; Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). We overrule Edwards's third issue. Pro-Se Issues. In an appendix, Edwards's counsel includes as a fourth issue one or more pro-se issues by Edwards. Edwards has no right to hybrid representation. Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 505 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 872 (2005). We do not address Edwards's fourth issue. Having overruled Edwards's issues, we affirm the judgment.