Opinion
24-cv-01054-BLF
04-29-2024
ECARDLESS BANCORP, LTD., Plaintiff, v. PAYPAL INC, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION
BETH LABSON FREEMAN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff eCardless Bancorp, Ltd. (“eCardless”) has filed an Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Joint Case Management Statement. ECF No. 117 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff's motion appears to concern information that Plaintiff designated as confidential.
“Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.'” Kamakana v. City & Cty. Of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Accordingly, when considering a sealing request, “a ‘strong presumption in favor of access' is the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to motions that are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action” bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons” that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79.
Records attached to motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the merits of a case,” however, are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.”). Parties moving to seal the documents attached to such motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c). Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This standard requires a “particularized showing,” id., that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff's main rationale for sealing is that the documents are marked “‘AEO - OUTSIDE ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY' under the Transferor Court's Protective Order.” See Mot. at 2-4. This rationale is insufficient to justify sealing. See Civil L.R. 79-5(c) (“Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.”). For many documents, Plaintiff merely states that the documents contain “highly sensitive information.” Mot. at 2-4. Without more detail, that explanation is insufficient. Furthermore, the Court is skeptical that any explanation could justify sealing the highlighted portions of pages 3 to 7 of the Joint Case Management Statement (“JCMS”) at ECF No. 117-3. While certain portions of the JCMS at pages 8 to 9 might meet the good cause standard, the redactions are not narrowly tailored.
As to the exhibits, parties should “avoid wherever possible sealing entire documents (as opposed to merely redacting the truly sensitive information in a document).” Civil L.R. 79-5(a).
Finally, the Court strikes all footnotes in the JCMS for failure to comply with the Court's Standing Order re Civil Cases § IV.F.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to seal is DENIED without prejudice to refiling. Any refiled motions shall comply with the Civil Local Rules and shall be filed by May 6, 2024.
IT IS SO ORDERED.