Opinion
A22A0070
09-16-2021
JILL EDEN v. JOHN F. EDEN et al.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
Plaintiff Jill Eden filed this direct appeal to challenge the trial court's order denying her purported motion for new trial. As explained below, we lack jurisdiction and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed.
This case stems from a family property dispute. In 2013, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit for quiet title against defendants John F. Eden and Lauren M. Eden, and the parties reached a settlement. The settlement agreement was adopted and entered as the order of the trial court. After defendant failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, plaintiff filed a motion for contempt. On October 6, 2016, the trial court denied the motion. In Eden v. Eden, 344 Ga.App. 864 (812 S.E.2d 317) (2018) ("Eden I"), we affirmed in part and vacated in part the trial court's contempt order. Following remand of the case, the trial court entered an order adopting our decision.
Plaintiff's claims against defendants have been the subject of two lawsuits that led to two prior appeals before our court. See Eden v. Eden, Case No. A19A2327 (March 4, 2020) ("Eden II"); Eden v. Eden, 344 Ga.App. 864 (812 S.E.2d 317) (2018) ("Eden I").
In 2018, following the remand in Eden I, plaintiff filed a second lawsuit against defendants, alleging breach of contract and bad faith claims based upon their failure the pay the amounts due under the settlement agreement. In Eden II, we issued an unpublished opinion affirming the trial court's judgment in that case. See Eden II, supra.
On December 14, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion designated as a "Motion for a New Trial," requesting that the trial court's prior contempt order be "set aside" based upon a change in material facts. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff then filed this direct appeal. We, however, lack jurisdiction.
"It is well established that pleadings, motions and orders are to be construed according to their substance and function and not merely as to their nomenclature[.]" Planet Ins. Co. v. Ferrell, 228 Ga.App. 264, 266 (491 S.E.2d 471) (1997) (punctuation omitted). Although plaintiff designated her motion as a motion for a new trial, no trial occurred in this case. Consequently, her motion can not be construed as a valid motion for new trial. See Luster v. Bank of Am., N.A., 331 Ga.App. 510, 512 (769 S.E.2d 394) (2015) (where there is no trial, the rules relating to motions for new trial do not apply and "[w]here a motion for new trial is not a proper vehicle for review of a trial court's action, the motion has no validity") (punctuation omitted); Daniels v. McRae, 180 Ga.App. 732, 733 (1) (350 S.E.2d 317) (1986) (plaintiff's motion could not be construed as a motion for a new trial because no trial had occurred).
Instead, a bench trial was conducted in plaintiff's second lawsuit. Because the lawsuits were not formally consolidated in the trial court, the pleadings and judgment that were separately rendered in the second lawsuit cannot be considered in our review of the instant case. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Futch, 213 Ga. 247, 248 (2) (98 S.E.2d 374) (1957) (when there has been no formal consolidation of the cases into one case, the records in each case must be considered separately). See also Baker v. Brannen/Goddard Co., 274 Ga. 745, 750 (2) (559 S.E.2d 450) (2002) (Sears, P. J., concurring) (cautioning against considering matters outside of the appellate record for the case on review).
To the extent that the motion can be construed as a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) or a motion for reconsideration, dismissal of this appeal is required. An order deciding a motion to set aside may only be appealed by complying with the discretionary appeal procedures, which plaintiff did not do. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8); Luster, 331 Ga.App. at 512. Moreover, an order resolving a motion for reconsideration is not directly appealable. See Luster, 331 Ga.App. at 512. As a result, plaintiff's appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.