We said in Middleton v. Middleton, 83 Ark.App. 7, 15, 113 S.W.3d 625, 630 (2003), that the prohibition against separating siblings in the absence of exceptional circumstances does not apply with equal force in cases where the children are half siblings, as they are in this case. In Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000), we affirmed a custody order which resulted in the separation of half-siblings, recognizing that trial judges cannot always provide " flawless solutions to unsolvable problems, especially where only limited options are available." Id. at 13, 9 S.W.3d at 537-38 (quoting Respalie v. Respalie, 25 Ark.App. 254, 257, 756 S.W.2d 928, 930 (1988)).
Id. It is well settled that the primary concern in child-custody cases is the child's welfare and best interest; all other considerations are merely secondary. Id.; Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000). Before a custody order can be changed, the court must be presented with proof of material facts which were unknown to the court at the time of the initial custody order or proof that conditions have so materially changed as to warrant a custody modification and that the best interest of the child requires it. Carver, supra.
From this, we should recognize that a trial court's findings concerning material changes as well as what is in the best interest of the child are questions of fact; accordingly, we must apply the clearly-erroneous standard of review. Again, in Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000), we acknowledged that [a] judicial award of child custody should not be modified unless it is shown that there are changed conditions that demonstrate that a modification of the decree is in the best interest of the child, or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interest of the child that were either not presented to the chancellor or were not known by the chancellor at the time the original custody order was entered.
Other jurisdictions reserve a higher "exceptional circumstances" standard only if the contemplated separation involves full siblings. See Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535, 537 (2000). Moreover, we find the strong public policy toward preservation of sibling relationships to be equally applicable whether the children are full sibling, half sibling, or stepsiblings. As recognized in Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, § 4-17 (2d ed.2004), a recurrent theme in custody cases is the importance of keeping siblings together because close familial relationships are much to be encouraged, brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and association in those everyday and often common experiences; separating them unnecessarily is likely to be traumatic and harmful.
Other jurisdictions reserve a higher "exceptional circumstances" standard only if the contemplated separation involves full siblings. See Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535, 537 (2000). [¶ 26] Moreover, we find the strong public policy toward preservation of sibling relationships to be equally applicable whether the children are full sibling, half sibling, or stepsiblings. As recognized in Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, § 4-17 (2d ed. 2004), a recurrent theme in custody cases is the importance of keeping siblings together because close familial relationships are much to be encouraged, brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and association in those everyday and often common experiences; separating them unnecessarily is likely to be traumatic and harmful.
The trial court found that Michael was not without his faults, but that those faults did not cause the court nearly the concerns it had about Danette. We are mindful that the trial court's custody decision has the effect of separating the custody of R.W. and his older half-brother, N.L. However, we have held that the prohibition of separating siblings in the absence of exceptional circumstances does not apply with equal force in child-custody cases where the children are half-siblings. Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000). In this case, the testimony reflected that R.W. and N.L. will still live in the same neighborhood, and Michael expressed the intent that they continue to spend time together.
Kerby v. Kerby, 31 Ark. App. 260, 264, 792 S.W.2d 364, 366 (1990) (citing Riddle v. Riddle, 28 Ark. App. 344, 775 S.W.2d 513 (1989)). Harrison v. Harrison, 102 Ark. App. 131, 137, 287 S.W.3d 601, 606 (citing Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000)). Kerby, 31 Ark. App. at 265, 792 S.W.2d at 366 (citing Johnson v. Arledge, 258 Ark. 608, 527 S.W.2d 917 (1975)).
However, while she concedes that Aaron's job and marriage may be “considered globally” with other factors, they do not “carry enough weight” to justify a change of custody. Sarah also argues that the trial court should have given B.M.'s relationship with her half-siblings “more weight” given the fact the three children were raised together. While she acknowledges that in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 72 Ark.App. 15, 32 S.W.3d 41 (2000), this court held that keeping siblings together cannot be the sole reason for a custody decision, and that in Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000), we said that the prohibition against separating siblings absent exceptional circumstances does not apply with equal force to half-siblings, she nonetheless argues that “the effect of tearing a family apart must carry some weight in this case.” We find this argument unconvincing.
Custody is not awarded to reward or punish either parent. Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000). The paramount concern in a custody determination is the best interest of the child; all other considerations are secondary. Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002).
Custody is not awarded to reward or punish either parent. Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000). The paramount concern in a custody determination is the best interest of the child; all other considerations are secondary. Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002).