Opinion
Civil Action 2:03-CV-272.
January 11, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, inmates in the custody of the State of Ohio, bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., alleging various violations of their Constitutional rights. With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Blankenship's Notice of Retaliation for this Legal Action, and Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Same (" Blankenship's Motion for Preliminary Injunction"). Doc. No. 194. For the reasons that follow, Blankenship's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2007, plaintiff Blankenship filed a motion for preliminary injunction, in which he states the he would like to "notify" the Court that his legal materials were confiscated by the staff of the Allen Correctional Institution, where he is currently incarcerated. Blankenship contends that the confiscation of his legal materials was done in retaliation for filing this action and was meant to be harassing. Moreover, Blankenship argues that the confiscation of his legal materials ultimately denies him his constitutional right of access to the courts.
Blankenship requests that this Court issue a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from harassing or retaliating against him by disciplining him for possessing legal files or by confiscating his legal materials.
II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
Blankenship's motion is governed by F.R. Civ. P. 65. The decision whether or not to grant a request for interim injunctive relief falls within the sound discretion of the district court. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1982). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only after consideration of the following four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a "strong" likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) ( en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although these four considerations are factors to be balanced, Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp.2d 902, 918 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (J. Sargus), the first factor is often determinative:
[C]ourts have often recognized that the first factor is traditionally of greater importance than the remaining three. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that when the proponent of the injunctive relief has no chance of success on the merits of the claim, the Court may dismiss the motion without considering the other three factors. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). Failure to do so is reversible error. See id.; Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).Stanley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. Corr., Case No. C2-02-178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21996, *8-9 (S.D. Ohio August 12, 2002) (J. Sargus) (denying motion for injunctive relief after evaluation only of chance of success on the merits factor).
III. DISCUSSION
Blankenship's request for interim injunctive relief is based on his allegations that defendants have harassed and retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit, and, as a result of their actions, he is being denied his constitutional right of access to the courts. Turning to the first factor of the four-part test, the Court concludes that Blankenship has demonstrated little opportunity for success on the merits of these claims.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (" PLRA"), requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies available to the prisoner prior to filing an action in a federal court. The PLRA states in pertinent part:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.Id. The plaintiff-prisoner bears the burden of proving that a grievance has been fully exhausted. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2002). Although exhaustion is not a jurisdictional predicate, it is nevertheless mandatory, Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999), even if proceeding through the administrative system would appear to the inmate to be "futile." Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1999). A prisoner must either attach "a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome." Knuckles-El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The reason for the requirement to show with specificity both the claims presented and the fact of exhaustion is so that the district court may intelligently decide if the issues raised can be decided on the merits."). Federal courts should not prematurely adjudicate the merits of a prisoner's claims until the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d, 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) ("a federal court should not prematurely `decide' the merits of any such action").
Blankenship's claims of denial of access to the courts, harassment and retaliation are all grievable complaints but Blankenship has not established that he has exhausted these claims through available administrative procedures. These claims are therefore not properly before this Court. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 520 (2002) ("we hold that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."). See also Neguse v. Wilkinson, Case No. 98-3087, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 9655, *2, 4 (6th Cir. May 3, 2000) (affirming district court's dismissal for lack of exhaustion prisoner's claim of, inter alia, harassment); Dodson v. Ohio Dept. of Corr., Case No. 99-3521, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14083, *2, 4 (6th Cir. June 14, 2000) (affirming district court's dismissal for lack of exhaustion prisoner's claim of retaliatory placement in segregation); Evans v. Voorhies, Case No. 1:06-cv-629, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78166, *7-8 (S.D. Ohio October 26, 2006) (J. Dlott) (dismissing for, inter alia, failure to exhaust denial of access to courts claim where prisoner claimed "that his legal materials were confiscated for one month during his placement in the `hole' and that he lost a case by `default' in the Ohio Court of Appeals as a result"); Easley v. Collins, Case No. 1:06-cv-431, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65785, *14-15 (S.D. Ohio September 14, 2006) (J. Beckwith) (requiring exhaustion for denial of access to courts case where prisoner claimed prison officials "`stole' his legal materials which resulted in the dismissal of a criminal appeal"). The mere fact that other claims are presented in this action does not mean that Blankenship may effectively seek to expand his allegations to include unexhausted claims or that the Court may now properly become involved in the day-to-day interactions between Blankenship and prison administrators. See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003) (purpose of the "exhaustion requirement is to provide states the first opportunity to resolve problems themselves"). Blankenship will not be permitted to forgo required administrative procedures available to him and bring his grievances directly to this Court in the context of a motion for interim injunctive relief.
In short, plaintiff Blankenship has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim of denial of access to the courts, harassment or retaliation. He is therefore not entitled to the interim injunctive relief that he seeks.
WHEREUPON, Blankenship's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 194, is DENIED.