In its ruling granting the motion, the court reasoned that "it was too late, that the judgment had not been executed, and that . . . the defendant purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value. The joint tenancy now could not be severed." The court relied on Eastern Shore Building and Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367 (1969), which the court described as standing "for the proposition that a joint tenancy may not be severed when the property is sold before a judgment is executed."

Failing that, some form of joint action by the husband and wife is necessary in order to achieve a severance.See, e.g., Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 434 A.2d 1015 (1981); East. Shore v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 532, 253 A.2d 367, 371 (1969); Schilbach v. Schilbach, 171 Md. 405, 407-08, 189 A. 432, 433-34 (1937). In East. Shore Judge Barnes said for the Court:

In Eastern Shore Bldg. and Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, we addressed the question of whether a joint tenancy must be severed in order for a lien to attach to the interest of an individual joint tenant. 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367 (1969). In Eastern Shore, a judgment was entered against one joint tenant's interest in real property to satisfy a judgment against him for defaulting on a bank loan.

For example, in Picking v. Yates, 265 Md. 1, 288 A.2d 146 (1972), the Court said: "No principle is better established in our law than that tenants by the entirety, because, unlike joint tenants, they hold per tout et non per my, must act together to sell their property, Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367 (1969); to subject it to any interest or encumbrance, Lissau v. Smith, 215 Md. 538, 138 A.2d 381 (1958), or to lease it, Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163 (1932). Similarly, both spouses must join in an action for damages to property which they own by the entirety, 2 Poe, Pleading and Practice § 428, at 18 (6th ed. 1970) not only because of the way title is held, but because Maryland may require on motion by a defendant that even tenants in common be joined as plaintiffs in an action ex delicto for damage to real property, Gent v. Lynch, 23 Md. 58, 64 (1865).

Szelenyi v. Miller (Me. 1989) 564 A.2d 768, 770, states that the "end result" of execution — presumably the change of title resulting from a sale — is a severance of the joint tenancy. In Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset (1969) 253 Md. 525 [ 253 A.2d 367, 370], the court stated that "the mere entry of a judgment against one of the joint tenants does not destroy any of the four unities of interest, title, time and possession and hence, until there is an execution on the judgment which will destroy one or more of these unities, there is no severance of the joint tenancy." Although the court did not elaborate on the nature of the execution proceedings under Maryland law, the distinction between acts which interfere with the rights of the joint tenants and those which do not is clearly made.

The Court said: "No principle is better established in our law than that tenants by the entirety, because, unlike joint tenants, they hold per tout et non per my, [by the whole, and not by the moiety] must act together to sell their property, Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367 (1969); to subject it to any interest or encumbrance, Lissau v. Smith, 215 Md. 538, 138 A.2d 381 (1958), or to lease it, Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163 (1932). Similarly, both spouses must join in an action for damages to property which they own by the entirety, 2 Poe, Pleading and Practice § 428, at 18 (6th ed. 1970). . . .

Gresham also argues that the district court incorrectly credited him with assets that are "not . . . available to him and . . . may never be available to him in an individual capacity" in assessing his "income, earning capacity, and financial resources" under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(1), as a result of the court's misunderstanding of tenancy by the entirety under Maryland law. Appellant's Br. at 14. Gresham notes that under Maryland law, a judgment creditor of one spouse may not reach property held under a tenancy by the entirety, whether or not the property is liquidated, see, e.g., Arbesman v. winer, 298 Md. 282, 468 A.2d 633, 636 (1983), because proceeds from a consensual sale of tenancy by the entirety property continue to be held under that estate, see Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367, 371 (1969). He contends that the district court "apparently believed that the sale of the Gresham home would destroy the tenants by the entireties status and permit the Government to execute its lien upon [his] share of any sale proceeds."

Thus, Angeles may recover from the trustee under this theory, because a judgment lien creditor in Maryland takes subject to equitable charges against the debtor. Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367, 370 (1969). IV.

Veen has no standing to seek the release of his mother's property because he holds no interest in that property; third parties (i.e., parties other than the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor) may only seek the release of property under levy when they "claim[] an interest" in it. Md. Rule 2-643(e). As for the other three vehicles, there is no justification for releasing the levies on any of them. Veen is correct that a judgment creditor can only levy on an interest in property actually held by the judgment debtor (i.e., Orteck), which would exclude an interest held by Veen. See, e.g., Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 530 (1969) ("A judgment creditor stands in the place of his debtor, and he can only take the property of his debtor, subject to the equitable charges to which it was liable in the hands of the debtor, at the time of the rendition of the judgment." (quotations omitted)).

Under Maryland law, as a general rule, a judgment creditor may not levy against a third-party's property in order to satisfy a money judgment against a judgment debtor. See Eastern Shore Bldg. Loan Corp. v. Bank of Somerset, 253 Md. 525, 253 A.2d 367, 369 (1969) ("[T]he lien of the judgment only attaches to the interest in land owned or held by the judgment debtor, himself, and is subject to the limitations, legal or equitable, to which that interest is subject at the time of the entry of the judgment.") In order to levy against a third-party's property, the judgment creditor must prove that the property of a third-party can be seized because: (1) the third-party is an agent, alter ego, or instrumentality of the judgment debtor; (2) the third-party is a garnishee of the judgment debtor; or (3) there was a conveyance of property between the judgment debtor and the third-party which was motivated by the intent to defrauding creditors.