As the Court has explained, however, Plaintiff's negligence claim merges into his strict liability claim, and “[c]ontributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim.” E. Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1118–19 (D.C.1990); see also Warner, 654 A.2d at 1275 n. 7. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to contributory negligence is also denied. B. Expert Testimony

A duty to indemnify may arise from an express contract provision or, in the absence of a contract, where indemnification is required to prevent injustice. East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. 1990). Where there is no express contract provision, an obligation to indemnify may be implied in fact on an implied contract theory or implied in law in order to achieve equitable results.

“In ‘implied in law,’ or ‘equitable’ indemnity, ‘the obligation is based on variations in the relative degrees of fault of joint tortfeasors, and the assumption that when the parties are not in pari delicto, the traditional view that no wrongdoer may recover from another may compel inequitable and harsh results.’ ” Id. (quoting E. Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1127 n. 20 (D.C.1990)). “A duty to indemnify may also be implied ‘out of a relationship between the parties,’ to prevent a result ‘which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory.’ ” Id. (quoting Myco, 565 A.2d at 297).

“[P]revious decisions [of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals] indicate that fact-intensive issues concerning the existence of a duty to warn and whether the warning was sufficiently specific to discharge the duty are generally reserved for the jury and may be resolved as a matter of law only when the evidence would not permit differences of opinion by reasonable jurors.” East Penn Mfg. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C.1990). Ansaldo argues that it did not have a duty to warn because it was merely the seller of a component part.

"[P]revious decisions [of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals] indicate that fact-intensive issues concerning the existence of a duty to warn and whether the warning was sufficiently specific to discharge the duty are generally reserved for the jury and may be resolved as a matter of law only when the evidence would not permit differences of opinion by reasonable jurors." East Penn. Mfg. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1115 (D.C. 1990). Ansaldo argues that it did not have a duty to warn because it was merely the seller of a component part.

Bloxom, 512 So.2d at 850-51. In East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 1990), the District of Columbia court again applied a presumption that an adequate warning would have been read and heeded even though the plaintiff in that case, a garage employee injured by an exploding car battery, had not himself read the warnings on the product. The court first concluded that the adequacy of a warning was a jury question, Pineda, 578 A.2d at 1122.

Indemnity is a shifting of responsibility from the shoulders of one person to another; and the duty to indemnify has been recognized in cases where the equities have supported it. A court's view of the equities may have been based on the relation of the parties to one another, and the consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a significant difference in the kind or quality of their conduct.R. G. Orthopedic Appliances, supra, 596 A.2d at 545 (quoting East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1128 n. 20 (1990) (quoting W. PROSSER R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 51 at 344 (1984))). Indemnity is a form of restitution.

To recover under a theory of strict liability, a plaintiff must show that the product entered the stream of commerce with a design or manufacturing defect rendering it unreasonably dangerous. See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1118 (D.C. 1990). In this context,

So it is that while indeed a right to indemnity may extend to those personally at fault, it is granted in such circumstances normally only where "a duty to indemnify may . . . be implied 'out of a relationship between the parties,' to prevent a result 'which is regarded as unjust or unsatisfactory.'" East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. 1990), quoting from Myco, supra note 6, 565 A.2d at 297. As noted in Myco, this concept in the main "is based on the well-established theory that if one [tortfeasor] breaches a duty owed to another and the breach causes injury, the former should compensate the latter."

In the absence of an express contractual duty to indemnify, a right to indemnity exists where a duty to indemnify may be implied out of a relationship between the parties to prevent a result which is unjust. East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1126 (D.C. 1990); accord Nat'l Health Labs., 596 A.2d at 558. The specific issue in this case is whether an employer — who has already paid worker's compensation to an employee for an on-the-job accident — can be held liable to indemnify a third party who has been sued by the same employee for the same accident.