This intent is found not only in section 1 of the amendment, but also in the title which reads in part, "An act requiring compensation for causing death and injuries resulting in death by wrongful act;" and from an examination of the liability created as indicated by a comparison of the damages recoverable under the death and survival acts prior to this amendment and under section 2 of the amendment. The situation prior to the 1939 amendment was that where the action was brought under the death act, recovery was limited by the act to actual pecuniary loss suffered by one entitled to or receiving support from the deceased (see In re Venneman'sEstate, 286 Mich. 368) and funeral expenses ( Edgerton v. Lynch, 255 Mich. 456). And where action was brought under the survival act (where the injured party survived even though only a short time), recovery was permitted of such damages as the deceased could have recovered had he lived to bring an action, such as conscious pain and suffering, loss of earnings sustained by deceased from the time of the accident until death and prospective loss from the date of death throughout the life expectancy of the deceased. See 18 Michigan State Bar Journal, p. 116.
Id. In addition, the fact that an accident occurred does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver. Edgerton v Lynch, 255 Mich. 456, 460; 238 N.W. 322 (1931). Whether a driver met the standard of reasonable prudence generally is a question for the jury. Marietta v Cliff's Ridge, Inc, 385 Mich. 364, 370; 189 N.W.2d 208 (1971).